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FOREWORD
DEAR READERS,
The Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) is pleased to publish The Landscape 
for Impact Investing in South Asia, in partnership with Dalberg Global Development 
Advisors and with support from UK aid from the UK Government through 
the Department for International Development’s Impact Programme. The first 
regional market landscape report developed by the GIIN, this report provides a 
comprehensive overview of the impact investing industry in South Asia, focusing 
on the countries of Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
Through this research, and additional upcoming regional landscaping studies, the 
GIIN aims to deepen our understanding of investor opportunities at a country-
specific level. 
The impact investing industry is relatively young, and so the degree of market 
development varies from one country to the next. This variation is present in South 
Asia, one of the least developed yet most populous regions in the world—a region 
with significant potential for impact investing. If we are to accelerate impact investing 
in South Asia, an understanding of the current state of the market is critical in 
identifying opportunities for and challenges to deploying impact capital and growing 
the industry.
Through our partnership with Dalberg, a firm with a strong track record in global 
development and investment research, we were able to conduct a detailed analysis 
of capital flows and the current state of impact investing in South Asia. In addition 
to examining the activities of various impact investors and impact enterprises, the 
full report highlights the role of key industry actors such as government bodies, 
investment advisors, incubators, and accelerators.
Looking forward, we are encouraged by clear areas of opportunity, such as the 
enormous potential market for affordable products and services to meet the needs of 
“base of the pyramid” populations. There is an undeniable need for improved access 
to quality housing, healthcare, education, financial services, and energy in South Asia, 
warranting continued exploration and increased activity in the impact investment 
market. 
We hope this report will accelerate interest, innovation, and investment in the region. 
Ultimately, this research is intended to inform investors currently deploying capital in 
the region, and spark further interest from those considering investing in the region.
We look forward to continued work with our network in future landscaping reports, 
and thank readers of this report for their interest and support.
Sincerely,
Amit Bouri
CEO, The Global Impact Investing Network
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OVERVIEW AND CURRENT 
STATE OF THE MARKET
This extensive report aims to provide a “state of the market” landscape analysis of 
the impact investing industry in six countries across South Asia—Bangladesh, India, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.1 Impact investments, as defined by the 
Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), are investments that intentionally seek to 
generate social and/or environmental impact alongside a financial return. In addition, 
the report captures other activity that may be relevant for impact investors, such as 
investments at the base of the economic pyramid that may lack an explicit intention 
for positive impact. 
Overall, although the market activity and dynamics of impact investing differ among 
the countries under study, the countries do share some common trends and areas of 
opportunity, as well as common challenges to be mitigated.
India is the largest and most active impact investing market in the region (see Figure 
1), benefiting from a broad range of investor and entrepreneur experience with 
impact investing. To date development finance institutions (DFIs) have deployed 
USD 5 billion while other impact investors have deployed USD 437 million. However, 
there is still room for growth in several areas, such as the development and use of a 
wider range of instruments, gap filling in early-stage investing, and the development 
of strategic and consistent impact measurement practices. 
FIGURE 1B: KNOWN CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY  
NON-DFI IMPACT INVESTORS, USD MILLIONS
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FIGURE 1A: KNOWN CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY DFIS, 
USD MILLIONS
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Source: Dalberg analysis. Notes: Figures represent aggregate capital deployed from 2004-2014. The majority of the capital represented here was 
deployed between 2009 and 2014. This is due in part to the limited availability of data for 2004-2009.
1 Chapters on Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan as well as an introductory section (“Setting the Scene”) 
were published in December 2014 along with this Executive Summary.
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After India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are the most active countries for impact 
investing in the region. Non-DFI impact investors have deployed USD 162 million 
and USD 121 million in Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively. DFIs, for their part, 
have deployed USD 1.8 billion and USD 834 million. In Pakistan, while political 
instability and terrorism are major concerns for many foreign investors, the domestic 
business community remains largely undeterred by these factors. Rather, domestic 
investors and fund managers in Pakistan have demonstrated optimism about the 
industry, given the large domestic market, relatively favorable regulatory environment, 
strong history of entrepreneurial activity, and interest from some foreign providers 
of impact capital. In Bangladesh, market potential (based on GDP and large 
population), and a long-standing presence of development finance institutions (DFIs) 
are key facilitators of impact investment.
Myanmar and Sri Lanka are two of the fastest growing economies in the region, and 
impact investors considered in this study have shown a strong interest in these two 
countries. In Myanmar, while only USD 12 million has been deployed to date, a further 
USD 109 million has been committed by various investors for deployment in the 
next two to four years. Sri Lanka offers a relatively favorable regulatory environment 
for investors. However, in both these countries, small overall market sizes and gaps 
in enterprise capacity pose challenges for investors. Still, over USD 100 million has 
been deployed to date by non-DFI impact investors in Sri Lanka and a further USD 
386 million has been deployed by DFIs, demonstrating the potential for capital flows 
across the region if the market climates are investment-friendly.
In Nepal, despite strong macroeconomic growth trends and recent improvements 
in the investment climate, there has been relatively little impact investing activity (as 
well as little overall investing activity). Nevertheless, there has been some growth and 
impact investor interest in certain economic sectors such as hydropower and tourism. 
In addition, approximately USD 54 million has been raised or committed by DFIs and 
funds; however, this money has not yet been deployed.
Roughly a dozen DFIs have deployed capital in each of India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, 
while a smaller number have been active in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar. Across 
the region, most (65-95%) of the impact capital currently originates from DFIs and is 
then deployed either directly into enterprises and projects or through funds of varying 
sizes. DFIs’ role as a dominant capital provider puts them in a position to drive trends 
in investment practice and impact measurement. In some countries, they also play a 
role in influencing the policies and the regulatory environment for investment. 
There are also many impact investment funds active across countries in the region. 
Most impact funds have a multi-geographic focus, including not just multiple 
countries in the region but a variety of countries worldwide. Bangladesh and India are 
the only countries with a handful (three or more) of country-specific impact funds 
with deployed capital. Five country-specific impact funds have been established 
in Nepal; however, only one of these has currently deployed capital (as of 2014). 
Overall, there are roughly 50 impact investment funds active in India, 11 in Sri Lanka, 
nine in Bangladesh and seven in Pakistan. These funds raise capital from a variety 
of sources, including DFIs, institutional investors (pension funds and insurance 
companies), family offices, high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs), commercial banks, 
and foundations. Some family offices, HNWIs, and foundations are also active in 
making direct impact investments.
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There are also several funds, banks, and family offices/HNWIs active in South Asia 
that are making investments on the periphery of impact investing—for instance, those 
who invest in enterprises providing goods, services, or employment to populations at 
the base of the economic pyramid (BoP), but without explicit impact intent.2 These 
include local wealthy families and individuals who often provide start-up financing, 
particularly to entrepreneurs within their family or social networks. Many local 
commercial banks, meanwhile, provide debt financing to SMEs (often mandated by 
policy) at the behest of DFIs. 
Impact investors in the region target their investments in a number of 
ways, including one or both of the following:
1. by the intention of the enterprise to create impact (“impact 
enterprises”—see side bar for definition);
2. by the potential of the enterprise to create impact (regardless of 
whether it explicitly intends to do so), e.g., investing in SMEs that 
can provide local employment; investing in enterprises in sectors 
the investor considers inherently impactful, such as health and 
education; or investing in high-growth sectors with job creation 
potential, such as manufacturing.
Thus far, across the region, only a relatively small proportion of the 
total capital deployed by impact investors has been directed at impact 
2 In this report, we use “base of the pyramid (BoP)” as a general term to refer to poor or low-income 
populations, with no specific threshold in terms of income level.
For this study, we define impact 
enterprises as those that
• have articulated a core 
objective to generate positive 
social or environmental 
impact (as a part of their 
operating model rather than 
an ancillary activity); and
• seek to grow to financial 
viability and sustainability
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF IMPACT FUNDS AND DFIS ACTIVE IN SOUTH ASIA
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 Source: Dalberg analysis. Notes: Nepal has five country-specific impact funds; however, only one of these has currently deployed capital.
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enterprises, perhaps due to the small investment sizes required (along with relatively high 
transaction costs), the limited pipeline of the investment-ready impact enterprises, and the 
fact that self-defining as an “impact enterprise” is itself an emerging practice.
OPPORTUNITIES
SECTORS
The markets in South Asia offer a diverse array of investment opportunities in different 
sectors. Across the region as a whole, the largest amounts of capital have been deployed in 
the sectors of energy, financial services (including microfinance), and manufacturing, and 
these remain active sectors for investment. There is notable variation between the sectors 
targeted by DFIs and those targeted by other impact investors, with the former preferring 
sectors that are able to absorb large investments, while the latter are more readily able to 
target impact enterprises. For instance, DFI energy investments have focused on large scale 
infrastructure projects, whereas energy investments by other impact investors have supported 
smaller, off-grid technologies. Similarly, DFI investments in financial services have targeted 
bigger banks, while financial services investments by other impact investors have focused 
more on microfinance institutions.
There is also growing interest among impact investors in other sectors such as agro-business, 
health, and information and communication technology (ICT), and in businesses providing 
basic goods and services to the base-of-the-pyramid (BoP) consumers.
FIGURE 3A: KNOWN CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY DFIS, USD MILLIONS FIGURE 3B: KNOWN CAPITAL DEPLOYED  
BY NON-DFI IMPACT INVESTORS, USD MILLIONS
Source: Dalberg analysis. Note: Figures includes the overall totals across all six countries considered in this study.
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TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF KEY IMPACT INVESTING SECTORS IN SOUTH ASIA
India
Most impact capital has been deployed in the manufacturing, financial services, and energy 
(both renewable and non-renewable) sectors, and a sizeable number of deals have been in 
other sectors such as education and healthcare. Funds are shifting toward a less opportunistic 
and more hypothesis-driven approach to selection; in this new approach, these funds start with 
the identification of a problem in a given sector, then identify a potential solution (hypothesis), 
and subsequently seek organizations that contribute to this solution. 
Pakistan
Energy, financial services (microfinance institutions (MFIs) and others), and manufacturing 
have been the most attractive sectors to date. Impact investors see high potential in businesses 
serving the large domestic consumer base. Angel investors on the periphery of impact 
investing are particularly drawn to ICT-related investment targets. 
Bangladesh
Most impact capital has been deployed in growing sectors such as ICT, energy, and 
manufacturing, particularly as many investors target job creation as their main impact objective 
and see these sectors as having the best potential to meet this core goal.
Sri Lanka
Microfinance and other financial services have drawn the bulk of impact capital. Tourism and 
hospitality have been attractive to investors as well. There is a growing interest in investment in 
BoP-focused enterprises in the ICT, energy, health, and technology sectors. 
Nepal
Transportation and tourism have drawn the largest proportion of impact capital to date—these 
sectors are attractive because they can absorb large ticket-size investments. For the future, 
impact investors are excited about opportunities in hydropower and tourism, which have been 
growing and are expected to continue to do so.
Myanmar
To date, most impact capital has been deployed in real estate due to a dearth of investible 
opportunities in other sectors. There is a strong interest among impact investors in financial 
inclusion for future investments.
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PRODUCT AND INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT 
Across the region, the majority of impact capital deployed by DFIs has been through 
debt instruments. On the other hand, the majority of capital deployed by other 
impact investors has been through equity. DFIs prefer debt for several reasons, 
including a lower risk appetite (given that they are investing taxpayer money), a 
lower level of due diligence required as compared to making equity investments, and 
less active management of the investment when compared with equity investments. 
In some countries, regulations can be unclear and restrictive regarding equity, 
further driving the preference for debt. Although interest exists in some countries 
around exploring new instruments such as quasi-equity, thus far, there has been little 
experience with these alternatives.
FIGURE 4B: KNOWN CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY  
NON-DFI IMPACT INVESTORS, USD MILLIONS
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FIGURE4A: KNOWN CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY DFIS, 
USD MILLIONS
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Opportunities for product and instrument development vary across the region, as 
detailed in the table below. 
TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF MIX OF INSTRUMENT USE IN IMPACT INVESTING IN SOUTH ASIA
India
Debt is the most common instrument in terms of the amount of capital, particularly because the 
primary source of overall capital is DFIs, who prefer debt instruments. However, DFIs indicate a 
growing preference for equity instruments in order to establish more integrated partnerships with 
their investees. Foreign funds are prohibited from investing in debt and, as a result, most of the capital 
from impact funds is deployed through equity instruments. Consequently, small domestic funds are 
emerging to fulfill the need for early-stage debt.
Pakistan
Most impact capital has been deployed through debt driven by DFI investors. Interest in quasi-equity 
has been articulated by impact investors, but thus far, there haven’t been any deals. The interest 
derives from the perceived difficulty of exiting pure equity investments (there have been no impact 
equity exits in Pakistan to date). 
Bangladesh
Most impact capital has been deployed through debt, with which both investors and entrepreneurs 
tend to have greater familiarity and comfort. Regulatory restrictions on equity investments (e.g., a 
three-year lock-in after public listing and lack of certain protections for investors and investees) also 
fuel the preference for debt.
Sri Lanka
Debt accounts for a majority of impact capital deployed, with early-stage investments tending toward 
equity. Impact investors have also provided some small to mid-sized guarantees to support access to 
finance for SMEs and non-bank microfinance institutions. 
Nepal
Debt is preferred, due in large part to the lack of a developed regulatory framework for equity. 
However, equity is being tested in small amounts by investors that are not legally registered as lending 
institutions and therefore, are not allowed to provide debt.
Myanmar
Debt is preferred among both current and future impact investors, again driven by the fact that most 
of the capital is deployed by DFIs. Foreign investors are prohibited from debt transactions, so they will 
have to invest through equity or other instruments as they enter the market.
 
Direct investments by DFIs tend to target mature companies, as DFIs prefer relatively 
large deal sizes that only mature companies are able to absorb. Investments in more 
mature companies are relatively easy because risk is mitigated by operating and 
financial histories and transaction costs are more easily accommodated by large deals. 
On the other hand, smaller investments in early-stage companies (start-ups as well as 
companies in early growth phases) are challenging and have been more limited to 
date. Thus, most DFI investments have been in the USD 10-50 million range, with a 
handful even above USD 50 million. In contrast, most investments by non-DFI 
investors have been below USD 1 million, and thus typically into growth and venture 
stage organizations.
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FIGURE 5: IMPACT INVESTMENTS BY SIZE OF DEAL IN SOUTH ASIA
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CHALLENGES
In taking advantage of these opportunities, investors will need to bear in mind 
several challenges. While these challenges do not pose insurmountable obstacles to 
impact investing in the region, they need to be understood by investors and other 
stakeholders so that they can be mitigated, circumvented, or resolved. Key barriers 
include regulatory issues, difficulties in deal sourcing, and issues of scale in terms of 
portfolios and deal sizes.
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS
Challenges in navigating regulatory environments—affecting both impact and 
conventional investors—are a common theme across countries, although there 
is some variation by country. These challenges tend to be related to complexity, 
variability, inefficiency, and restrictiveness. For example, in India, relevant laws and 
policies have repeatedly changed over the past few years. Currently, there are also 
restrictions on the use of various instruments: foreign investors cannot make pure 
debt investments, and certain structured products are not sanctioned by the Reserve 
Bank of India (e.g., non-convertible preferred shares). Entrepreneurs also face barriers 
in establishing and scaling businesses, as bureaucratic processes add to the transaction 
costs and time required to establish a business and to maintain compliance with 
regulations during growth phases.
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In Bangladesh, foreign equity investors face the dual challenge of regulations related 
to a) local companies accepting foreign capital (which requires separate registration) 
and b) establishing a locally domiciled fund (through a lengthy and complex process). 
In addition, there are unclear or unfavorable regulations around public offerings 
(e.g., a three-year lock-in period). Nepal’s environment is characterized by general 
uncertainty as the country does not currently have a constitution, and regulations for 
equity (a new instrument in the country) have not yet been defined. In Myanmar, the 
key regulatory constraints include complex and opaque screening and investment 
approval mechanisms, regulations that prohibit most foreign investors from debt 
lending, and complicated separate laws governing foreign and domestic investment. 
Although not completely devoid of challenges, Sri Lanka’s and Pakistan’s regulatory 
environments are relatively favorable for investment and enterprise.
TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF CONSTRAINTS BY INVESTMENT STAGE
Entry into 
Country
Pipeline  
Develop-
ment
Screening 
and Due 
Diligence
Structuring 
for  
Investment
Managing 
Investment/ 
Follow-up Exit
Bangladesh
India
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Least severe Most Severe
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DEAL SOURCING
Sourcing deals that meet various investor requirements of impact potential, risk, 
return, and size of investment is challenging. Impact capital across the region tends 
to be concentrated in certain sectors (particularly energy and microfinance) and 
stages of business (growth stage for funds and mature companies for DFIs). There is 
also a need to bring less-exposed enterprises into the fold in a number of countries. 
Even in India, where formal networks of entrepreneurs exist, it is difficult to find 
enterprises that are not a part of these networks. Additionally, in many countries 
studied, there is a gap between investor and investee expectations. This is due in part 
to the entrepreneurs’ limited comfort and familiarity with investment concepts such as 
ownership, equity, and valuation.
SCALE
Many investors face scale issues related to small market sizes (particularly in Sri 
Lanka and Nepal) and to small enterprise sizes across the region. Therefore, there 
is a need for vehicles to deploy smaller sums of capital, particularly in early-stage 
deals. However, funds seeking DFI investment often need to establish larger funds 
that deploy in larger ticket sizes (e.g., more than USD 1 million). This is because DFIs 
often have minimum investment sizes (e.g., USD 20 million) plus a requirement that 
their stake be no more than a certain percentage of total capital in the fund (e.g., 
25-30%). This also presents a challenge for fund managers to raise enough matching 
capital to secure the DFI anchor investment. 
Constraints vary by country and by stage of investment process, reflecting the 
differing investment environments and enterprise landscapes of the countries in the 
region. For example, while entry (e.g., establishing a fund or presence in the country) 
is a challenge in Myanmar and Nepal due to regulatory and fundraising issues, in 
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, the more severe challenges come at the later stages 
of the process such as due diligence, deal structuring, and exit. Table 3 illustrates this 
variation, and details on these constraints can be found in the country chapters. 
REPORT STRUCTURE
In the chapters that follow, readers will find greater depth and detail on the current 
state of and future opportunities for impact investing in each of the six countries in 
this study. Each chapter includes sections on the general country context, the supply 
of impact investing capital, the demand for capital from potential investees, and the 
ecosystem that supports the actors involved in impact investing. We hope that this 
information proves useful for both investors already active in the region and potential 
investors currently scoping new opportunities. As the country chapters show, the 
region is diverse and full of potential for making sound investments that can both 
generate a financial return and address a host of social and environmental issues.

INTRODUCTION
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SETTING THE SCENE
Introduction and objectives
In recent years, impact investing has gained prominence on the global stage as an 
approach to deploying capital with social/environmental goals as well as financial 
return objectives. Deployed in both developing and developed markets, impact 
investments are made across a range of sectors and asset classes. 
South Asia* is home to more than 1.6 billion people and has 
experienced significant economic growth over the last decade. 
However, this rapid growth, while changing some economies 
dramatically, has been uneven between and within countries; 
about a quarter of the region’s population continues to live on 
less than USD 1.25 per day.3 Nonetheless, the region presents 
enormous opportunities as a large market with a significant share 
of its population being young and potentially economically 
active; approximately 30%4 of the population is currently 
under the age of 15, creating a future demographic bulge that 
presents an opportunity to develop human capital and nurture 
entrepreneurship. 
Within South Asia, we see enormous variation between countries 
in terms of population size, economic growth and market maturity, 
entrepreneurial activity, and indeed, investing activity (both 
impact and conventional). The impact investing model is most 
well established in India, with pioneers such as Aavishkaar and 
Acumen active since the early 2000s. The industry has grown 
dramatically with almost 50 funds now active in the market, a huge 
range of impact enterprise models of varying scales and across 
many sectors, and a vibrant and robust ecosystem to support these 
actors. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka also have markets that are sizeable in their 
own right, while investors are actively thinking about opportunities being presented 
in Nepal and Myanmar—two countries going through fundamental political and 
economic transformations.
With the population of India at 1.2 billion in 2012, and the additional combined 
populations of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka at close to 450 
million people, South Asia represents an enormous potential market for products and 
services. South Asia also presents a particular set of needs and opportunities for the 
so-called base of the pyramid (BoP) populations5 who largely lack access to quality 
3 Weighted average calculated with the latest country data (2010–2012) from World Bank Development 
Indicators; Myanmar figures are not included in the weighted average.
4 Weighted average calculated with the latest country data (2013) from World Bank Development 
Indicators.
5 In this report, we use “base of the pyramid (BoP)” as a general term to refer to poor or low-income 
populations, with no specific threshold in terms of income level.
*South Asia, for the purposes of this 
study, includes
• Bangladesh
• India
• Myanmar
• Nepal
• Pakistan
• Sri Lanka
Map is based on UN map.  
Source: UN Cartographic Section.
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social services, finance, energy, and infrastructure as well as to affordable consumer 
products. The opportunity for impact through the deployment of capital into 
organizations and enterprises that increase incomes, create jobs, and provide access 
to essential services is significant, and the status of the impact investing industries in 
these countries is worthy of attention.
The objective of this study is to develop an understanding of the status of the impact 
investing markets in these countries, as a critical input to future investments and 
engagement to build and grow these markets. The key themes explored include the 
current status and trends in terms of the types of active investors, capital deployment, 
opportunities for and challenges to investing, the demand for impact capital, 
challenges to accessing capital and opportunities for enterprise growth, and the 
vibrancy and scale of the supportive ecosystem for the industry.
Defining key terms and concepts
THE SUPPLY SIDE: WHO IS AN IMPACT INVESTOR?
As defined by the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), impact investments are 
“investments made into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention 
to generate social and environmental impact alongside a financial return.”6 
The three key characteristics of an impact investor are as follows:
1. Expectation of a financial return that can range from the return of capital to risk-
adjusted market-rate returns and that can be derived from investments in a range 
of asset classes. Impact investors may also earn fees from the provision of catalytic 
instruments such as guarantees.
2. Intent to generate positive social and/or environmental impact through 
investments. For example, investors may seek to use investments to increase 
access to financial services, education, healthcare, affordable housing, or quality 
employment by underserved populations. Investors may also invest in solutions 
aimed at mitigating the negative effects of climate change and environmental 
degradation.
3. Commitment of the investor to measure the social/environmental performance of 
the underlying investments.
This report focuses significantly on the impact investing landscape in each of the 
six countries covered. Various terms may be used to refer to the impact investing 
landscape, including “impact capital” and “impact funds,” depending on the context. 
For the sake of fluency, the modifier “impact” will be dropped when the context is 
clear.
While the central goal of this study is to map the current landscape of impact 
investing activity in South Asia, there is also significant investment activity on the 
6 For more details, refer to the GIIN website, www.thegiin.org.
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periphery of “impact investing” that is interesting to explore. In particular, we consider 
the following two types of investment activity:
a. Investments in businesses serving BoP populations by investors who have no 
explicit impact intention
b. Investments where there is some intention to have social and/or environmental 
impact, but this impact is assumed to occur as a by-product and is not measured in 
any meaningful way
An analysis of such investment activity is also important for understanding the 
broader opportunity landscape for impact investing in the future. When a section in 
the report focuses specifically on investment activity in this peripheral region, we will 
refer explicitly to such investment activity as “impact-related” investments, clearly 
differentiating them from “impact investing.” (Please note that we are using these 
labels purely for the ease of reference and do not intend the names to imply any 
subjective judgment on the nature of an investor’s investment activity or approach.)
One simplifying feature of this framework is that it is investor-driven rather than 
transaction-driven. In the impact investing market, there is a healthy ongoing debate 
on whether a particular investment should be treated as an “impact investment.” 
Often, this debate centers on the portfolios of DFIs, who tend to be large players, 
and invest across a range of sectors and organization types—from small microfinance 
institutions to large land conservation and real estate projects. Accordingly, while 
some are happy to consider all DFI activity as “impact investing,” others would argue 
that a more considered segmentation needs to be applied to DFI portfolios.
PORTFOLIO SEGMENTATION: THE OPIC APPROACH
A recent announcement by OPIC’s President described their new approach to segmenting their portfolio 
based on impact intention at the investment level, and the rationale for the approach. Recognizing the learning 
from the growth of impact investing that “there are rarely clear, bright lines that distinguish true impact intent 
from investing with impact,” OPIC shared their categorization approach with a view to help inform the ongoing 
debate around how best to define impact investing, as well as to support other agencies as they think through 
their own impact portfolios.
• Development finance: All of OPIC’s financial commitments aim to have a positive 
development impact. By definition, the projects we support are expected to demonstrate 
positive development, social, and financial returns while safeguarding against damage to 
the environment and promoting high-quality job creation.
• High impact sectors: Investments in sectors generally associated with impact investing. 
These sectors face the most difficult challenges in attracting capital: agriculture, education, 
access to finance, housing for the poor, small and medium enterprise finance, healthcare, 
renewable energy, water, and sanitation. Given the far easier investment options, these are 
sectors investors would only engage in out of a deep commitment to impact.
• Impact investing: These investments had an explicit and inherent intent at startup 
to address environmental or social issues, as well as a business model with a structure 
dedicated to achieving both impact and financial returns. To select these transactions, 
projects in impact sectors were first identified, and then project teams were asked to 
identify impact intent at origination, reviewing project sponsor’s intent to generate impact.
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
HIGH IMPACT SECTORS
IMPACT  
INVESTING
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It is an interesting development to note that some DFIs have, indeed, recently begun 
thinking more carefully about their overall portfolios and how these are segmented 
(see boxed note on OPIC, the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation). 
However, these exercises are still early-stage, and it would be premature to begin 
segmenting DFI portfolios (or any investor’s portfolio for that matter) in our own 
research at this stage. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, we have chosen to 
be investor-driven, i.e., to apply a common intentionality standard across an investor’s 
entire portfolio. While we recognize that this may be simplifying, we find that the 
approach does not detract from our ability to conduct detailed analyses of and obtain 
a nuanced understanding of the opportunities and challenges across the countries 
under study.
THE DEMAND SIDE: WHERE IS THE IMPACT CAPITAL GOING?
With impact investing being defined primarily by the intention of the investors, and 
not necessarily the intention or approach of the investees, the types of organizations 
that absorb capital from impact investors vary.
As will be described in the individual country landscapes, we see a different set of 
target enterprises absorbing the impact capital in each country. One subset that is 
important to call out is “impact enterprises.” Impact enterprises (sometimes called 
social enterprises or inclusive businesses) have been variously defined as follows:
• The IFC defines an inclusive business as one that “expands access to goods, 
services, and livelihood opportunities for those at the BoP in commercially viable, 
scalable ways.”7 
• The ADB defines a social enterprise as one meeting the following three key 
criteria: 1) exists primarily to create specific positive social or environmental impact 
(as opposed to ancillary or secondary initiatives, such as a company’s Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) program); 2) adopts a market orientation; and 3) 
focuses on financial sustainability.8 
• The Rockefeller Foundation describes impact enterprises as “enterprises that 
intentionally seek to grow to sustain financial viability, realize increasing social 
impact, and influence the broader system in which they operate.”9 
7 Jenkins, B; Ishikawa, E; Geaneotes, A; Baptista, P; and Masuoka, T, Accelerating inclusive business 
opportunities: Business models that make a difference, Washington, DC: IFC, 2011.
8 Asian Development Bank, Impact investors in Asia: Characteristics and preferences for investing in 
social enterprises in Asia and the Pacific, 2011.
9 Rockefeller Foundation, Innovations in accelerating impact enterprise growth to scale, <http://www.
rockefellerfoundation.org/our-work/current-work/innovation/impact-enterprise>
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Paraphrasing from the above definitions, for this study, we describe impact 
enterprises as enterprises that10 
• have articulated a core objective to generate a positive social or environmental 
impact (i.e., as a part of their operating model rather than an ancillary activity 
as with CSR programs), and
• seek to grow to financial viability and sustainability. 
In more mature impact investing markets such as India, and in the rapidly growing 
markets of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, we see a large number of successful 
impact enterprises; many of these have reached significant scale, making them strong 
investment targets for impact investors. Further, a relatively large volume of impact 
capital in these markets may be directed into such business models. However, in less 
mature markets, where the impact enterprise model is less embedded or where the 
scale is still small, we see the impact capital directed to a broader range of enterprises.
Approach and Methodology
The content and analysis presented in this study are developed from both a review of 
the existing literature and extensive primary data collection as detailed below.
The data and perspectives gathered from both the primary and the secondary 
research were synthesized to arrive at the estimates of the total capital flow, key 
trends, and preferences by sector, instrument, deal size, and growth stage. In specific 
cases where detailed information was missing, we made assumptions on the split of 
capital between sectors or investment categories and, subsequently, validated our 
outputs through expert interviews. All of our assumptions are clearly annotated in the 
corresponding analyses.
The existing literature on impact investing in the region is sparse, except for India, 
for which there is a growing body of research that we have analyzed in depth. 
Consequently, our analysis both builds on the existing literature and outlines where 
our findings differ from the findings of other related studies.
Overall, given the limited volume of the existing research, the research process 
relied heavily on the primary data collection. Three tools were used for primary data 
collection to capture activities and perspectives across the investor, enterprise, and 
ecosystem categories. These tools are as follows:
10 To note, this definition does not represent a perspective articulated by the GIIN across its global 
activities but is developed and adopted for the purposes of this study in order to enable a description and 
discussion within the context of the six countries considered in this study.
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INDIVIDUAL SEMI-STRUCTURED STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS
More than 135 interviews were conducted across the six countries included in this 
study, with investors, entrepreneurs, and other market stakeholders active in or 
scoping the region.
Interviews with investors were used for gathering data on investment portfolios and 
other activities, key trends observed, challenges faced, and opportunities perceived. 
With entrepreneurs, we conducted interviews to understand business models 
and rationale, opportunities for and challenges to growth, sources of finance, and 
perspectives on and preferences for instruments and investors. Within the ecosystem, 
we sought to interview across the range of relevant players, including regulators/
policymakers, professional service providers, business development service providers, 
and incubators/accelerators.
ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTED TO INVESTORS AND 
ENTREPRENEURS
To supplement the interviews described above, a questionnaire was developed for 
distribution and completion online by investors and entrepreneurs with whom it was 
difficult or impractical to schedule individual conversations (n=58). The similarity of 
questions allowed for the collection of both comparable data and supplemental data.
EXPERT ADVISORY GROUPS 
In the final phase of the study, between two and four expert advisors for each country 
under study were convened, and the conversations facilitated the sharing of emerging 
findings, collection of feedback, and validation of perspectives. Expert advisors were 
selected from previous interactions for their broad view on the market and awareness 
of key actors and activities, as well as for a balance of perspectives across the supply, 
demand, and ecosystem segments.
BANGLADESH
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COUNTRY CONTEXT
Overview
Bangladesh has the third most active impact investing market in South Asia 
after India and Pakistan. DFIs have deployed over USD 830 million to date, 
while other impact investors have deployed USD 120 million. A number of 
impact investors are entering South Asia’s third-largest economy, encouraged by 
high economic growth, a large potential market, and an addressable social need. 
Given that the impact investing industry is still in its early stages, impact investors are 
pursuing impact through investments in businesses with an impact intent as well as in 
companies that operate in sectors that investors believe make valuable contributions 
to the economy and generate jobs. While these trends in capital flow and investor 
activity are exciting and signal a positive trend, significant challenges remain to grow 
the industry to its full potential.
Despite many years of instability, violence, and civil unrest ever since 
Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, investors express a belief that the political 
environment is relatively stable at present. After achieving independence from 
Pakistan (then called West Pakistan) in 1971, Bangladesh underwent a number of 
military coups until the final military general in power stepped down in 1990 amid 
civil unrest. The country has since made a transition toward democracy. While the 
political system continues to run predictably, there has been widespread political and 
religious violence since the early 1990s. Most recently, massive protests in response 
to perceived leniency toward a political figure convicted for war crimes set off riots 
in Dhaka that soon spread to other cities, and in 2013, labor strikes effectively shut 
down businesses in the capital. However, there is a widespread belief among local 
and foreign investors that the country is stable and political transitions will continue to 
occur peacefully and on schedule due in large part to the generally positive long-term 
trends in economic growth, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, and the stock 
market growth, despite the decades of political turmoil and civil unrest. In short, the 
expectation is that business will continue as usual.
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FIGURE 1: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN BANGLADESH’S HISTORY
Source: BBC News (2014). Bangladesh profile—Timeline
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GDP growth and drivers of FDI 
Investors express strong optimism about prospects in Bangladesh, given the 
country’s strong, growing, and diversifying economy and appealing demographic. 
In 2013, GDP topped USD 325 billion (PPP, current international dollars), making it 
the third-largest economy in South Asia.11 Growth has averaged 8% annually in the 
last decade (through 2013) and is forecasted to continue increasing at 9% annually 
through 2016.12 
FIGURE 2: HISTORICAL AND FORECASTED GDP GROWTH (PPP, CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR BILLIONS) 
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 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Data 2014; Notes: 1990-2012 actual, 2013 estimated, 2014-2016 forecasted as of June 30, 2014
This growth has been primarily spurred by a diversification of the economy 
within the industry and the service sectors. While agriculture, industry,13 and 
services have all grown in absolute terms, agriculture has shrunk in terms of the 
percentage of value added to the GDP, from 26% of GDP in 1995 to 18% in 2012.14 
A strong services sector and growing industry sector have outpaced growth in the 
agriculture sector, with the expansion and diversification of the sub-sectors within 
each sector. Most notably, manufacturing, which is captured in the industry sector, 
is a booming segment, due to a large and expanding textile and garment industry. 
Manufacturing alone contributed 18% to the GDP in 2012, up from 15% in 1995.15  
11 IMF World Economic Outlook Data 2014.
12 IMF World Economic Outlook Data 2014.
13 Industry defined by the United Nations’ International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities, Rev.3 (ISIC Rev 3) as mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas.
14 World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
15 World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
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FIGURE 3: SECTOR GROWTH AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP (PPP CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR BILLIONS) 
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Additionally, Bangladesh’s large population and shifting demographics make 
the country appealing to investors as both a sizeable labor market and a large 
potential consumer market. Bangladesh is the eighth most populous country 
in the world with a total population of 157 million.16 The population is relatively 
young—89% of the people are under the age of 54 years, and 45% are under the 
age of 24 years.17 For investors, Bangladesh’s large young population translates into 
a large potential labor market. There were more than 76 million economically active 
people as of 2012,18 and nearly 50 million more will be added in the next decade. Yet, 
despite significant economic growth in labor-intensive sectors (like manufacturing 
and agriculture), unemployment remains high, particularly among the youth. As of 
2012, 9.3% of the females and 8.6% of the males between 15 and 24 years of age were 
unemployed; these figures have remained more or less constant since the turn of the 
century.19  
16  World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
17  CIA World Fact Book.
18  ILO Key Indicators of the Labor Market Database.
19  ILO Key Indicators of the Labor Market Database.
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Recent investor optimism has led to sharp increases in FDI inflows since 2009, 
following a decade of instability, but concerns around infrastructure and policy 
implementation remain.20 FDI inflows have increased by 17% since 2009 (Figure 
4). While foreign investors are responding positively to low labor costs and an 
increasingly investment-friendly climate shaped by recent policy changes, they 
have also been discouraged by continuing regulatory uncertainty, which reduces 
the country’s appeal as an investment destination. Investors also cite poor physical 
infrastructure as a critical limitation and express disillusionment with the actual 
implementation of investment-friendly policies and the capacity of bodies responsible 
for enforcing these policies.21 
FIGURE 4: FDI NET INFLOWS IN CURRENT USD MILLIONS
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Bangladesh’s capital markets are also growing, driven primarily by a developing 
domestic investment culture. Market capitalization has grown fifteen-fold since 
2000.22 Further, there are currently 533 listed companies in the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(Figure 5). Following a decade of growth in the stock market averaging about 31% per 
year from 2000 to 2010, there was a sharp decline in 2011 when capital flowed back 
toward the developed markets recovering from the 2008 financial crisis. Further drops 
followed in October and November of the same year, allegedly due to malpractice 
in the markets, causing public protests and sit-ins by small investors. The market has 
since recovered, but domestic investors report considerably increased wariness.
20  World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
21  Research Center on Development and International Relations (2010). A Study of Major Determinants 
and Hindrances of FDI inflow in Bangladesh.
22  World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
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FIGURE 5: MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF LISTED COMPANIES IN USD MILLIONS
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Despite this growth, investment, and optimism, 43% of Bangladesh’s population 
lives below the poverty line of USD 1.25 per day,23 although the poverty 
headcount ratio is on a strong downward trend. Even with a strong and growing 
GDP, the country has the second-lowest GDP per capita in the region (USD 752, 
in current USD). For impact investors, the implications are two-fold: i) the poverty 
headcount translates into a sizeable need and an opportunity to address this need 
through a range of impact strategies (for example, providing capital to the numerous 
organizations that deliver goods and services to BoP populations), but for some 
investors, ii) the high poverty headcount also calls into question the potential in 
the consumer market and necessitates an approach that reaches those with some 
disposable income in order to ensure returns.
INVESTING IN BANGLADESH: 
THE SUPPLY SIDE
The impact investing market in Bangladesh is nascent, but, of the countries under 
study, it is the third-most active after India and Pakistan and is likely to continue to 
see strong growth over the next few years. The Bangladesh market accounts for 11.2% 
of the total capital deployed among the countries under study, has the fourth-largest 
number of active players, and has a number of investors scoping the market for 
possible entry.
23 The figure of USD 1.25 a day is based on the World Bank’s revised poverty line at 2005 purchasing 
power parity.
32 • THE LANDSCAPE FOR IMPACT INVESTING IN SOUTH ASIA
The broad impact capital market in Bangladesh 
There are at least 15 impact investors currently active in Bangladesh with a total 
of USD 955 million in deployed capital, of which USD 834 million has been 
deployed by DFIs.24 Among these investors, there are nine funds (five investing 
only in Bangladesh and four regionally), four DFIs, and two foundations (Figure 6). 
These investors currently have more than 50 active investments.25 While most of 
these investments have been made by a few small private equity funds, the bulk of 
capital represents investments by DFIs in enterprises and banks and by microfinance 
institutions (MFIs). The section “Key trends of impact investing in Bangladesh” 
discusses in detail the emerging trends among these investors.
FIGURE 6: NUMBER OF DIRECT IMPACT AND IMPACT-RELATED INVESTORS ACTIVE IN BANGLADESH
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Beyond these impact investors, at least 14 impact-related investors have 
current investments in Bangladesh of about USD 744 million (Figure 7). Most 
of this capital has been provided as loans to SMEs through commercial banks. 
The remaining investors are funds and a small group of high net-worth individuals 
(HNWIs). While commercial banks have a clear primary focus on financial returns 
and, for now, see their impact as a by-product of their lending activity, some of these 
other impact-related investors may develop a more explicitly intentional strategy, as 
they seek to formalize their impact measurement and articulate clearer non-financial 
24 Figures in this report represent a best effort to size the total impact investing market in Bangladesh, 
including both impact and impact-related investors. While there may be additional investments on the 
margins that remain uncaptured, these figures provide a directionally accurate estimate of the market.
25 This excludes one outlier, which has more than 2,200 investments; many of these investments are small, 
microfinance-like investments, while a few are equity investments into SMEs.
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objectives. As many of these investors have focused on gaining a foothold in the 
market and achieving financial sustainability, impact intention has not been a core 
focus to date, but this is likely to become clearer over time.
FIGURE 7: TOTAL CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY RING, BANGLADESH 
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MILLIONS
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
Investors of the same type (DFIs, foundations, etc.) are largely concentrated 
within the same ring, with the exception of fund managers that appear in both 
rings. All DFIs and both foundations are impact investors, whereas commercial banks, 
three Bangladesh Bank funds, and one group of HNWIs are impact-related. There is 
more diversity among fund managers, which are found in both rings.26
Active impact and impact-related investors in 
Bangladesh
We see a diverse range of investors operating in Bangladesh. A range of players 
are active in Bangladesh as either impact or impact-related investors, including funds, 
DFIs, foundations, HNWIs and family offices, diversified financial institutions and 
banks, and the Bangladesh Bank, which, while being primarily the country’s central 
bank, also manages three funds. 
Funds are the most common type of investor currently. There are 12 active funds 
in Bangladesh—seven of these funds are only making investments in Bangladesh, 
while the remaining five are regional with capital deployed in other countries. Ten of 
the 12 are private equity (PE) funds and two are venture capital (VC) funds. PE funds 
are backed by a range of limited partners (LPs), mostly DFIs but also foundations, 
26 The Bangladesh Bank operates three programs that provide subsidized debt to banks for SME lending: 
The Equity and Entrepreneurship Fund (EEF), JICA-SME Loans, and ADB Refinance Scheme.
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HNWIs, and family offices. The three VC funds are investing off their own books with 
capital invested by the general partners. Of these funds, nine are impact investment 
funds while three are impact-related but invest in relevant markets.
DFIs are responsible for the largest portion of impact capital through 
investments directly in enterprises. Currently, four DFIs have nearly USD 834 
million of investments in enterprises, primarily in information and communication 
technology (ICT),27 energy, manufacturing, financial services, and agro-processing. 
DFI investments account for 87% of the capital deployed from impact investors. 
Details on DFI investment preferences are discussed further in the section “Key 
trends of impact investing in Bangladesh.”
DFIs (and one multilateral donor) have also provided USD 739 million in debt 
and guarantees to banks for SME28 loans. An industry-wide liquidity crisis in 201129  
prompted four DFIs to provide capital to seven banks, earmarked for SME loans. 
One DFI and one bilateral donor have also provided funding to the Bangladesh Bank 
for SME lending through commercial banks, and an estimated USD 153 million has 
been loaned through these funds.
About 94% of the capital originates with DFIs through their direct investments 
into enterprises, guarantees, and indirect investments (anchoring funds and 
backing commercial SME loans), and given this sizeable role in the impact 
investing market, DFIs are driving trends across the space. The significance of 
DFIs is twofold: i) as a vital and significant source of capital for enterprises and funds 
and ii) as a catalyzing force signaling the potential of the market and the credibility 
of local enterprises and fund managers. In an effort to draw in other investors, 
DFIs often back funds as anchor investors. In some cases, DFIs have succeeded in 
catalyzing as much investment from other investors as they themselves have put in. In 
others, investors have chosen to wait to observe some fund investment activity before 
making a commitment. While it is difficult to demonstrate the catalytic effect of 
DFIs at this stage since the industry is so new, we do see fund managers actively seek 
DFI anchor participation for both these reasons. However, the fact that some funds 
with DFI commitments have been unable to raise matching capital, suggests that 
DFI participation alone is not sufficient. More broadly, prospective investors are also 
waiting to observe a stronger track record of exits before entering the market.
DFIs are also driving trends beyond capital, often setting benchmarks for 
defining and measuring impact and advocating pro-investment policies. Many 
trends in the placement of capital discussed in depth throughout the Bangladesh 
report are driven by the substantial DFI spending, but investors are also looking to 
DFIs for impact definitions and measurement standards. In Bangladesh, DFIs have 
27 ICT includes information technology companies (e.g., internet service providers and software 
developers) and communication technology companies (e.g., mobile network providers).
28 SMEs are defined by the Bank of Bangladesh as follows: (i) not publicly listed and (ii) 10–100 employees 
and fixed assets of USD 6,400–1.9 million for trading and services or 25–250 employees and fixed assets 
of USD 64,000–3.9 million for manufacturing.
29 In late 2010, the Central Bank moved to address inflation and reign in financial markets by raising the 
cash reserve ratio of banks and asking financial institutions to adjust their stock investment exposure. 
The move heavily reduced liquidity in the banking sector, and in part, contributed to the stock market 
crash in 2011.
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identified job creation and economic growth as core impact goals, and this has 
led them to focus their activities on high-growth sectors. DFIs are also using their 
legitimacy to advocate for pro-investment policy changes within the government. For 
example, one DFI is working with policymakers to address the lack of understanding 
about venture capital and private equity in order to develop stronger regulatory 
frameworks that make Bangladesh more appealing to both PE and VC investors. 
DFIs have also been advocating for the loosening of a three-year lock-in period for 
investors following an initial public offering (IPO).30 
Only two foundations are currently active as investors, but foundations are also 
providing business development services. While only one domestic foundation 
is providing debt financing to SMEs and one international foundation has made an 
equity investment, foundations have been active in offering technical assistance to 
business managers, discussed further in the section “Enabling impact investing: The 
ecosystem.”
HNWIs are likely a large source of start-up capital, most of which is provided 
informally; foreign HNWIs have backed a few funds, and at least two family 
offices are scoping the market. Family and friends are the primary source of seed 
capital for young entrepreneurs. A number of successful Bangladeshi entrepreneurs 
have also provided start-up capital. In most cases, these investments are made without 
any formal documentation or set timelines, and due to their informality, it is difficult to 
scope the exact size of this market. However, most players in the market estimate this 
capital to be substantial. Beyond this, only a few formal domestic HNWIs offer capital 
as angel investors. Foreign HNWIs have backed impact funds, but typically in small 
amounts. At least two foreign family offices have been in talks to back a local fund.
Institutional investors largely operate on a commercial basis as lenders, but seven 
banks have portfolios targeting lending to SMEs and women-owned enterprises. 
Seven banks have received capital from DFIs that has been earmarked for SME 
lending. Banks are also lending to SMEs in priority sectors driven by government 
mandate rather than by impact intention.
30 The Securities and Exchange Commission mandates that “the securities (equity share) subscribed by 
the Sponsors/Promoters/Directors as described in the Prospectus, shall be subject to a lock-in period 
as under: ‘Three years in case of Companies intended/intending to go for Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
from the date of its approval thereof by the Commission or from the start of its commercial operation, 
whichever is later.’ There will be no lock-in on foreign sponsors.”
36 • THE LANDSCAPE FOR IMPACT INVESTING IN SOUTH ASIA
FIGURE 8: TYPES OF IMPACT AND IMPACT-RELATED INVESTORS ACTIVE IN BANGLADESH
TYPE OF INVESTOR ESTIMATED NUMBER DETAILS OF INVESTORS IN BANGLADESH
Funds and fund managers 12 Ten private equity funds and two venture capital funds testing the market with equity and quasi-equity investments
DFIs 4 DFIs and  one donor
Drivers of market trends through both large, direct investments into 
enterprises (mostly debt to mature stage companies), as well as indirect 
investments (acting as LPs of funds or providing debt capital to banks for 
SME lending)
Foundations 2
Limited number of players in the impact investment market— one 
providing small amounts of debt financing to SMEs and one that has 
made an equity investment—but more active as business development 
providers
HNWIs/Family offices
5-10 formal 
and many more 
informal
Friends and family are likely one of the largest sources of seed 
funding, but most of these investments are made informally—with no 
documentation or timelines. Only a small number of HNWIs offering 
capital beyond this—as LPs or making direct investments—and at least 
two family offices looking to back a fund.
Diversified financial institutions/banks 7+ Seven banks lending to SMEs with debt provided by DFIs
Bangladesh Bank  
(central bank of Bangladesh) 3 funds
Managing three funds providing subsidized debt to banks making SME 
loans to targeted sectors or disadvantaged groups
Key trends of impact investing in Bangladesh
The following section examines trends among impact investors, the “core” ring 
of investors under study. The figures quoted in this section refer only to this set 
of investors, who collectively have about USD 955 million currently deployed. 
The activities of impact-related investors will be discussed in the section “Beyond 
the impact investing market.” Given the sizable amount of capital deployed in 
Bangladesh, we see interesting trends emerging around impact investor preferences 
in terms of instrument, growth stage and deal size, and sector. 
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INVESTOR MIX
Among all the known impact investors, DFIs have deployed the largest amount of 
impact capital into enterprises. About 87% of the capital is deployed by DFIs. The 
remaining 13% has been deployed by fund managers and foundations.
FIGURE 9: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED DIRECTLY BY TYPE OF INVESTOR (USD MILLIONS)
834.3 
(87.4%)
118.6
(12.4%)
2.1
(0.2%)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
DFI
Fund or fund manager
Foundation
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
INSTRUMENT
Seventy percent of the total impact capital currently deployed has been through 
debt. The overall trend can largely be explained by the sizeable amount of capital 
flowing from DFIs. As we see in Figure 10, 79% of the USD 834 million invested by 
DFIs is through debt. This preference for debt is driven by risk aversion, regulatory 
barriers for using other instruments, and a greater familiarity with debt (particularly 
among business managers). In contrast, only about 9%, or USD 10 million, of capital 
from non-DFIs is structured as debt.
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FIGURE 10: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY INSTRUMENT (USD MILLIONS)
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10.2 
(8.5%)
0.7 
(0.6%)
1.2 
(1.0%)
6.5 
(5.4%)
NON-DFI
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
Equity and other instruments are being tested in small amounts by all types of 
investors, but are the most common type of instruments for non-DFI investors. 
Instruments other than debt make up about 17% of the known capital among impact 
investors. As seen in Figure 10, equity is the most common instrument used, outside 
of debt. While DFIs have made equity investments worth USD 51 million (or about 
6% of their investments by value), it is the non-DFI investors that are primarily 
exploring instruments beyond debt. About 91% of the non-DFI capital has been 
deployed through equity, quasi-equity, or deposits. This is largely driven by a single 
large domestic fund that has made nearly USD 100 million in equity investments.
In general, both investors and entrepreneurs express that debt is preferable given 
their needs and expectations. Investors, unsurprisingly, are looking to minimize their 
risks in the nascent impact investing market of Bangladesh, and debt allows them to 
assume less risk than other instruments. While one may expect early and growth stage 
entrepreneurs to seek equity investments, as these are often appropriate for their 
stage of growth, entrepreneurs tend to be more familiar and comfortable with debt 
structures and are reluctant to give up stake in their company. Many business owners 
do not recognize the value of instruments beyond debt and are unaware of the risk 
mitigation that equity structures can allow.
Regulatory structures surrounding equity investments, particularly those around 
exits and legal protection of the investor and investee, also fuel the preference 
for debt. The regulatory process for exits through IPO is unclear, and investors face a 
three-year lock-in of their investment following a public listing. Investors and investees 
are also uncertain of the legal framework for addressing disputes that might arise.
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GROWTH STAGE AND DEAL SIZE
Mature companies have received most of the known capital, as these companies 
can absorb larger amounts and meet the operating requirements of the investors. 
Mature companies are attracting most of the capital from both DFIs and non-DFI 
investors for two reasons. First, only mature companies are of a size capable of 
absorbing the amount of capital that many impact investors look to invest in deals, 
i.e., typically more than USD 1 million. Second, mature companies have an established 
operating history, are legally registered, and keep (at least partially) accurate financial 
records—all important requirements for investors. However, there is some concern 
that the pipeline of attractive opportunities in mature companies is limited. Investors 
scoping the market have suggested that the few large funds operating in Bangladesh 
have already taken the “low hanging fruit” of desirable investments, and hence, impact 
investors, finding it more difficult to secure investments in mature companies, are 
expected to begin exploring investments in earlier growth stages. Further, as VC 
funds continue to explore the market, it is likely that capital will be more diversified 
across different business stages. 
FIGURE 11: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY GROWTH STAGE (USD MILLIONS)
Mature, public
Mature, private
Growth
Venture
Seed
Unknown
DFI NON-DFI
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
While seed funding is nearly negligible as a share of the total capital deployed 
through formal channels, entrepreneurs with strong networks can raise seed 
capital from friends and family; those without strong networks struggle to raise 
seed capital, which is a major gap in the market. Entrepreneurs, finding it difficult 
to access bank loans (due to high collateral requirements) or to reach other investors, 
often turn to friends and family for start-up capital. Seed capital needs are often 
minimal, and for amounts less than USD 10,000, well-connected entrepreneurs can 
access capital through such informal channels. Given that many young entrepreneurs 
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are launching start-ups that require minimal capital expenditure, particularly in the 
ICT sector, informal funding is likely to constitute a significant amount of capital. 
However, this source of funding is not available to all entrepreneurs; thus, a gap still 
exists for some entrepreneurs looking for seed funding.
Venture and growth stage funding represent the largest gaps. For growth and 
venture stage companies looking for capital in the range of USD 50,000 to USD 1 
million, accessing capital is a significant challenge. These challenges will be discussed 
later in the section titled “Challenges facing investors deploying impact capital in 
Bangladesh.”
FIGURE 12: IMPACT CAPITAL BY DEAL SIZE (USD MILLIONS)
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis . Notes: This excludes one outlier, which has more than 2,200 investments; 
many of these investments are small, microfinance-like investments, while a few are equity investments into SMEs.
There have been about 50 investments to date, of which about half have been 
less than USD 1 million in size, reflecting the small portfolio sizes of the non-
DFI investors and the capital needs of the target investees. As seen in Figure 12, 
DFI deals have been typically at the larger end; only one DFI deal has been less than 
USD 1 million, while 18 have been greater than USD 10 million. Meanwhile, 22 out 
of 24 non-DFI deals have been less than USD 1 million. Although not presented in 
the above chart, it is worth highlighting that one local impact fund has made 2,245 
investments in small enterprises that can only absorb small amounts in the range of 
USD 30,000. 
Deal size is largely dependent on sector—most ICT companies look for relatively 
small investments, whereas manufacturing tends to require more capital. With the 
exception of one large phone company, most enterprises in the ICT sector are small 
and looking for a corresponding amount of capital. Thus, relatively small funds are 
investing in these companies. 
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SECTOR
The sectors receiving most of the impact investing capital are high-growth 
sectors such as ICT, manufacturing, and energy. Investor confidence in these 
sectors is high due to strong historical performance and future growth prospects. 
Both ICT and energy have been identified as government thrust sectors, further 
driving interest in these areas. The high-growth sectors are appealing because of their 
potential to both provide financial returns and help meet the investors’ impact goals, 
as these sectors are likely to generate jobs and stimulate economic growth (which, as 
will be described later, have been identified by DFIs as the core impact objectives).
Financial services and microfinance are also receiving a small portion of capital 
from both DFIs and funds. Bangladesh is the birthplace of the microfinance 
movement31 and has seen a large number of organizations grow to a large scale over 
the past three decades. Foreign investors have expressed that the MFI market is 
rather saturated, so we see few direct investments in these sectors. However, DFIs are 
providing guarantees and debt to lending institutions—including banks and some of 
the country’s largest MFIs—in an effort to increase SME access to finance that is often 
constrained. In other words, in Bangladesh, DFIs are using MFIs and other banks as 
vehicles for SME lending; this activity is being captured as “Ring 2” investments, as 
loans from banks and MFIs to SMEs. This is further discussed in the “Beyond the 
impact investing market” section.
Exit possibilities
Investors express a preference for IPO exit, and optimism is growing regarding 
the viability of this exit strategy as one impact investor is approaching an IPO 
with a current investment. IPOs are favored as they are perceived to yield the 
highest returns. To date, no impact investor has exited an investment through an IPO, 
so investors are watching with tempered optimism as the first impact investment is 
moving through a public listing. The process for IPO is long (typically a year) as the 
exact process is unclear and can change from investment to investment. Therefore, 
investors—particularly domestic investors—expressed interest in the outcome of the 
first impact investment being exited through public listing. 
While IPO is the preferred exit, secondary sales, trade sales, and owner buyback 
are all viewed as feasible exit options. Because of the difficulties associated with 
IPO exits—including long lock-in periods and an uncertain process—investors have 
instead exited investments through secondary sales, trade sales, and owner buybacks, 
and they believe that these avenues remain feasible options for exiting investments 
going forward as well.
31 While microcredit existed informally prior to the 1970s, Professor Muhammad Yunus is widely credited 
as bringing microfinance to the global stage. Yunus began making informal loans in the 1970s and started 
Grameen Bank in 1983. Grameen Bank, along with a Bangladesh-based non-profit BRAC, are now two 
of the largest microfinance institutions in the world by number of borrowers.
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Impact measurement
Of the 15 impact investors active in Bangladesh, at least four DFIs and six funds 
have reasonably well-developed impact metrics that are measured and reported. 
DFIs typically define impact in the context of Bangladesh as “job creation,” with 
additional metrics in place to ensure ESG compliance. Fund managers typically follow 
DFI standards for measuring and reporting impact, given that DFIs act as LPs for 
some funds (and thus, require specific reporting of metrics) and because DFIs are the 
most active players in this field. The preference for ESG compliance is also driven 
by widespread availability of ESG metrics and recognition that ESG compliance 
satisfies basic “impact” criteria and mitigates the risk of non-compliance for investor 
and investee. Nevertheless, in some cases, investors are further customizing metrics 
to look beyond ESG compliance, measure more relevant indicators, and reduce the 
reporting burden for the investees. For example, these metrics include “the number 
of products sold to poor households,” “the number of poor households reached per 
USD 100,000 of investment,” and “the estimated trade generated (in USD).” The 
metrics selected are case specific (dependent on the type of enterprise and intended 
impact).
Outside of these 10 organizations, and outside of ESG metrics, most investors 
provide anecdotal reporting of the impact. Impact measurement is considered 
secondary to managing the investment, which, in the context of Bangladesh, requires 
a large investment of time and resources on the part of the investor. As a result, 
many investors have limited capacity to define metrics and measure non-financial 
performance, and therefore either focus on more limited metrics, are still working 
to develop appropriate metrics, or report only anecdotally. These investors believe 
FIGURE 13: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY SECTOR (USD MILLIONS)
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis. Note: Approximately USD 104 of USD 120 million of non-DFI investments 
are unknown with respect to sector, and therefore the above graph largely represents trends of DFI investors.
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impact measurement is important and intend to develop more formal processes and 
metrics based on standardized approaches once they have sufficient capacity to do 
so.
Beyond the impact investing market 
The most active investors on the periphery of impact investing are commercial 
banks lending to SMEs. About USD 731 million, or 98% of the capital deployed by 
this ring, is commercial bank lending to SMEs with capital from DFIs and one bilateral 
donor. While information on the individual portfolios of these banks is not publicly 
available, the following trends can be summarized: 
• All of this capital has been deployed as debt to SMEs. 
• Growth stage preference depends on the lender, but as the banks require at least 
a few years of operating history to qualify an entity for a loan, there is mostly no 
seed funding and minimal venture stage funding. 
• Sector preferences depend on the lender, but most lending is sector agnostic. 
However, preference may be given to government thrust sectors and women-
owned enterprises. 
• As these funds target SMEs, deal sizes are likely to be less than USD 1 million.
Beyond SME lending, three impact-related funds and one group of HNWIs 
are providing small amounts of equity and deposits. In total, these investors have 
USD 14 million in active investments—41% as equity and 59% as deposits—with deals 
ranging from USD 36,000 to USD 5 million. While the growth stage is unknown 
for most of this capital (61%), we see about USD 500,000 invested in venture stage 
organizations and USD 5 million in mature private enterprises. Investments have 
flowed into a number of sectors. Health has received the largest segment of capital 
from these investors (USD 5 million); however, this is the result of a single, relatively 
large investment. Beyond health, these investors, like impact investors, prefer high-
growth sectors. Agro/food processing, manufacturing, ICT, and agriculture have 
absorbed 52% of the capital from these investors, and the remaining capital has been 
spread across a diverse range of sectors in small amounts.
Challenges facing investors deploying impact 
capital in Bangladesh 
While impact investors are fairly optimistic about Bangladesh due to political stability, 
GDP growth, and demographic trends, there are still significant challenges that 
dissuade investors from entering the market.
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FIGURE 14: CHALLENGES FACED BY INVESTORS AND ASSET MANAGERS ACROSS THE INVESTMENT CYCLE
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For asset managers, the key challenges at the entry stage have been the difficulty 
in raising funds and the regulatory limitations surrounding domiciliation. Nearly 
all Bangladesh-specific funds have had difficulty in raising capital, with only one fund 
successfully closing after meeting its target. Most fund managers would like DFIs 
to act as LPs, with seven of the eight funds (six active and two scoping) currently or 
previously approaching DFIs for funding. While DFIs have backed two funds and 
committed capital to others scoping the market, securing additional co-investors 
has been a challenge for fund managers. A part of this challenge has been scale; 
DFIs typically require their investment to be both fairly large (e.g., USD 20 million) 
and only a portion of the total fund (usually 25%–30%). Therefore, large amounts of 
additional capital need to be raised, but this has proved challenging. Only one fund 
has successfully raised its target capital, with many others closing well below their 
targets and some unable to raise sufficient capital to launch the fund. A suggested 
reason for the difficulty in raising funds is that LPs are waiting for one large fund to 
exit a few deals before committing, in order to better gauge the market.
In addition to difficulties in raising funds, fund managers face regulatory issues around 
both overseas and domestic domiciliation of equity funds. Because regulations limit 
access to foreign capital for companies that are not appropriately registered to accept 
foreign capital, investing out of foreign-domiciled funds can be challenging as it limits 
the potential of the investment pipeline. This leads fund managers to see the need 
to domicile in Bangladesh. However, domiciling in Bangladesh can be a long process, 
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particularly for funds with foreign LPs, and given that there is no explicit option to 
structure and register a fund locally, domestic funds often have to go through the 
process of registering as a private company.
While pipeline development is a challenge, issues can be overcome if investors 
(whether asset owners or fund managers) can develop networks and establish a 
local presence. Early funds have taken the “low-hanging fruit” in the market, as only 
a few companies are currently structured and registered appropriately for investment. 
As a result, fund managers must invest quite a bit of time scoping for investment 
opportunities. This is particularly true for those with small portfolios, as they can 
only make small deals and finding investable companies of this size requires a heavy 
investment of time. While this creates an additional barrier for investing, it is not 
insurmountable. Many fund managers have started developing a local presence, and 
partnerships are developing across funds to leverage strong networks.
Screening companies and structuring these companies for investment represent 
the largest challenges facing investors, particularly equity investors. Many 
companies in Bangladesh lack strong governance and financials that are accessible 
and sufficiently accurate to structure a deal. Companies are often run as traditional 
family businesses, operating with multiple financial accounting records—one for tax 
purposes and another that is more accurate. For investors, a large amount of time and 
resources must be devoted to working with business managers to set up governance 
structures and create financial records prior to making any investment. Even more 
difficult, investors have to convince business managers of the value of equity, as most 
are unfamiliar with the instrument, are unwilling to dilute their ownership, or do not 
want to legally register as a corporation in order to accept equity. Therefore, business 
managers prefer debt.
Screening and due diligence are less challenging for debt investors because there are 
more safety mechanisms in place, including credit rating agencies to evaluate risks.
Although uncertainty around exits makes it difficult for some asset managers to 
raise funds, active investors have not been deterred by exit uncertainty. All equity 
investors expressed a preference for exit through IPO. They expect the greatest 
returns from public listing and are most familiar with this mechanism. Investors express 
hope that IPOs will be a viable option at the end of their investment periods, but 
believe that other options may be more feasible, such as owner buy-back and trade 
sales. Secondary sales are rare due to a limited number of senior funds. 
To date, no equity investments have gone through an IPO process, so while IPOs 
are the preferred exit among equity investors, it is uncharted territory. IPOs are not 
common due to unclear and somewhat unfavorable regulations regarding the IPO 
process. For example, long lock-in periods imply that equity investors cannot sell 
their shares immediately after listing, increasing their time horizon and potentially 
lowering their returns. Additionally, despite open repatriation policies on paper, in 
practice, investors have found the process to be quite challenging. That said, there 
has been active engagement of the investors and donors with the government and 
the regulators to identify such challenges, and there is a strong perception that 
there is commitment to reform and develop a more conducive framework for capital 
investors.
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Looking forward
The landscape for impact investing is evolving. Active investors have already 
committed additional capital (beyond what has been deployed), funds are raising 
capital, and impact definitions are becoming more sophisticated.
FIGURE 15: FUNDS COMMITTED BUT NOT DEPLOYED
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USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
300
(80.3%)
38.4
(10.3%)
35
(9.4%)
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
Investor optimism is evident, with an additional USD 373 million committed 
but not yet deployed by impact investors and others on the periphery of impact 
investing. About USD 300 million of the USD 373 million has been committed to 
commercial banks for SME lending. About USD 38 million has been committed 
by direct investors—five investments in companies by an existing fund and direct 
investments in a hospital and a power plant.
Fund managers are looking to raise capital and are confident that they will be 
successful. At least four fund managers are looking to raise a combined total of USD 
750 million. A few funds have even hired local fund managers before the fund closes, 
expressing confidence that capital will be raised and an eagerness to begin sourcing 
deals.
Additionally, there are expectations that local government bodies will be 
allocating more capital for SMEs. The government has identified SMEs as a focus 
area for financial and technical support. As such, it is expected that the government 
will be launching new financing schemes for SMEs, but few details are known.
The types of investors present are expected to diversify as the market evolves. 
Although still nascent, more players active in the impact investing market recognize 
that Bangladesh is at an inflection point. While investors to date have primarily been 
DFIs, commercial banks/non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), and small funds, 
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there are expectations that the space is on the brink of diversification. In fact, new 
venture capital firms and angel investors are already emerging, all of them local with 
small portfolio sizes.
Investors scoping but not yet active in the market are waiting for the two largest 
funds to fully deploy and for a few successful exits before entering the market. 
A number of foreign investors interested in the country expressed that while they are 
enthusiastic about the potential of the market, they are waiting for the currently active 
impact investors to test and prove this potential. As discussed previously, one fund is 
currently in the process of an IPO exit, and the outcome will be a critical moment for 
impact investors.
At the early stage of the market’s development, the threshold for “impact” is still 
unclear, but it is expected that measurement and intention will become more 
sophisticated as impact investors become more targeted in their portfolios. 
To date, investors have been primarily looking to DFIs to take the lead on defining 
impact, as DFIs are both LPs for funds (and thus, have specific measurement and 
reporting requirements) and early movers with an articulated impact thesis. As a 
result, in Bangladesh, “impact” is largely defined in terms of job creation. This is a 
relatively easy metric to measure and requires little customization. However, as impact 
investors become more established, many want to identify metrics that use a broader 
set of indicators specific to the sector and the expected impact of the investment. 
For instance, one fund manager expressed that their focus to date had been on 
financial returns with the investor himself dedicating all his time and resources to 
mentoring entrepreneurs, leaving no time for thinking through impact definition or 
measurement. However, this investor is now looking for strong examples of impact 
measurement and reporting to incorporate into his investing activities.
NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES: 
THE DEMAND SIDE
We see impact capital in Bangladesh deployed into a wide range of enterprises, 
including impact enterprises,32 SMEs, and other companies operating in sectors 
that make valuable contributions to the economy and generate jobs. Only about 
USD 6.5 million is currently invested in impact enterprises. The remaining capital has 
flowed into SMEs and organizations in sectors with a high potential for job creation.
32 Impact enterprises for the purposes of this report are defined as those that have articulated a core 
objective to generate a positive social or environmental impact (i.e., as a part of their operating model 
rather than an ancillary activity as with CSR programs); and seek to increase their financial viability and 
sustainability.
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Overview of social enterprise ecosystem in 
Bangladesh
The impact enterprise landscape is vibrant but still developing. The concept of 
“impact enterprise” is a relatively new one in Bangladesh; however, the landscape is 
built on a foundation laid by Professor Muhammad Yunus, who introduced the idea of 
“social business”—a venture that serves a social need by selling a product or service.33 
FIGURE 16: RELATIVE NUMBER OF IMPACT ENTERPRISES BY SECTOR, WITH EXAMPLES
Kazi & Kazi
Tea
Grameen
Bank
Oasis 
Coffins
Apollo 
Hospitals dnetbKash
Waste 
Concern
Water 
Health
Betterstories Grameen  Shakti
Grameen  
Danone  
Foods
BRAC Pebble
Bengal 
Meat ASA Aarong
Proshika Jita
Food and 
Agriculture
Education Energy Microfinance Healthcare Housing Financial  
Services  
(excl. Microfinance)
ICT Water and
Sanitation
Other
Few                         Some                   Many
Sources: Yunus, Moingeon, Ortega (2010); Stakeholder interviews; Organization websites; Dalberg analysis
33 In Bangladesh, Muhammed Yunus first coined the term “social business” to refer to businesses that 
are designed to address a social problem. “Social businesses” are explicitly non-loss and non-dividend 
in structure; i.e., profits realized by the company must be reinvested. While this is a term that strongly 
resonates with Bangladeshi entrepreneurs, investors, and regulators, we have retained the above 
definition of “impact enterprises” throughout this report in order to maintain consistency across the 
region but do note the importance of this business approach in creating space for impact enterprises.
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The Grameen family and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
(BRAC) pioneered the social business model and have each spun out several 
entities with a dual social and financial mandate. Both the Grameen Group and 
BRAC have in-house incubators/accelerators that focus on growing these impact 
enterprises by providing technical assistance and financing. The sector focus has 
largely been on renewable energy, healthcare, and manufacturing/retail. In addition, 
Grameen and BRAC enterprises often provide seed capital for new impact-oriented 
enterprises, creating an informal impact investing sector that on its own has created 
a network of 30–40 companies defined as social businesses under the Yunus 
philosophy. Not all of these may be attractive candidates for impact investors, given 
that some of them retain their non-dividend philosophy, but some of them have spun 
out as independent entities. A few examples are provided in Figure 16.
The impact enterprise space is also driven by foreign social entrepreneurs 
that see an opportunity and have an understanding of social business models. 
Foreigners have launched a number of impact enterprises that align closely with 
various social business models known globally, such as reinvesting profits or focusing 
on fair trade. For the most part, foreigner-owned impact enterprises are producing 
their products locally using ethically-sourced, environment-friendly inputs and 
exporting goods to more developed markets. These entrepreneurs typically launch 
the enterprise with their own seed funding, but a few have taken investments at 
venture or growth stages.
Many local entrepreneurs are launching businesses that address a social need, 
target BoP customers, or incorporate local communities into business operations 
as suppliers, distributors, or employees, but these entrepreneurs do not explicitly 
define themselves as impact enterprises. While the impact enterprise model is used 
in practice, most local entrepreneurs do not self-identify as such. These enterprises, 
recognizing an opportunity created by gaps in the provision of basic services, are 
addressing a need through for-profit business models rather than operating with an 
explicit impact intention, as we see among the Grameen and BRAC entities and 
foreign entrepreneurs that have launched social businesses in Bangladesh.
Microfinance is the sector with the largest number of impact enterprises, with 
more than 600 registered MFIs and four very large MFIs. This is unsurprising, 
given that Bangladesh is often seen as the birthplace of the microfinance model now 
used around the world, as noted earlier. Among impact enterprises, MFIs are the most 
active. There are four large MFIs currently active in the country, including the first 
movers Grameen Bank and BRAC.
Outside of microfinance, renewable energy and ICT (including mobile 
financial services) are emerging sectors for impact enterprises. Renewable 
energy enterprises have emerged in response to the limited power infrastructure in 
Bangladesh. Increasingly, impact enterprises are addressing access to energy issues 
with mini-grids and solar lighting for homes. With nearly 70% of the population using 
mobile phones, ICT and mobile financial services are also growing in appeal. In fact, 
recently, two large players servicing the BoP with ICT services have emerged, and 
both have received investments greater than USD 10 million.
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While growing as impact enterprise sectors, education and healthcare have 
service gaps that have traditionally been addressed by a large NGO sector 
offering free services. Given the historical precedent set by an active NGO sector, 
both consumers and entrepreneurs tend to expect education and healthcare services 
to be provided free-of-charge. 
One gap identified by investors as an impact sector that is largely neglected is 
housing. There is a sizeable need for low-income housing options, and as NGOs 
are not addressing all of the need, there is a strong potential for enterprise-based 
solutions and thus, an opportunity for investors to support such enterprises.
There are four common impact models, or theories of change, that we see among 
impact enterprises, and these models differ across sectors. First, many impact 
enterprises aim to create jobs and generate economic growth. These enterprises tend 
to be in high-growth sectors such as manufacturing. Second, some impact enterprises 
manufacture products using ethically-sourced, environment-friendly inputs. Often, 
these products are exported or sold through socially-oriented retail stores. Third, 
some impact enterprises incorporate low-income or marginalized populations into 
their supply chains. These are usually agriculture or handicraft production companies. 
Finally, impact enterprises may provide some much-needed services (such as 
healthcare services) to the BoP, often through MFI lending. Some enterprises have 
adopted multiple theories of change. For example, one manufacturer is developing a 
rural supply chain to source environment-friendly inputs and is setting up production 
sites in low-income communities.
Given the high rate of unemployment and low GDP per capita, both investors 
and impact enterprises acknowledge job growth as the primary impact focus 
at present. Irrespective of the sector or business model, most business managers 
describe their enterprise’s impact as job creation, particularly among the BoP or 
marginalized populations. As described earlier, most impact investors also articulate 
impact in similar terms.
Access to finance
As in other countries, most impact enterprises were seeded out of an 
entrepreneur’s own savings or from friends/families due to a lack of seed 
capital available or a reluctance to take on debt/equity. Most early-stage impact 
enterprises have not accessed formal channels for capital, preferring instead to 
provide initial financing from their own pockets or from personal networks. The 
reasons vary, particularly across instruments. For debt, collateral requirements and 
interest rates are too high to warrant taking a bank loan, particularly for seed capital. 
With respect to equity, entrepreneurs have several concerns: they are not familiar 
with the instrument, are reluctant to cede control to an investor, are concerned that 
the investor’s values may not align with the core values of the enterprise (or that the 
investor will prioritize financial returns over social impact), or feel that they may have 
difficulty in identifying the appropriate impact investors.
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A survey of 1,442 enterprises in Bangladesh34 reveals that access to finance is 
the third largest constraint for companies (Figure 17). Like investors, enterprises 
recognize political instability and limited infrastructure as the most significant 
challenges, but access to finance is also identified as an important issue.
FIGURE 17: CHALLENGES FACING ENTERPRISES IN BANGLADESH (% OF RESPONDENTS)
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Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey of 1,442 enterprises in Bangladesh, 2013
34 World Bank Survey of 1,442 enterprises in Bangladesh, 2013. http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/
exploreeconomies/2013/bangladesh
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Closely looking at the challenges related to access to finance reveals that growth 
and venture stage companies face the greatest constraints. As seen in Figure 18, 
enterprises at these stages have difficulty in both identifying appropriate sources of 
capital and accessing capital. Formal sources of capital are difficult to secure or are 
not available for these companies.
FIGURE 18: ACCESS TO FINANCE CHALLENGES ACROSS GROWTH STAGES
Severity of access to finance challenge, by stage of growth
Key challenges faced and severity of impact
Least severe Most Severe
Public listingSeed Venture Growth Mature
Identifying sources of capital
Most impact investors prefer ticket size that is too large for small, young companies
Limited formal sources of capital for start ups;  
most seed funding from friends, family Limited number of capital sources outside banks
Difficulty identifying potential equity investors, especially investors that match with 
values and expectations of entrepreneur
Appropriateness of capital
Entrepreneurs uncertain if legal resource can be taken  
or will be successful if issues arise with equity investor
Lack of clarity on the 
regulations for IPO
Terms of loans from banks not appropriate—requires operating history,  
asset collateral. Interest rates are high
Accessing capital
Difficult to secure reliable third party valuation; methods are old, enterprises themselves 
don’t understand/have capability
Companies have not kept accurate financial records, and investors require 1+ years operating records
Complicated process of applying for capital and negotiating terms of investment, 
due to lack of investment-related experience
Equity investors locked in for 
3 years following IPO listing
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis 
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Identifying sources of capital is the most difficult for early-stage companies. Even 
though most deals are under USD 1 million, the ticket size is still often too large for 
young companies. Outside of banks, there are few sources of capital available.
Furthermore, the capital available is often not appropriate for enterprises, 
particularly in the early stages. Legal and regulatory constraints limit the types 
of capital available to business managers. Additionally, perceptions of equity and 
a lack of knowledge about non-debt instruments limit the interest among business 
managers. The terms for investments are often not appropriate, as debt requires high 
collateral and investors require an operating history and financial records that many 
companies do not have. Debt in early stages can also be crippling, due to interest 
repayment.
Accessing capital is the most challenging area for enterprises across growth 
stages. Regulations require that equity investors are locked in for three years 
following an IPO. Also, companies do not keep accurate financial records or are not 
willing to share records, which investors require during the due diligence process. 
Lastly, companies often view investments as “rainy-day” funds rather than an injection 
for growth.
Regulatory challenges are barriers across identifying and accessing capital. 
Regulations are restrictive, due to both a lack of clarity and, when there is clarity, 
the perception that the existing regulations and processes are too constraining to 
facilitate investment.
ENABLING IMPACT 
INVESTING: THE ECOSYSTEM
Bangladesh has made strong efforts to improve the investment climate through 
regulatory changes, leading to the country’s gain in the overall ease of doing 
business, although its rank still remains quite low overall. Bangladesh climbed two 
spots in 2014 to 130 out of 189 countries in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
Ranking, following a downward trend in the rankings in previous years. Strong reforms 
on paper over the last year to improve the ease and process of starting a business 
contributed to the abovementioned rise in rank, but the country still scores relatively 
low overall. Interestingly, Bangladesh scores very high on investor protection, ranking 
22 in 2014,35 but it is important to note that this largely reflects the experience of 
foreign direct investors who have benefited from the country’s steady economic 
growth and regulation reforms that have promised to open the market for foreign 
investors, and is less reflective of the capital-only investors (e.g., private equity 
investors or venture capitalists), who still feel relatively unprotected due to the lack of 
clarity in the regulations with respect to equity investments and the potential recourse 
for a contract default.
35 World Bank “Ease of Doing Business” Rankings.
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Investors and business managers are enthusiastic about the future trajectory of 
the country, given its GDP growth, but infrastructure gaps in power and roads, 
as well as labor issues, remain troubling. While most players in the impact investing 
market recognize that the investment climate in Bangladesh is improving, there is 
still skepticism about key gaps. Limited power and poor road infrastructure have 
prevented the country from realizing its full economic potential (Figure 19). Poor 
labor laws also remain a barrier to growth, particularly in the manufacturing sector 
(textile production), which has suffered a few very public tragedies that have spurred 
debate around labor standards. For instance, the labor strikes in 2013 were paralyzing 
for businesses in Dhaka, the nation’s capital.
Despite regulatory changes that have resulted in a recent increase in the ease of 
doing business, regulatory constraints remain the largest ecosystem challenge. 
While policies are considered liberal on paper, execution is erratic, conservative, 
and slow. Often, business managers and investors have little certainty about how 
regulations will play out in practice, despite clear policies in many aspects. For 
example, investors express that the process for filing for an IPO is uncertain, as the 
expected timeline varies substantially, regulatory bodies may not follow the process as 
it is defined, and consequently, the outcome of the IPO is not predictable. While the 
dominant perception among industry players is that regulatory bodies recognize these 
constraints and are open to addressing barriers, the consensus is that this process will 
take time (probably a year or more). Some specific regulations include the following: 
• There is a three-year lock-in period for equity investors following a public listing.
• Foreign investors are restricted from investing in companies that are not 
appropriately registered for receiving FDI.
• Board of Investment must approve deals, rather than just receiving a notification.
• There are some regulatory barriers to repatriating dividends.
• If domiciled in Bangladesh, a fund must be registered with the Government of 
Bangladesh in order to make investments.
• Foreign investors cannot provide debt to Bangladeshi companies.
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FIGURE 19: SEVERITY OF INVESTMENT CLIMATE CONSTRAINTS IN BANGLADESH
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Political stability
• Waves of political unrest over the last decade
• Domestic perception that political climate is improving, but foreign investors are wary
• Labor strikes in late 2013 were paralyzing for businesses— especially severe in ready made 
garment sector, but whole economy affected and concerns about recurrence
Macroeconomic 
governance
• Interest rates on the high end for the region (up to 18% depending on credit rating). 
Some caps exist for particular sectors and investor types, but real rates often high
• Strong government regulations limit foreign borrowing; this is being relaxed on a case-by-
case basis
• Tax rates perceived as reasonable, but processes/administration are cumbersome and slow
Infrastructure
• Power supply is erratic and unreliable. Even small enterprises require power back-up 
systems which are expensive to run. Inconsistent fuel supply compounds issue
• Road infrastructure is poor. Traffic conditions in major corridors slow business and raise 
costs. E.g. Dhaka Chittagong highway, the main artery, is extremely congested
• Ports are highly inefficient which increases business costs for enterprises, especially those 
importing and exporting
Regulatory 
environment
• Liberal policies on paper, but execution is erratic, conservative, and processes slow 
• Perceptions of significant corruption to get processes moving or completed
• Bangladeshi companies not allowed to access foreign debt, but regulations relaxing
• Key concerns include:
 » Land purchase, transfer approvals
 » Visas, work permits
 » High fee for company registration (for small domestic entrepreneur)—BDT 50,000 
(~USD 645), so people incorporate as proprietorship to save money
 » Unclear regulation for PE/VC as there is no explicit guidance around governance, 
minimum capital requirements, or reporting. This is expected to be addressed  
within 2014
 » Unfavorable IPO regulations e.g. lock-in period of 3 years (under review by SEC 
after discussions with investors and donors)
• Investors agree that regulators are open to reform but the process will take time
Least severe
Most severeSources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
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There are three bodies responsible for the regulation and investment climate 
in Bangladesh; perceptions of their efficacy and degree of private-sector 
friendliness vary. Among these bodies, the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is perceived by investors as the most supportive of the pro-
investment policies (Figure 20).
FIGURE 20: ROLES, MANDATE, AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREE KEY REGULATORS IN BANGLADESH
Role / mandate Investor perceptions / challenges
Board of 
Investment 
Bangladesh 
• Established in 1989 by the Investment Board Act
• Mission to encourage private sector investment, to identify constraints 
to investment, and provide necessary facilities and assistance
• Services include “investment promotion and facilitation covering 
support, suggestion and aftercare support to the investors.”
• Perception that low effectiveness 
among bureaucrats reduces utility in 
practice
Bangladesh 
Bank
• Chief monetary and financial system regulator established under 
Bangladesh Bank Order 1972
• Key functions include formulation and implementation of monetary/
credit policies; supervision and regulation of banks and NBFIs; issuance 
of currency; maintaining deposit insurance scheme; money laundering 
prevention; acting as banker to the government
• Aware of gaps in policy and overly 
restrictive regulations
• Perception that the Bank is willing  
to address gaps and loosen policy,  
but that process will take some time  
(one year at least)
Securities 
and Exchange 
Commission
• Capital market regulator; mandated under Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act 1993
• Key functions include: registration/regulation of capital market 
investors and intermediaries; prevention of fraudulent/unfair trade 
practices; promoting investor and intermediary training; undertaking 
investigations/inquiries as needed; conducting research and publishing 
information
• Perception that SEC supports private 
sector development and is in favour 
of regulatory changes to improve the 
investment climate
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
There is a growing support system for investors and business managers, but the 
budding ecosystem has not been sufficient to fully address needs (Figure 21). 
While gaps exist for investors, the largest constraints are for enterprises looking for 
service providers to assist in building key business skills.
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FIGURE 21: CONSTRAINTS TO INVESTOR AND ENTERPRISE SUPPORT IN BANGLADESH
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• The regulatory process to set up and register a fund is complicated and difficult to 
navigate with little support available
• Few organizations exist that support international investors with their pipeline 
development—e.g. deal-sourcing or matchmaking is not a commonly available service 
(this is less of a constraint for domestic investors as their networks tend to be more 
effective for pipeline development)
• Similarly, the dearth of providers of valuation services based on modern methods (e.g. 
projected cash flows rather than book value or net present value) means both the 
initial structuring and exiting of equity investments is difficult 
• On the fund management side, most are first time fund managers, though many have 
worked in banking/financial services (and several with Grameen/BRAC networks) and 
some have international experience, but in general, fund management experience is 
low, and exposure to international learnings and best practices are limited so there is 
some need for training and networking to build this capacity for fund managers in the 
impact investing space
• Limited complexity in impact measurement, as many funds are new and many 
managers are new to impact investing
Enterprise 
support
• In addition to access to finance challenges, entrepreneurs face a range of other 
constraints to growth including their own business mindset, skills and knowledge, as 
well as access to information and networks.
• Few organizations currently exist to support/address these needs in a comprehensive, 
easy-to-access way, and those that exist are relatively new and have minimal reach
• Key areas of need include:
 » Aggregation/networking/knowledge sharing amongst entrepreneurs
 » Training in key business management functions—both strategic and operational
 » Linkage to investors or platforms for accessing investor information
Least severe
Most severeSources: Stakeholder interviews; Bangladesh Enterprise Institute studies; Dalberg analysis
Investors often find themselves providing technical assistance (TA) to 
enterprises in order to fill ecosystem gaps. Many enterprises are not receiving 
the development support that they require. As a result, at least six investors are 
also providing TA in the form of direct management support to business managers 
in order to help the enterprise progress to an investable level (in the case of pre-
investment support) and to increase profitability (for post-investment support). 
Often, the TA focuses on basic skills around structuring a company for an investment 
and setting up governance structures. Some investors are also providing financial 
support to SMEs for securing TA.
In addition, formal ecosystem players have emerged, but most are new to the 
space. A small number of incubators and accelerators have launched within the 
last year, but most are still piloting their services, which primarily include improving 
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investment readiness of enterprises (maintaining financial records, developing a 
business plan, pitching to investors, etc.) and strategy design. Ecosystem players are 
also hosting networking events and workshop trainings, but these are relatively new. 
Access to these services is limited, not just because these service providers are few 
in number, but also because these services are restricted to Dhaka and awareness of 
these programs is limited.
Credit rating agencies are the most active in this field, but most impact investors 
are not utilizing their services, even for conducting valuations. Regulators have 
licensed a large number of credit rating agencies, which some speculate is due to 
political considerations as Bangladesh has more credit rating agencies than any of 
its neighbors, including India or China. However, only banks are using their services 
for assessing the credit worthiness of borrowers. Other investors do not use credit 
rating services, even for conducting valuations, despite the lack of formal valuation 
knowledge among many investors (particularly local investors) and business 
managers. 
FIGURE 22: ACTIVE ECOSYSTEM PLAYERS IN BANGLADESH
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Bangladesh Enterprise Institute studies; Dalberg analysis
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AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH
In order to further understand the opportunities in the impact investing market in 
Bangladesh, we propose several areas for further research. 
First, given that impact investing in Bangladesh is beyond the idea phase, as in 
some other South Asian markets, investors are seeking more sophisticated ways 
of measuring their impact but lack good examples or tools to do so. As part of the 
maturing process of the impact investing landscape, given that investors have a 
history in the market, the desire to be more rigorous about impact measurement and 
to tailor impact metrics to different sectors and types of enterprises requires further 
study on tools for the Bangladeshi context. Investors and enterprises alike are looking 
to move beyond output measurement to outcome and impact measurement, and will 
benefit from a resource that examines these within the local setting. 
Second, there are opportunities for exploring the potential role of the Bangladeshi 
diaspora’s contribution to the growth of the investment landscape in several ways. 
Either through a mobilization of networks abroad, or through direct investments 
in their home country, a significant amount of potential capital can be unleashed 
provided there are appropriate awareness and channels to do so. Furthermore, 
Bangladeshis who have acquired experience in the financial services industry 
abroad are also now returning and managing funds. Research on capitalizing on the 
movement of the diaspora, and providing a clear overview of the opportunities to 
optimize this engagement, can contribute to the growing impact investment market 
in Bangladesh. 
Lastly, as the market in Bangladesh evolves, an increasing number of investors 
are interested in public listings as an option for exiting their investment. In reality, 
however, only the first impact investment is going through an IPO at this moment, 
and the process is largely undefined. Additional research and information to support 
strategic exit options, including the definition and analysis of the conditions under 
which certain exit options are better than others and a preparation during earlier 
stages of the investment, will be considerably beneficial for both investors and 
investees.
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COUNTRY CONTEXT
Overview
Nepal’s small population, low GDP per capita, and political instability are 
deterrents to investments in the country, resulting in the country having the 
second smallest impact investing market by capital deployed among the 
countries under study (slightly larger than Myanmar). Nepal, with a population of 
27.5 million and a GDP per capita of about USD 690 (at the current USD exchange 
rate),36 is passing through a momentous and a prolonged transition following a 
10-year-long violent conflict that ended in 2006. Since monarchy was abolished in 
2008, there have been numerous attempts to draft a new constitution (Figure 1). 
Following a year of multiple delays, elections were held in 2013 to elect the second 
Constitutional Assembly. The Maoist party lost its majority, and the new government 
is now committed to delivering a new constitution by 2015.
FIGURE 1: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN NEPAL’S POLITICAL HISTORY
King relinquishes sovereign power; 
House of Representatives takes 
control
First Constitutional Assembly 
dissolved due to inability to 
draft new constitution by 
deadline
House of Representatives 
officially abolishes monarchy
Second Constitutional 
Assembly sworn in and 
promises new constitution 
within a year
Following a year of multiple delays, 
elections held to elect second 
Constitutional Assembly; Maoist 
party loses majority
Nepal united as single 
country; monarchy 
established
Strife arises between parties 
and multiple Prime Ministers 
ousted; delay in drafting of new 
constitution
Elections held to elect 
Constitutional Assembly tasked 
with drafting new constitution; 
Maoist party wins majority
2006
1700s 2008 2008-2011
2008 2012 2014
2013
Source: BBC Nepal profile < http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12511455>
36  World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 2013.
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The implications of this for investors are numerous:
• Nepal’s political instability has brought about low investor confidence. Investors 
will only feel confident in a politically stable environment and a government 
that will hold for a reasonable length of time (e.g., five years). Further, Nepal’s 
policy and regulatory environment is uncertain, highlighted by the lack of a 
constitution. However, there is a general belief among domestic investors that the 
recently sworn in Second Constitutional Assembly will have a new constitution 
within a year, as promised, leading to tempered optimism within the investment 
community. 
• On the positive side, diminished Maoist power has created space for more private 
sector activity and a more supportive agenda for policy reform, again creating 
optimism among investors.
• This has also meant decreased labor volatility. In the early 2000s, labor strikes were 
paralyzing the country, but have since reduced in frequency and severity. 
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GDP growth and drivers of FDI
Nepal has seen steady GDP growth at about 6% per annum since 2004 and is 
expected to continue this trend through 2016, but its GDP remains the lowest 
among the countries under study. Nepal’s total GDP in 2013 was only 42 billion 
(PPP, international dollars),37 as seen in Figure 2. At 6% per annum from 2014 to 2016, 
the forecast growth is also one of the lowest in the region.
FIGURE 2: GDP OF NEPAL (PPP, INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR, BILLIONS): CHANGE OVER TIME AND 2013 COMPARISON 
WITH THE REST OF THE REGION
GDP OF NEPAL
(PPP, CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR, BILLIONS, 2013)
GDP, BY COUNTRY
(PPP, CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR, BILLIONS, 2013)
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
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5,069
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Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook Data 2014. Notes: 1990-2013 actual, 2013 estimated,  
2014-2016 forecasted figures as of June 30, 2014.
With the second smallest population in the region and the smallest GDP per 
capita among the countries under study, Nepal’s consumer expenditure and 
market potential are not seen as very attractive for investors. At a population 
of 27.5 million38 (Figure 3), Nepal is considered a small market by investors. The 
population size, coupled with a low GDP per capita, are seen as deterrents for 
investors, who express concern that low relative consumer expenditure and market 
potential do not warrant the high risk of investing in the country. 
37  IMF World Economic Outlook Database.
38  World Development Indicators, The Work Bank.
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FIGURE 3: POPULATION OF NEPAL AND REGIONAL COMPARISON (MILLIONS)
20 28
58
155
179
1,237
IndiaPakistanBangladeshSri Lanka MyanmarNepal
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
Growth trends and investor interest are observed in some economic sub-sectors, 
particularly tourism and hospitality, and hydropower. Within the services sector, 
tourism and hospitality is a fast-growing sub-sector, creating employment for about 
20% of the economically active population and accounting for 3% of the GDP.39 
While holding the GDP share steady, the industry sector40 is growing in absolute 
terms, contributing to 37% of the country’s GDP41 due to the strong growth of 
hydropower and textiles, which continue to be attractive to investors. In fact, Nepal 
has one of the largest untapped hydropower resources in the world—an estimated 
83,000 megawatts of hydropower potential.42 
FIGURE 4: SECTOR SHARE OF GDP OVER TIME (PPP, INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR, BILLIONS)
36
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15%
37%
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16%
37%
36%
18%
46%
22%
41%
37%
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1995 2000 2005 2010 2012
48%
14
19
26
Agriculture
Industry
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42%
23%
Sources: World Development Indicators, The World Bank; IMF World Economic Outlook
39  Bishnu Prasad Gautam, Tourism and economic growth in Nepal, 2011.
40  Industry defined by ISIC Rev 3 as mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas.
41  World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
42  World Bank Nepal Overview.
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A key driver of growth, primarily through increased consumption, is remittance 
income from Nepal’s large migrant working population. Personal remittances 
totaled USD 4.8 billion in 2012.43 Remittances accounted for about 25% of the GDP, 
significantly higher than in any of the other countries under study. Remittances are 
driving increases in consumption as well as expenditure on private services such as 
education and healthcare. Remittance income also represents an important source of 
capital for asset purchase (land, houses, etc.), which in turn can serve as collateral for 
loans to provide seed funding to entrepreneurs. 
FIGURE 5: PERSONAL REMITTANCE INFLOWS: NEPAL OVER TIME (CURRENT USD MILLIONS) AND COMPARED WITH 
THE REST OF THE REGION (AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP)
PERSONAL REMITTANCES SENT TO NEPAL
(MILLIONS, CURRENT USD)
PERSONAL REMITTANCES SENT BY COUNTRY
(% OF GDP, 2012)
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Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
Despite these positive markers and trends, overall investor confidence has been 
low, reflected in low capital market investments and FDI inflows. In 2012, FDI net 
inflows reached about USD 1 billion, or about 4.9% of the GDP.44 In the same year, 
market capitalization totaled USD 4.1 billion.45 Investors considering opportunities in 
the region would prefer to invest in larger, more dynamic markets such as India and 
Bangladesh.
43  World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
44  World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
45  World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
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FIGURE 6: MARKET CAPITALIZATION AND FDI IN NEPAL COMPARED TO ITS REGIONAL NEIGHBORS
India IndiaBangladesh BangladeshNepal Nepal
4 118 1
24
1,260
MARKET CAPITALIZATION
USD BILLION, 2012
FDI NET INFLOW
USD BILLION, 2012
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank; IMF Balance of Payments database
Domestic investors are also not heavily engaged, in large part due to the 
population’s low levels of access to financial services as well as a poor 
understanding of and a relative lack of trust in these services. Given the 
extremely low levels of access to financial services in Nepal in the mid-2000s, the 
government and the central bank undertook extensive efforts to increase access to 
banking services across the country. The banked population grew considerably to 
approximately 40% in 2013 from 26% in 2006; however, while savings/deposits have 
increased, lending and investment in general remain low, reflecting low levels of 
familiarity with, and trust in, other asset classes. For example, the domestic capital 
market remains small and fairly illiquid—many listed companies are banks or financial 
institutions, which, by government mandate, must offer 30% of their equity to the 
public.46 
Key constraints and opportunities in Nepal
Nepal’s weak basic infrastructure is a major challenge, making it costly to run 
businesses and difficult to access markets or build supply chains. Despite a 
relatively high electrification rate (76% of Nepalis have access to electricity47), supply 
46  Nepal Stock Exchange.
47  International Energy Agency, Key world energy statistics, 2013.
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is unreliable and hours of access are few; therefore, the population is heavily under-
electrified (as reflected by the low per capita energy consumption), and back-up 
power supplies for businesses and industry are extremely expensive. Road networks 
are few, leaving much of the country inaccessible and economic activity very heavily 
concentrated in the Kathmandu Valley.
While these business constraints mean lower attractiveness of Nepal for 
investors seeking purely financial returns, investors with impact objectives have 
an opportunity to address significant social needs by investing to promote basic 
services, infrastructure, and economic opportunities. Nepal is among the poorest 
countries in the world and currently ranks 157 out of 187 countries on the Human 
Development Index.48 Although reduced from 53.1% in 2003, 24.8% of the population 
still lives below the World Bank USD 1.25 per day poverty line (PPP) as of 2010.49 
Gaps in basic services—such as healthcare and education—and poor infrastructure 
contribute to this poverty. For impact investors, these gaps present an opportunity to 
achieve their social mandate, albeit in a difficult market.
INVESTING IN NEPAL: THE 
SUPPLY SIDE
Overall, impact investing in Nepal is fairly limited, reflecting a small investment 
landscape at-large. pproximately USD 17.3 million has been deployed by impact 
investors in Nepal to date, of which USD 16 million has been deployed by DFIs. 
Investors see the small population of Nepal, low GDP growth (relative to other 
countries in the region), limited infrastructure, and political uncertainty as deterrents 
to investing in the country. As a result, in Nepal, the risk capital market is largely 
driven by impact investors (unlike in other markets where there is an existing set of 
commercial private equity (PE)/venture capital (VC) investors). For commercial 
players, the viability or potential of the market is unproven and unclear. Therefore, 
while there are few active players, those that are present are explicitly impact driven 
(however, even these players are still largely testing the market). 
The broad impact capital market in Nepal 
There are eight impact investors active in Nepal (Ring 1),50 although half of 
these are in an indeterminate state. Of these eight investors, there are five local 
funds, two development finance institutions (DFIs), and one regional fund, as shown 
48  UNDP, Human development reports, 2013.
49  World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
50  In this report, we use a simple framework to categorize investors. The inner ring—Ring 1—represents 
impact investing activity, and the outer ring—Ring 2—represents activity related to impact investing but 
which may lack either explicit impact intention or a commitment to measurement.
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in Figure 7. Four funds that have raised capital have either not yet deployed, or have 
been put on hold, or have closed due to management issues or the difficult market. 
These challenges will be discussed further in the section “Challenges facing impact 
investors in Nepal.” 
FIGURE 7: NUMBER OF DIRECT IMPACT AND IMPACT-RELATED INVESTORS ACTIVE IN NEPAL
2
1
5  Nepal-specific funds*
2  DFIs
1  Regional fund
1
1  Nepal-specific funds
8  Commercial banks providing   
 loans backed by DFIs/IFIs and  
 earmarked for SMEs
• Unknown number of high 
 net-worth individuals and   
 family offices
2
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis. *Notes: Two of these funds have raised capital but have not yet been deployed; 
another two funds have been put on hold according to the other players in the market. 
An additional USD 54 million is expected to be deployed soon. This capital has 
been raised but put on hold in part due to internal management constraints, difficulty 
in closing funds, and other challenges as will be discussed later in this chapter. Of 
this capital, USD 30 million has been raised by two large funds and is waiting to be 
deployed, and the remaining USD 24 million has been committed by DFIs as direct 
investments into enterprises (Figure 8). While this additional capital commitment 
signals a growing interest in the market, it also reflects the difficulties that investors 
have had in securing investments.
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FIGURE 8: TOTAL CAPITAL RAISED OR COMMITTED BY IMPACT INVESTORS IN NEPAL, BUT NOT YET DEPLOYED  
(USD MILLIONS)
FundsDFI/IFIsTotal capital  
on hold
30
24
54
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
Outside of impact investors, there are nine periphery impact-related investors 
active in Nepal with about USD 13.6 million in current investments. These 
investors include one Nepal-specific fund making small investments ranging from 
USD 2,000 to USD 8,000. Eight commercial banks are also making SME loans 
backed by DFI funding. As shown in Figure 9, these impact-related investors have 
made 44% of the total investments by amount.
FIGURE 9: TOTAL CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY RING
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
13.6
(44%)
17.3
(56%)
Ring 1: Impact investors
Ring 2: Impact-related investors
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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Active impact and impact-related investors in Nepal 
There is a range of different types of investors active in Nepal, but only a limited 
number of each type. While we see funds, DFIs, diversified financial institutions/
banks, and family offices/high net-worth individuals (HNWIs) present as in other 
markets, most are still testing the market with a minimal number of investments. There 
have been some recent efforts by local fund managers to raise new funds, but these 
are largely not yet active or deploying capital.
While at present, foreign fund managers express a low appetite for investments 
in Nepal, domestic funds are slowly emerging, and although most of these funds 
are facing difficulties in closing and deploying capital, they are shaping the 
market. Only one foreign fund has entered the country with a small investment. All 
other funds are domestic. Two of these domestic funds (both small with less than USD 
1 million in capital to deploy) have made a series of small deals as they test the market. 
Given the dearth of commercial private equity investors and venture capitalists, these 
funds are playing a vital role as the first movers to demonstrate market viability and as 
policy advocates with the government. The largest fund to date (with a portfolio of 
USD 20 million) has recently closed and is expected to begin deploying capital soon. 
This will signal a significant step for the market as the amount of capital deployed by 
funds will then rival the direct investments by DFIs (as compared to other markets 
where DFI investments dwarf investments made by fund managers). 
DFIs are the most active players in the market by capital deployed, but these 
too have only entered the market recently and are still very much testing the 
waters. In contrast to other countries where DFIs are trying to play a more catalytic 
role and to move the market, in Nepal, DFIs are still quite wary. As direct investors, 
DFIs are only making deals less than USD 10 million. Even though DFI activity is less 
than in Nepal’s regional counterparts—in terms of both the number of deals and the 
size of these deals—DFIs are still a large segment of the impact investing market, 
accounting for 93% of the total deployed impact investing capital (56% if we include 
the committed capital yet to be deployed). 
Recognizing their potential role as market catalysts, DFIs are using guarantees as 
an investment instrument in Nepal as well as their direct lending to commercial 
banks. As in other countries, DFIs are backing SME portfolios for commercial banks 
to increase lending to these enterprises. The guarantees have been to five banks to 
promote SME lending in the range of USD 40,000 to USD 8 million each (totaling 
USD 12.3 million) and three loans to banks in the range of USD 260,000 to USD 
800,000 (totaling USD 1.4 million). These investments reflect the DFI interest in 
testing the market without excessive exposure, as well as their interest in increasing 
SME access to finance in the country. 
DFIs are also acting as limited partners (LPs) for two funds, both of which have 
yet to launch. Three DFIs have backed two domestic funds—one for USD 20 million 
and the other for USD 10 million. Neither fund has yet deployed capital, but one is 
expected to close its first deal soon. Additionally, at least one bilateral donor and one 
DFI have assessed the possibility of anchoring sizable equity funds for Nepal, but 
the limited track record of the existing funds and the low level of experience of these 
funds have been the deterrent factors.
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DFIs and donor agencies play an active role in promoting and advocating 
pro-investment policy changes on behalf of the investment community. DFIs 
and donors, in collaboration with fund managers, have been working closely with 
regulators to address gaps and constraints in regulatory frameworks. Regulators 
perceive DFIs and donor agencies as knowledgeable and credible sources, and 
have addressed some concerns raised by these parties, including a recent change to 
blacklisting laws from which foreigners are now exempt (regulations will be discussed 
further in the section titled “Challenges facing impact investors in Nepal”).
Diversified financial institutions and banks have been fairly inactive as impact 
investors. SME lending from commercial banks is limited as the 117 domestic banks 
and 90 non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) have been reported to shy away from 
small deals and prefer to finance the less-risky, well-collateralized, and diversified 
business houses. Further, there has been some effort to promote increased lending 
to SMEs by financial institutions through government mandates and DFI guarantees, 
but given the large unbanked population in Nepal, it is still difficult to reach SME 
owners with formal financial services. Only a small amount of capital—largely debt 
provided or guaranteed by DFIs but on-lent through the commercial banks—is being 
channeled through institutional investors.
Domestic family offices and HNWIs are operating largely informally—without 
formal fund structures or stringent timelines. HNWIs, as well as the families of the 
leading business houses, are often considered to be the sources of seed capital. This 
happens informally and through networks that are not easy to access. There is one 
group of young investors that is starting to engage more formally as angel investors, 
but this has not been institutionalized. As in other countries, friends and family 
members also serve as a source of capital, particularly through remittance income. 
International HNWIs are also slowly engaging in Nepal, particularly through one asset 
management firm that matches these investors with enterprises. The asset manager 
works to identify potential investees, determines capital needs (as well as business 
development support needs), and approaches an existing network of investors 
outside Nepal to secure the needed capital.
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FIGURE 10: TYPES OF IMPACT INVESTORS AND IMPACT-RELATED INVESTORS ACTIVE IN NEPAL
TYPE OF INVESTOR ESTIMATED NUMBER DETAILS OF INVESTORS IN NEPAL
Funds and fund managers 7 (6 impact investors)
Small local funds are slowly emerging and have been critical in shaping 
the market, given the limited number of impact and commercial investors 
in the country, but many have been put on hold, shut, or delayed due to 
difficulties in raising capital and management issues.
DFIs
2 (2 additional 
ones are 
anchoring funds)
DFIs are making direct investments, anchoring two funds, providing 
guarantees and loans to banks to promote SME lending, and advocating 
regulatory changes on behalf of the investment community.
HNWIs/Family offices Likely many informal ones
Friends and family are a significant source of seed capital, and HNWIs are 
starting to engage informally.
Diversified financial institutions/banks 8 providing loans with DFI backing
The large unbanked population implies that many SME owners cannot 
be reached through formal financial institutions; therefore, bank lending is 
limited, but eight banks are providing SME loans with funding from DFIs.
Key trends in impact investing in Nepal 
The following section examines the trends among impact investors. The figures 
quoted in this section refer only to this set of investors, who have collectively 
deployed about USD 17.3 million to date. The activities of impact-related investors 
will be discussed in the section “Beyond the impact investing market.” Despite the 
small amount of capital deployed in Nepal, we see trends emerging around features 
such as instrument, growth stage, sector, deal size, and return expectations. 
INVESTOR MIX
As discussed, two DFIs are responsible for 93% of impact capital currently 
deployed, or USD 16 million. The remaining USD 1.2 million has been deployed by 
two small funds.
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FIGURE 11: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY INVESTOR TYPE
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USD MILLIONS
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
INSTRUMENT 
Debt is the preferred instrument for most of the overall impact capital in Nepal. 
DFIs are responsible for these trends as they are testing market viability through 
these relatively low-risk instruments. DFI debt investments account for at least 73% of 
capital deployed by impact investors, whereas equity is about 5% (Figure 12). 
FIGURE 12: IMPACT CAPITAL BY INSTRUMENT
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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Regulatory uncertainty around equity makes debt preferable. Even among 
investors that have not yet deployed capital, debt is identified as the most feasible 
and least risky instrument. As a new instrument, the regulatory rules and processes 
around equity have not yet been fully defined in Nepal. Equity deals must get the 
approval of the country’s central bank, but the process for approval is long and not 
well-defined, leaving investors uncertain about what to expect. In addition, domestic 
investors can be blacklisted from financial markets or services if they provide equity 
to a company that fails (foreign investors have recently been exempted from these 
regulations).
However, equity is being tested in small amounts, particularly by investors that 
are not legally allowed to provide debt. While regulations around equity are stifling 
for investors, debt is outright prohibited for certain investors. In particular, in order 
to provide debt, an investor must be registered as a bank in its country of origin. 
For small funds, this is unfeasible, so they are testing the market through equity 
investments.
GROWTH STAGE AND DEAL SIZE
Most of the currently deployed impact capital has been invested in mature 
companies; this is strongly driven by one large investment by a DFI. As is the case 
in the other countries considered in this study, DFIs prefer to make investments larger 
than USD 1 million, but only a small number of companies can absorb capital of this 
amount in Nepal—and these are primarily mature. As such, given the small amount 
of capital deployed and only around six deals made, the DFI investments drive an 
observed preference for mature companies.
FIGURE 13: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY BUSINESS STAGE 
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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All known investments from non-DFI investors are in growth stage companies, as 
the capital requirements for these companies match the small ticket size of funds 
that are currently active. For these non-DFI investors, ticket size limitations of less 
than USD 1 million are driving their preference for growth-stage companies. These 
investments have been less than USD 200,000 in size. 
Seed capital represents a funding gap among formal impact investment channels 
but is addressed by informal networks such as friends and family. No seed capital 
has been provided by formal impact investors, and it is difficult for entrepreneurs 
to secure seed funding from commercial banks, due to high collateral requirements 
and general reluctance on the part of banks to fund early-stage ventures. As a result, 
entrepreneurs access seed capital through informal channels such as self-financing, 
friends, and family. Nepal’s significant remittance inflows are likely driving much of this 
informal lending by friends and family.
All four of the known non-DFI deals in Nepal are less than USD 1 million in 
value; the two known DFI investments are significantly larger. As a result of two 
larger deals made by DFIs, the larger of which is USD 10 million, the overall average 
deal size across all known deals is approximately USD 2.4 million. Specific portfolio 
information was not available for one DFI; hence, the number of deals made is 
unknown. 
We see small deal sizes as investors are wary of the market, small investors are 
looking to diversify their portfolios, and only a limited number of companies 
are capable of absorbing large capital infusions. As discussed previously, a limited 
number of investment-ready companies can absorb large amounts of capital (more 
than USD 1 million). DFIs, while able to deploy larger ticket sizes, are still new to the 
market. Smaller funds are looking to diversify their portfolios to minimize risks and are 
therefore, deploying smaller ticket sizes to allow for a greater number of deals. These 
funds have only made deals under USD 1 million. 
Deal size trends are likely to shift as two large funds begin to deploy capital. 
While small ticket sizes have been the norm to date, two large funds are entering the 
impact investing market with expectations of deploying ticket sizes greater than USD 
1 million, and focusing on renewable energy, tourism, education, information and 
communication technology (ICT), healthcare, and agriculture. 
SECTOR
Transport and tourism and hospitality are two sectors that are currently receiving 
the largest portion of capital, but these preferences simply reflect two DFI 
investments. Collectively, these sectors have absorbed 78% of capital.
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FIGURE 14: IMPACT INVESTMENTS BY SECTOR (BOTH DFI AND NON-DFI INVESTORS)
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
In general, sector selection has been fairly opportunistic rather than strategic, 
as investors are focused on finding investable companies irrespective of sector. 
Faced with a dearth of investment-ready enterprises, investors are reluctant to restrict 
their portfolio to certain sectors. This has led to more capital flowing to sectors 
with investable companies. To date, these sectors are tourism and hospitality (there 
has been an investment in a hotel and interest in a restaurant, driven by the large 
number of foreign tourists visiting the country) and transport (there have been two 
investments in an airline). 
Additionally, sector selection is often tied to ticket size. Investors who need to 
deploy large amounts of capital in individual transactions typically look for deals in 
sectors where enterprises can absorb large investments, including energy (particularly 
hydropower), and tourism and hospitality. While deal flow has been fairly limited, 
investors looking to make larger investments are expressing interest in these sectors 
(as discussed below). Agriculture in Nepal, in contrast, is still highly subsistence-based 
with little commercialization. Most investable opportunities in this sector are small in 
size and thus, do not appeal to DFIs or larger funds moving into the market. Instead, 
we see small funds investing in agriculture opportunities, with ticket sizes of USD 
200,000 or less.
Although investments to date have been opportunistic with respect to sector, 
for the future investors are particularly excited about the potential of investing 
in hydropower, and tourism and hospitality. Historically, both these sectors have 
been high-growth sectors, and these trends are expected to continue. In addition, 
there have been a number of large hydropower projects that have brought on 
foreign investors, and IPO exits are more feasible, making it possible to list during 
construction to raise more capital. However, investors are growing wary of the 
hydropower sector, as regulations may tighten due to Indian investors looking to enter 
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the market. Tourism and hospitality has also historically been a strong sector, and 
many investors are looking to invest in large hotel chains to capitalize on the growing 
number of foreign tourists visiting the country. 
Outside of hydropower and tourism, sectors such as healthcare and education 
are growing in appeal due to remittance-funded spending for private services 
in these sectors. As remittance inflows continue to grow, provision of basic services 
is moving increasingly toward the private sector. Many families benefitting from 
remittance income are sending their children to affordable private schools and using 
private healthcare facilities, rather than the free public alternatives. Recognizing this 
trend, investors are increasingly interested in the for-profit entities coming into the 
market to address gaps in basic services. 
Return expectations and exit possibilities
Return expectations range from 17% to 35% for equity investors, but with 
little market activity to date, these expectations are untested. Equity investors 
benchmark expectations against a high cost of capital (12%–13%) and the less-risky 
return expectations of the capital markets (16%–18%). Given the lack of exit activity 
among impact investors, return expectations are being calculated against returns on 
other asset classes (Figure 15). 
FIGURE 15: APPROXIMATE RETURNS OF OTHER ASSET CLASSES (%, ANNUAL)
Commercial bank 
interest rate for 
savings/deposits*
Fixed deposit rate** Average returns on 
capital market***
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Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank; Nepal Rastra Bank; Stakeholder Interviews. Notes: *Interest rates have historically been 
volatile, making both depositors and investors wary. **Rate on 1-year deposits; lower rate offered used to calculate average, as of 2010. ***Market 
returns at 16%–18%.
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Exits have been limited, among both impact investors and commercial investors. 
Given the nascent commercial and impact investment markets, few investors have 
exited deals. The exceptions are hydropower projects, which have had a few exits 
through IPOs and, in turn, are driving greater interest in the sector. Interestingly, 
regulations allow for hydropower projects to be listed even before the project begins.
While equity investors would prefer exits via IPOs, it is more likely that exits 
will happen through secondary sales, trade sales, or owner buybacks. IPO is 
preferred as investors believe that this exit option will yield the strongest returns. 
However, for now, the capital market is fairly small and not very vibrant. Additionally, 
the mandatory three-year post-IPO lock-in period (for investors holding equity stakes 
pre-IPO) is a key challenge that deters investors from making equity investments in 
the first place. Investors are hoping that IPO exits will be a feasible option by the time 
they are ready to exit as the capital market grows, but expect other exit mechanisms 
to be more likely. In particular, investors look at the large potential market in India 
as an exit option for both secondary sales to larger Indian funds and trade sales/
acquisitions by Indian companies looking to expand.
Beyond the impact investing market
In addition to the eight impact investors, there is a peripheral group of impact-
related investors that currently have investments worth USD 13.6 million. These 
investors include one small local fund making small ticket investments of between 
USD 2,000 and USD 8,000. There are also eight commercial banks using DFI capital 
to make SME loans. While this is a common activity of DFIs in the other countries 
under study, it has been limited by comparison in Nepal as DFIs are just entering the 
market and banks do not have the potential to reach many SMEs. 
Debt is the preferred instrument among these investors, reflecting the large 
share of commercial bank lending to SMEs in this ring. Indeed, apart from only 
one USD 5,000 equity investment that has been made by a single investor, all 
investments in activity peripheral to impact investing have been deployed as debt. 
While little is known about the individual portfolios of the commercial banks, it is 
likely that there is wide diversity in the sector, deal sizes are small, and investees 
are in the growth stage or are mature companies. Sector selection, ticket size, and 
growth stage preferences differ by lender. However, most lenders are sector agnostic; 
they look for investments that are financially viable in any sector. Therefore, there is 
likely to be some diversity in the sectors absorbing capital. Given that the loans are 
targeting SMEs, ticket sizes are small. Banks require an operating history, so it is likely 
that no seed (and minimal VC) funding is available. The other investor in this ring 
has also been making small deals and is opportunistic with respect to sector selection; 
however, this investor has only invested in venture stage companies as their capital 
needs are small (and match the fund’s desired ticket size) and the fund manager has 
experience with companies in early growth stages.  
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Challenges facing impact investors in Nepal
Looking across the investment cycle, investors struggle to get an initial foothold 
in Nepal due to cumbersome regulations (discussed further in the section titled 
“Enabling impact investing: the ecosystem”) as well as challenges in converting 
identified opportunities into investable deals (Figure 16). In the early stages 
of entering the market, investors face particular constraints navigating regulatory 
processes (particularly those related to registration and approvals) and identifying 
talented fund managers (since there is little history of PE/VC in Nepal, there are few 
experienced managers). Foreign investors face a cumbersome FDI process, which 
requires a minimum investment of USD 50,000 and pre-investment approval by 
certain authorities (rather than post-investment notification as in other markets). 
Domestic investors, while not facing the same challenges, are subject to a 
“blacklisting” regulation that states that equity investors in a company that defaults or 
fails altogether are blacklisted in the financial markets, a threat that significantly lowers 
the investors’ risk appetite. Further, fund managers find it difficult to raise funds from 
both foreign and domestic investors who are uncertain of the potential in Nepal as 
illustrated in Figure 16.
In addition to restrictive or deterrent regulatory elements, the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the application of regulations is additionally a deterrent. 
For example, investors express that regulatory restrictions related to IPO exits are 
a barrier to investments—both in their official form and in the uncertainty of their 
enforcement. With a limited history of IPOs in the market, investors have no evidence 
of the viability of this exit option. Therefore, while defined on paper, there is no 
certainty that the regulatory process will be followed in practice. Furthermore, the 
regulations require a binding three-year lock-in period for investors following a listing 
and the premium valuation of shares is not allowed; instead, shares can only be listed 
at the present value. 
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FIGURE 16: CHALLENGES FACED BY INVESTORS AND ASSET MANAGERS ACROSS THE INVESTMENT CYCLE
Severity of investor challenges, by stage of investment
Key challenges faced by investors and severity of impact
Entry into  
Nepal
Pipeline  
Development
Screening,  
due diligence
Structuring for 
investment
Managing  
investment/ 
follow up
Exit
Uncertain regulatory/ 
political environment
Difficulty finding local 
talent to manage fund
Foreign investors must 
bring in at least  
USD 50,000
FDI process cumbersome; 
requires approval and not 
simply notification
Domestic investors can 
be blacklisted if investee 
company defaults
Difficulty in raising 
funds —foreign investors 
wary of market
For debt investors must 
be registered in country of 
origin as a bank —harder 
to leverage equity
Few companies 
are investor savvy 
and know how 
to interact with 
or present to 
investors
Few viable 
companies outside 
Kathmandu
Investors all 
“fishing in the 
same pond” 
making deal 
sourcing difficult
Unclear 
regulatory/political 
environment 
makes exit 
possibilities 
uncertain
Limited 
experience with 
IPOs—no proof of 
success
Regulatory 
environment 
for IPO very 
unattractive
Corporate 
governance typically 
poor —traditional 
structures preferred
Companies often 
undercapitalized —
can access 
bank loans so 
no incentive to 
improve
Companies often 
lacking accurate or 
sufficient financial 
records
Many companies 
are not licensed 
and, thus, cannot 
receive capital
Significant 
time and effort 
required to 
help companies 
establish proper 
financials and 
corporate 
governance to 
absorb investment
Managing a large 
numbers of small 
investments 
requires more 
bandwith than 
most small funds 
have
Unclear investor 
protection laws; 
uncertainty about 
legal recourse in 
case of contract 
default
Least severe                 Most Severe
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
In terms of pipeline development, while never an easy task, the small size of 
Nepal’s market in this case presents some advantages. The small market is 
made even smaller by the fact that most of the economic activity is concentrated 
in the Kathmandu Valley, and therefore most of the investible opportunities are 
concentrated there as well. On the flip side, this does at least make the identification 
of enterprises easier. While there is some level of “fishing in the same pond,” pipeline 
identification is possible through networking and relationship building as in most 
markets, and through alternative strategies such as working with commercial banks 
and other network points for enterprises.
However, the real challenge for investors in Nepal is getting identified 
enterprises to the point where the execution of a deal is possible. Above and 
beyond the standard due diligence, extensive and time-intensive work is needed to 
develop financial records and projections, business plans, governance structures, etc., 
as part of the deal-structuring phase. This can take months to achieve and requires 
significant hands-on investor engagement.
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FIGURE 17: FUNDRAISING CHALLENGES FOR FUNDS AND FUND MANAGERS
Difficulty raising 
funds and long 
fundraising 
timelines
• One fund took approximately 2.5 years to raise USD 20 million and has been primarily funded by DFI/IFIs
• One fund raised capital from a DFI, but was unable to raise any additional capital
• The remaining funds have not raised capital, but are/were either self funded, funded by winnings from a 
business competition or pair HNWIs with investable businesses to facilitate investments from HNWIs to 
business
Funds put on 
hold/closed
• Two funds seemingly closed after poor performance and one fund was put on hold due to management issues
• One fund has not yet deployed any capital, but has deals in the pipeline. Many investors (including DFI/IFIs) 
waiting to see how this fund performs before releasing or committing capital 
• DFI/IFIs have put investments on hold
Challenges with 
foreign capital 
investments
• Overseas funds are restricted to equity deals, because regulations require that debt providers be registered in 
their country of origin as a bank
• The Government of Nepal is considering an increase in FDI minimum from USD 50,000 to USD 200,000
• Bringing in foreign capital is time consuming, difficult, and may require bribes be paid
Least severe                 Most Severe
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
Looking forward
Apart from the roughly USD 54 million capital that has been raised or committed 
to be deployed in the next 2-3 years, there are a few investors looking to raise 
additional capital for Nepal. While the size of these anticipated increases is much 
smaller than in other markets, these increases still represent a significant volume when 
compared to existing deployment. The investors will be a combination of DFIs and 
bilateral donors who are exploring the use of investment instruments to supplement 
their traditional grant-based financing. In fact, a few donors have expressed interest 
in anchoring investment funds or making direct investments. Finally, there is a small 
angel fund under consideration by existing Nepali investors that would meet a vital 
need for seed funding provided alongside technical assistance and mentorship.
In addition, a recently announced government program will provide USD 5 
million to start-ups. No details are available on the program as yet. It is expected to 
take a year or more for the fund to open. 
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NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES: 
THE DEMAND SIDE
Overview of social enterprise ecosystem in Nepal 
Like impact investing, the concept of impact enterprise, as defined by this 
report,51 is relatively new in Nepal, and very few enterprises have been started 
with an impact intention. Stakeholders suggest that a large proportion of enterprises 
in Nepal are focused exclusively on financial returns, but there has been a recent shift 
toward operating socially minded businesses. The shift is being driven by investors 
and consumers who are interested in supporting socially conscious companies and 
buying environmentally friendly products.
As a result of both the small size and the nascent status of the impact enterprise 
landscape as well as the broader concerns related to the market, we see very little 
impact capital directed into impact enterprises. Rather, investors deploy capital 
into SMEs or enterprises operating in sectors where, irrespective of the business 
model itself, the investors perceive an opportunity to broadly meet their dual social 
and financial mandates. In Nepal, these sectors have been hydropower—given the 
limited access to energy and large, untapped hydro potential in the country—and 
tourism, which is expected to generate significant economic growth. 
Given the agricultural base of the economy, there are a large number of 
agricultural and agro-processing enterprises that seek to develop more 
inclusive supply chains. While for many entrepreneurs in the sector, “impact” was 
often not a core consideration in developing their businesses and business models, 
increasing awareness implies there may be a shift to explicitly incorporate social and 
environmental impact into the model once the enterprise is established. 
While potentially an interesting target for impact capital, investors perceive two 
ongoing challenges: i) most enterprises are small scale as agriculture is mostly 
for subsistence and commercialization is still limited, and ii) while there are many 
enterprises in the sector, most are unused to external capital and the vast majority 
are outside the Kathmandu valley, making access and identification by city-based 
investors difficult.
Secondly, education and, to a lesser extent healthcare, are also attracting 
entrepreneur attention, driven by the potential market arising from remittance-
fuelled disposable income. Early entrepreneurs in education have focused on 
lucrative private coaching centers and college/university prep centers, but a growing 
number are exploring the potential of low-income private schools, successfully 
drawing students out of the public system as families prioritize quality education with 
their increased incomes. While a similar trend could be possible in healthcare—as 
51  For the purposes of this study, we define impact enterprises as those that have articulated a core 
objective to generate a positive social or environmental impact (as a part of their operating model rather 
than an ancillary activity), and seek to increase their financial viability and sustainability.
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remittances increase incomes, populations become more discerning and willing to pay 
for private care—the regulations in the sector create relatively high barriers to entry. 
Therefore, impact enterprise activity in the sector may be slower to take off. 
Energy is the third area that is increasingly seen as a growth opportunity for 
impact enterprises and therefore, for investors as well. Nepal offers massive 
untapped potential in the sectors of hydro and wind energy, and as the current 
energy demands are not being met, there is notable scope for innovative enterprise 
models to meet household needs. While experimentation and entrepreneurship in 
the sector are still limited, and the focus remains on relatively large-scale hydro plant 
development, there is potentially an opportunity for small-scale enterprise activity in 
the sector as well.
Ethically sourced handicrafts are a growing market, largely driven by foreign 
tourists. Handicraft stores in Kathmandu valley and other tourist spots are selling 
woven products, jewelry, and cosmetic and bath products produced using ethically 
sourced inputs. These retail stores often source directly from local women’s 
cooperatives that manufacture the products. The market is largely driven by foreign 
tourists.
That said, while opportunities are certainly visible in the market, the low level of 
familiarity with the impact enterprise concept means that thus far, there has been 
little innovation in the space. Some investors believe that once impact-oriented 
funds become more active and start to target and develop viable impact enterprises, 
the awareness and attractiveness of the model will grow; entrepreneurs that may have 
been operating with dual social and economic objectives without explicitly defining as 
such may start to rearticulate their models and new approaches may be developed.
Constraints to enterprise growth
As shown in Figure 18, access to finance is the third biggest constraint to growth 
in Nepal, preceded only by political instability and access to electricity. Power 
access is particularly important for enterprises in manufacturing industries where the 
key issues are related to reliability and consistency, given the context of heavy load 
shedding in Nepal, rather than connectivity or access itself. 
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FIGURE 18: ENTERPRISE CHALLENGES (PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS IDENTIFYING A CERTAIN CHALLENGE AS THE 
LARGEST CONSTRAINT TO BUSINESS)
8.6
48.9
25.6
5.1
3.0
2.9
1.3
1.3
1.0
0.1
Politcal instability
Electricity
Access to finance
Transportation
Practices of informal sector
Access to land
Customs and trade regulation
Business licenses and permits
Tax rates
Inadequately educated work force
Sources: IFC Enterprise Survey of 482 enterprises in Nepal; Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
The access to finance constraint is driven by multiple sub-factors (Figure 18). 
For business managers, access to capital (rather than its availability) is often the 
more pressing issue. In particular, many enterprises do not know where to look or 
how to identify sources. Often, the capital available is not appropriate for the needs 
of business managers, and the process of obtaining capital also prevents access. For 
instance, the low level of innovation in bank products means a poor fit for enterprise 
needs: no bridge loans or project finance products are available, and working capital 
loans are only given against stock (which may not exist in the early stages).
Like investors, entrepreneurs also face certain challenges while raising finance in 
the capital markets as they are similarly dissuaded by the regulatory conditions. 
As discussed previously, regulations in Nepal require a three-year lock-in period for 
investors and prohibit the premium valuation of IPOs. As such, business managers 
have little incentive to list shares on the public market. 
As expected, we see that the extent and manifestation of these challenges vary 
by enterprise growth stage. Seed stage enterprises can often, although not easily, 
access capital through microfinance or informal channels. Therefore, it is after the 
initial injection and before the company is fully profitable or with stable revenues that 
the greatest constraints are felt.
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FIGURE 19: SEVERITY OF ACCESS TO FINANCE CHALLENGES FOR BUSINESS MANAGERS BY ENTERPRISE GROWTH STAGE
Identifying sources of capital
Appropriateness of capital
Severity of access to finance challenge, by stage of growth
Key challenges faced and severity of impact
Least severe Most Severe
Public listingSeed Venture Growth Mature
Accessing capital
Limited formal sources of capital for early stage; most seed 
funding from friends and family
For large loans, banks prefer only to loan to companies 
with whom they are familiar or have a lending history
Few domestic investors take equity stakes in private companies; they either invest equity in enterprises within their 
own networks (which are easy to vet) or they invest in public equity markets
Many entrepreneurs are wary of banks due to belief that 
bank employees may steal business idea
International investors not interested in or cannot 
enter Nepal market
Small capital market with mostly 
banks listed
Outside of banks, there are a minimal number of capital sources present in the country
Banks do not reach a large portion of the population
Complicated process of applying for capital and negotiating terms of investment, due 
to lack of investment-related experience
Uncertainty about IPO process and 
perceptions of restrictive nature
Difficult to secure reliable third party valuation; enterprises themselves don’t 
understand or have the capability
Companies have not kept accurate financial records (by design to avoid taxes or by default due to lack of 
knowledge) and investors require 1+ years of operating records
Owner can only sell to other owner–
limits ability to exit through IPO
Collateral requirements are high, too high for new/young enterprises; entrepreneurs 
often take personal loans or use unregulated financial institutions, both of which have 
higher interest rates
Working with foreign investors is more difficult due to cultural mindset—perceptions of how things should work based in home country are different
Low levels of understanding among business managers of non-debt instruments and 
appropriateness of instrument given needs/stage (e.g., debt in early stages can be crippling  
due to interest repayment) 
Regulations inappropriate—act as 
a deterrent or disincentive (e.g. 3-5 
year lock-in period, no premium 
valuation)Uncertainty about legal recourse available if issues 
arise with equity investor
Tenure of bank loans not appropriate–in early stages need long term loans with long grace 
periods before company is revenue positive
High levels of volatility in interest rates can be crippling 
and reduce ability to repay
Low levels of innovation in bank products means poor fit for enterprise needs—e.g. no bridge 
loans or project finance products, working capital loans only given against stock which doesn’t 
exist in the early stages, etc.
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
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In addition to limited access to finance, enterprises struggle to grow due to lack 
of business and management skills—a gap identified by entrepreneurs, investors, 
and ecosystem players. In particular, for SMEs, the low levels of operational and 
financial management skills are a significant constraint to growth, particularly 
around financial record keeping and planning, HR management, and supply chain 
management.
FIGURE 20: KEY CONSTRAINTS FACED BY ENTERPRISES OF DIFFERENT SIZES
Challenge Area Key Issues
Severity for 
SMEs
Severity  
for large 
enterprises
Business 
management skills 
• Business managers do not always have the skills to source or access capital 
(e.g., business plan development and investor pitches)
• Business managers have a traditional business management approach 
and mindset as many are traditional family-owned business structures— 
businesses “run out of pockets” with low levels of strategic growth 
planning—; starting to change with new generation
Operational /  
Financial 
Management
• Weak operational systems and processes, particularly in HR practices
• Business managers strong at running business, but not as strong at growing 
and expanding business
• Lacking corporate governance among many companies
• Businesses have not undertaken basic activities required for getting capital, 
such as registering the company and keeping financial records
• Difficulty managing/integrating into supply chain; supply chains not 
streamlined; no predictable supply of quality inputs
Information / 
Networks
• Low levels of understanding about different financial instruments and how 
to access these instruments
• Business managers do not have networks to connect with potential 
investors, especially investors abroad
• Lack of mentorship for budding business managers
Least severe
Most severe
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
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ENABLING IMPACT 
INVESTING: THE ECOSYSTEM
The two broad dimensions of the ecosystem to consider are the macro investment 
climate (including considerations such as ease of doing business, political stability, 
macroeconomic governance, infrastructure strength and reliability, and the regulatory 
framework) and the specialized support available for investors and enterprises for 
navigating the investment landscape (such as deal sourcing and matchmaking, and 
enterprise development).
The macro investment climate
The macro climate for investors has been improving slowly along certain 
dimensions, but in general, it remains fairly unattractive. While ranking fairly highly 
in our study country set (lower than Sri Lanka and India but higher than the rest), 
overall, Nepal ranks 105 out of 189 countries in the World Bank “Doing Business” 
rankings. Nepal scores relatively high on protecting investors with a ranking of 80 and 
the ease of starting a business rank improved from 103 to 97 between 2013 and 2014.
Investors and entrepreneurs are optimistic that shifting political conditions, and 
a new constitution (currently under negotiation) will open markets and lead to 
more liberal policies and regulations. However, delays in the political process to 
date leave them uncertain of when the changes will come and exactly how positive 
these changes will be. In the meantime, a variety of regulations reduce the appeal for 
investors or prevent entry altogether. Some of these regulations have been discussed 
previously and are highlighted below. 
 ü Foreign investors must bring at least USD 50,000 for investment, and the 
government is considering raising this threshold to USD 200,000. 
 ü Foreign investors must gain approval from the Department of Industries for all 
equity investments. For new equity investors, the process requires additional 
registration and approvals. 
 ü A foreign investor providing debt must be registered with the appropriate officials 
as a bank in their country of origin, and the loan must also be approved by the 
Department of Industries.
 ü Foreign investors are restricted from investing in 21 sectors under the Foreign 
Investment and Technology Transfer Act of 1992. However, the current list is 
under review and a new policy seeks to reduce the number of sectors restricted 
to foreign investment from 21 to seven. Sectors that are likely to remain restricted 
under the amended framework include real estate and housing (excluding 
construction), hotels that have a ranking of less than three stars, multi-brand retail 
businesses with investments of less than USD 50,000, cottage industries, arms and 
ammunition, and coins and currency.
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 ü Domestic investors can be blacklisted from financial markets if they hold equity 
in a company that fails. Foreign investors were recently exempted from this 
regulation.
 ü The Securities Registration and Issue Regulations Act requires that pre-IPO 
investors are locked in for a period of three years following a public listing. 
 ü Upon public listing, no premium valuation of shares is allowed. 
Perceptions of political and policy instability are compounded by the weak 
infrastructure—particularly, power and road infrastructure. Although nearly 80% 
of the population has access to electricity, power is unreliable, with residential and 
business areas losing power for up to eight hours a day. Many businesses are forced 
to use generators, which are a financial drain. Meanwhile, poor road conditions make 
it difficult to access areas outside Kathmandu—disrupting supply chains, increasing 
the cost of travel and shipping, and making it difficult for investors to scope for 
companies outside the Kathmandu valley.
FIGURE 21: SEVERITY OF INVESTMENT CLIMATE CONSTRAINTS IN NEPAL
Key  
components Key ecosystem constraints in Nepal
Severity of 
constraint
Regulatory 
environment
• Extreme uncertainty about future regulatory environment, given fluid political landscape
• Perception that regulators are considering more open policies, but an increase in the FDI 
minimum suggests these perceptions may be too optimistic
• Current regulations considered not conductive to foreign investment, including:
 » FDI threshold
 » Restricted sectors list
 » Lock in periods on capital following an IPO
 » Registration as a bank in country of origin for all debt providers
• Regulations are rigid on paper, but not as clear and well defined in practice, making it difficult 
to predict and follow regulatory processes
Political stability
• The Government of Nepal has operated under an interim constitution since 2008 and 
numerous political maneuverings have delayed the drafting of a new constitution, leaving 
significant uncertainty about the country’s political future
• Domestic perception that political climate will eventually improve, but foreign investors 
doubtful and awaiting new constitution
Infrastructure
• Residential areas and many businesses lose power more than 8 hours a day in Kathmandu; 
access to power limited outside the capital. Generators and fuel are financial drains on many 
companies
• Road density, especially in rural areas, is low. As of 2007, only 43% of the population had 
access to all-weather roads
• One international airport and limited connectivity domestically
Least severe
Most severe
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Ministry of Industry “Invest Nepal” and policy documentation; Nepali news reports; Dalberg analysis
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The general perception is that the new government and the heads of key 
bureaucratic divisions are pro-private sector and will institute business-friendly 
reforms. However, the key question for investors and entrepreneurs is related to the 
pace of such reform, and the perception is that although positive, the change will be 
slow. 
There are three institutions leading the efforts to improve the investment climate 
(in partnership with donors and DFIs): the Nepal Investment Board, Nepal 
Rastra Bank, and the Securities Board of Nepal. While investors seem to believe 
that all three regulatory bodies are pro-private sector growth and thus, investment-
friendly, there are varying degrees of belief in these bodies’ ability to address the 
existing gaps in policy (Figure 22).
FIGURE 22: ROLE, MANDATES, AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREE KEY REGULATORS
Nepal 
Investment 
Board 
• Established under the Investment Board Nepal Act in 2011
• Promotes economic development by creating and ensuring an 
investment-friendly climate
• Functions include mobilizing and overseeing investments, setting 
investment priority areas, selecting investment projects
• Perception that Nepal Investment Board is 
supportive of private sector development 
and improvements to investment climate
• Able to interface with foreign investors
Nepal Rastra 
Bank
• Founded in 1956 under the Nepal Rastra Bank Act
• Monetary, regulatory and supervisory authority of banks and 
financial institutions
• Functions include regulating and overseeing banks, monitoring 
economic situation, promoting financial services and setting 
monetary policy
• Perception that bank is aware of policy gaps 
and willing to address these gaps
• Uncertainty about the future direction of 
Bank policy, given shifting political climate 
and new constitution
• Process is expected to take time  
(One year to sign new constitution)
• Perception that there are very low levels 
of understanding about new financial 
instruments, leading to difficulty in regulating 
instruments they don’t understand
• Concern about bureaucrats’ ability to work 
with foreign investors
Securities 
Board of Nepal 
(SEBON)
• Set up in 1993 under the Securities Act
• Registers securities; regulates sale, transfer and exchange of 
securities; supervises and monitors stock exchange; supervises 
investment funds and grants permission for their activities
• Appear supportive of regulatory changes 
that promote investment and private sector 
development
• Concern about bureaucrats’ ability to work 
with foreign investors
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
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Support for investors and enterprises 
There are a growing number of service providers for investors and enterprises, 
but this support is not sufficient or advanced enough. Little is known about the 
changing regulatory environment, and there is no support for investors navigating 
the regulations. No “one-stop shop” exists to support investors with navigating the 
process of registering.
FIGURE 23: CONSTRAINTS TO INVESTOR AND ENTERPRISE SUPPORT IN NEPAL
Key  
components Key ecosystem contraints in Nepal
Severity of 
constraint
In
ve
st
or
 an
d E
nt
er
pr
ise
 su
pp
or
t Investor 
support
• Little is known about the changing regulatory environment and there is no support for 
investors navigating the regulations
• DFI/IFIs and large funds advocating to regulators/policymakers on behalf of investors
• No local providers of investor support, but many fund managers are expats or have 
worked/been schooled abroad and have a strong grasp of the financial sector
• No “one stop shop” for investors to register —e.g. Department of Industry approves 
FDIs, Central Bank approval, etc.—and no assistance provided to navigate process
Enterprise 
support
• In addition to access to finance challenges, entrepreneurs face a range of other 
constraints to growth including their own business mindset, skills and knowledge, as 
well as access to information and networks
• Given the small market size in Nepal, there are quite a few providers of business 
support services, but these providers are typically small and new to the space
• Key areas of need include:
 » Aggregation/networking/knowledge sharing amongst entrepreneurs
 » Training in key business management functions—both strategic and 
operationalLeast
Least severe
Most severe
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
While there has been some history of donor programs (including some run 
by Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and Stichting 
Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (SNV)), private players are only just starting to enter 
the enterprise development or support landscape and very few are well known or 
easily accessible. Given the current focus on improving the investment climate and 
regulatory environment, there has been a heavy emphasis on institutional capacity 
building and policy advocacy. As a result, enterprise development support has not 
been emphasized as heavily, although there is recognition now of the severe need in 
this area with the emergence of private providers.
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FIGURE 24: EMERGING PLAYERS IN ENTERPRISE SUPPORT LANDSCAPE IN NEPAL
Entrepreneurs  
for Nepal (E4N) DANIDA UNCTAD Nepal Business Forum
TA Providers
SwissContact
Eos Advisors
Samriddhi
Lead International
Biruwa
SNV
GIZ
Beed
Asian Development  
Bank
Saadhva
Advisory Services
Rockstart Accelerator* ChangeFusion Nepal Startup Cup
Incubators/Accelerators
ICRA Nepal
Credit Rating Services
* Has not yet started but is in final fundraising and should host first cycle this year
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
While the ecosystem seems to be evolving and growing, it is not yet sufficient to 
address the needs of entrepreneurs and investors in the market. Investors hope 
that a new constitution will bring about regulatory structure and certainty, kick-starting 
the investment market and enabling continued growth.
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AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH
As Nepal represents a still-maturing impact investing landscape, there exists scope 
for additional research to highlight key opportunities in the country. First, in addition 
to determining what innovations in financial products are optimal for a nascent 
enterprise and investing market, further insight on what will make the market more 
attractive overall, would be beneficial. Investors from abroad are not yet very 
interested in the Nepal market, given the country’s small population, small GDP, and 
a very small number of companies that can actually absorb capital. Furthermore, 
exposure to financial services and investor experience in Nepal is limited. Given a 
very young and not fully supportive overall ecosystem for impact investing, further 
research can highlight how to catalyze impact enterprise growth, increase investor 
knowledge and experience in-country, and pinpoint areas of interest for foreign 
investors.
Second, most of what is known about the impact investing market in Nepal reflects 
what is happening in Kathmandu only and not the activity outside this region. A 
greater understanding of what is happening in the surrounding areas would be helpful 
to the investors. 
Third, further study in specific sectors of interest, including tourism and hydropower, 
to estimate the financial performance and impact of historical activities, will provide 
lessons that will guide the market growth.
Lastly, specific research on the effect of remittances from abroad on the private 
uptake of traditionally public services would be interesting. For example, there are 
several start-up enterprises that provide basic services, such as water, sanitation, 
healthcare, and education. Families in Nepal can, to a large extent, consume these 
services because of their remittance income, which is a significantly high percentage 
of the country’s GDP. If foreign nationals further develop an interest in investing in 
small enterprises, remittances may begin to fuel investments in growing start-ups in 
Nepal, as a trend.
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COUNTRY CONTEXT
Overview
Pakistan is a young country but has had a tumultuous political history with 
numerous regime changes including martial rule, dictatorships, and democracy. 
Between 1947 and 1971, India and Pakistan fought two major wars over Kashmir, setting 
Pakistan up for several years of political churn. In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf came 
to power through a military coup, remaining in power for almost ten years. Between 
2008 and 2013, Pakistan again saw several political changes. These included President 
Musharraf’s resignation in 2008 following impeachment proceedings against him, and 
the election of Asif Ali Zardari (the widower of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, 
who was assassinated in 2007), as well as reform efforts in 2010 when the parliament 
approved wide-ranging constitutional reforms (including the transfer of key powers 
from the Office of the President to that of the Prime Minister). Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif ’s parliamentary election in 2013 marked the first time an elected government 
successfully completed its term in office and handed power to an elected successor. 
The new government is widely considered to be pro-private sector and business 
friendly, and this is encouraging for investors—a necessary boost after decades of 
instability serving as a strong deterrent.
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FIGURE 1: TIMELINE OF PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL HISTORY
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In addition to political instability, the most significant deterrent for investors is 
the perceived insecurity or the volatility of the security situation in the country. 
Pakistan has been marred by terrorist attacks and sectarian violence. Despite 
government attempts to fight terrorism, threats remain high. Since 2001, terrorism 
inside Pakistan has increased twofold, where in addition to sectarian violence, Pakistan 
has had to combat the threat of Taliban militants and the Al-Qaeda. According to 
President Zardari, between 2001 and 2011, militant attacks killed 35,000 people in 
Pakistan (including 5,000 law enforcement personnel) and caused material damage 
worth USD 67 billion.52 According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 
database, between 2003 and September 2014, there were 18,389 civilian and 5,917 
security force personnel fatalities due to terrorist violence.53 These attacks have 
targeted both local and foreign interests, including physical and human resources for 
the United States’ “war on terror,” establishments frequented by westerners, direct 
interests of the Pakistani army, numerous prominent Pakistani politicians (some of 
whom were assassinated), key infrastructure (including airports and courts), and 
various ethnic and religious minority groups.
52 Express Tribute, Islamabad, Kabul look inwards as Tehran blames US, 2011.
53 South Asia Terrorism Portal, www.satp.org, accessed: September 17, 2014.
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GDP growth and drivers of foreign direct 
investment (FDI)
Security concerns greatly undermine investor confidence and deployment of 
foreign capital into Pakistan; investors have reacted strongly to significant 
changes in the political environment (see Figure 2). For instance, a rapidly 
worsening security situation in 2007 and 2008 (imposition of emergency rule and the 
siege of a major mosque by a terrorist group) preceded a dramatic decrease in FDI 
inflows in 2008 and 2009.
Although security concerns remain an issue, the introduction of pro-business and 
private sector measures as of 2012 under Prime Minister Sharif’s government 
have resulted in increased FDI in the country. The new government has taken 
several measures to improve the ease of doing business in Pakistan, particularly with 
respect to investor protection and starting a business. Moreover, the government has 
launched fiscal and structural reforms (supported by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)) to address macroeconomic challenges and energy shortages, and to steer the 
economy towards faster and more sustainable growth54 (refer to the “Enabling impact 
investing: The ecosystem” section for more details on the regulatory environment).
 
FIGURE 2: FDI NET INFLOWS INTO PAKISTAN (CURRENT USD MILLIONS)
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Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
54 ADB, Asian Development Outlook 2014, Manila, 2014.
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Pakistan’s forecasted GDP growth rate is predicted to be one of the lowest 
in the region. The key drivers of Pakistan’s low projected growth are continued 
security concerns and the need for structural reforms in the areas of energy, taxation, 
and state-owned enterprises.55 Accelerating growth will be challenging without 
improvements in the security situation and without addressing these regulatory and 
infrastructural challenges.
FIGURE 3: PAKISTAN GDP (PPP) OVER TIME AND FORECASTED 2015 GDP GROWTH RATE FOR THE REGION
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55 ADB, Asian Development Outlook 2014, Manila, 2014.
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The distribution of sector contribution to GDP has remained relatively 
unchanged over the years, with services contributing the most to Pakistan’s GDP 
growth. Despite agriculture’s small share of contribution to GDP (25% in 2013), it 
employs more than 40% of Pakistan’s labor force, while the services sector, which 
makes up the most sizeable contribution to GDP at 53% in 2013, employs around 30% 
of the labor force.
FIGURE 4: SECTOR CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP (PPP, INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR, BILLIONS)
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Sources: World Development Indicators, The World Bank; IMF World Economic Outlook; Dalberg analysis
In addition to GDP growth, the capital markets are slowly recovering after 
a drastic decline in 2008. Pakistan has three stock exchanges, namely Karachi, 
Islamabad, and Lahore. Market capitalization grew from USD 33 billion to USD 
44 billion in 201256 (See Figure 5). Moreover, despite violence and a worsening 
security situation, there was overall growth in market capitalization between 2004 
and 2012 due to a wide range of economic reforms launched in 2000, including 
fiscal adjustment, privatization of energy, banking sector reforms, and trade reforms. 
In addition, low interest rates, high liquidity, and strong external demand helped 
Pakistan’s growth. Moreover, concessional external assistance and debt restructuring 
(including that from the World Bank) played a significant role as did increased 
support provided by the US post-September 2011.57 
56 World Development Indicators, The World Bank (2008–2012).
57 World Bank, Macroeconomics and economic growth in South Asia: Growth in Pakistan.
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FIGURE 5: TOTAL MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF LISTED COMPANIES (CURRENT USD BILLIONS)
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Key constraints in Pakistan
Energy shortages, in addition to security concerns, remain one of the most 
significant challenges to investment. Currently, more than 30% of all households 
are un-electrified,58 while a significant proportion of Pakistan’s population is under-
electrified. Access to energy is a particular concern for the manufacturing industry 
for which consistent, reliable, and affordable power is a key driver of competitiveness. 
Investors report low interest in heavy manufacturing sectors due to the high costs of 
such access to energy. 
58 World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
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FIGURE 6: PAKISTAN’S PROJECTED POWER GENERATION DEFICIT, HISTORIC AND FORECASTED (MW)
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Given the projected deficit, the government and the private sector are now 
trying to directly address the access to energy challenges. The government is 
undertaking the construction of more power plants, using both renewable (e.g., wind 
and hydro-power) and non-renewable energy sources, in addition to providing cash 
and bonds59 to independent power producers to enable them to clear their 
outstanding debts and generate additional power.60 Moreover, given the market 
opportunity to serve consumers in off-grid and under-electrified regions, there is an 
increasing interest in the development of enterprise models to serve the energy needs 
of these areas.61 
Overall, despite concerns about security challenges and energy shortages, 
Pakistan’s large population, growing middle class, and increasingly favorable 
regulatory investment environment remain strong foundations for attracting 
investors. The large domestic market creates a strong demand and opportunity and 
is expected to grow with the expansion of the consumer class. Similarly, the regulatory 
environment has been improving since 2000. For example, today, fewer approvals, 
permits, and licenses are required from several different government entities to launch 
a business in Pakistan.62 Overall, while Pakistan’s World Bank “ease of doing business” 
rank of 128 is below that of Sri Lanka’s (99) and Nepal’s (108), Pakistan scores higher 
than both India (142) and Bangladesh (173). 
59 The Diplomat, Pakistan’s energy crisis, 2013.
60 State Bank of Pakistan, Annual report, 2012.
61 Dalberg, Stakeholder interviews
62 US Department of State, Investment climate statement, Pakistan, 2014.
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FIGURE 7: POPULATION OF PAKISTAN AND REGIONAL COMPARISON (IN MILLIONS, 2012)
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Despite this relative regulatory strength, public service provision in Pakistan 
remains poor, as evidenced by its low performance on key social indicators. 
Pakistan’s human development index score of 0.52 is below the South Asia average 
of 0.56,63 life expectancy at birth is relatively low at 65.7 years,64 and infant mortality 
is high at 69 per 1000 live births,65 which are all indicative of a weak healthcare 
system.66 Similarly, in the education sector, with almost 5.5 million children that are 
out of school, Pakistan has the second highest number of out-of-school children 
in the world, after Nigeria.67 Literacy rates are low and skewed by gender: 50% 
for women and 69% for men.68 According to UNESCO’s 2014 Global Monitoring 
Report, Pakistan is among the 21 countries facing an extensive “learning crisis” due to 
academic performance, literacy, enrolment, and dropout rates.69
63 The human development index examines life expectancy at birth, expected and mean years of 
schooling, and GNI per capita.
64 UDDP, Human development index, 2013 (2012 data).
65 UNICEF, Pakistan statistics, basic indicators, 2012.
66 World Development Indicators, The World Bank (2013)
67 UNESCO, “Teaching and learning: Achieving quality for all,” EFA Global Monitoring Report, 2014.
68 World Economic Forum, The global gender gap report, 2013.
69 Op Cit. UNESCO, EFA global monitoring report, 2014.
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INVESTING IN PAKISTAN: THE 
SUPPLY SIDE
The broad impact capital market in Pakistan
In spite of the perceptions of extreme volatility and insecurity, Pakistan has one 
of the largest impact investment landscapes in the region. More than USD 1.8 
billion has been deployed into Pakistan by DFIs, while a further USD 162 million has 
been deployed by other impact investors.
The key advantages that investors perceive in the Pakistan market include the large 
domestic market and the resulting investment opportunity with a strong return 
potential, favorable regulatory environment (although there are some concerns 
related to the regulation of the private equity (PE) industry, as will be described 
subsequently in the section “Challenges facing impact investors in Pakistan”), an 
extremely strong local entrepreneurial culture, and a relatively large and deep pool 
of talent from the well-educated, internationally exposed middle and upper classes. 
However, the perceptions of volatility and insecurity loom large, particularly for 
foreign investors or investors without strong local ties who find it difficult to establish 
a local presence or conduct due diligence, and hence, refrain from investing despite 
recognizing the potential in the country. 
The impact investing space in Pakistan is diverse, with a range of different actors. 
Figure 8 provides an overview of the landscape of actors, including both impact 
investors and investors in related activities but without an explicit impact intention or 
commitment to measure impact. 
FIGURE 8: OVERVIEW OF IMPACT INVESTOR AND RELATED INVESTOR TYPES IN PAKISTAN
TYPE OF INVESTOR ESTIMATED  NUMBER DETAILS OF INVESTORS IN PAKISTAN
Fund managers 11 (7 impact investors) Six international/regional funds and five Pakistan-specific funds 
DFIs 11 (11 impact investors)
Making both direct and indirect investments, although a large proportion of 
capital is invested directly
HNWIs/Family offices Several There are many local foundations active in Pakistan as a result of a strong philanthropic culture
Diversified financial 
institutions/banks
More than 30 
commercial banks
Little SME lending by banks, which are averse to risks caused by poor economic 
conditions and an increase in the number of non-performing loans
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Within the fund manager landscape, we see a mix of both local and international 
players. Domestic investors are generally more commercially oriented but are 
increasingly adopting the impact intention. International funds are largely investing 
from offices outside Pakistan; only a few of them have a local presence. Additionally, 
four new Pakistan-specific funds are launching soon, of which three are by fund 
managers who have current investments in Pakistan. Further, regional funds are keen 
on exposure to the country.
Development finance institutions (DFIs) play a prominent role in Pakistan and 
have deployed most of the capital to date. This dominance of the impact investing 
landscape in Pakistan by DFIs is in large part due, as in other countries, to their 
greater ability to operate in riskier markets. As public entities, DFIs can work with 
the Pakistani government on policy-related issues to help shape and improve the 
investment climate, even while investing in the market itself.
There is a substantial presence of local high net-worth individuals (HNWIs), 
family offices, and foundations in Pakistan, but not many are actively engaged in 
impact investing; rather, their intent is either purely philanthropic or commercial. 
These players mainly provide grant capital to large charities and support social service 
provisions although some capital is channeled as grants to entrepreneurs. In addition, 
large business conglomerates have increasingly established family offices conducting 
investment activities alongside their philanthropic activities, which provide low- to 
no-return investments directly to enterprises at varying stages of growth. While there 
is still some aversion to investment in funds, as fund management in Pakistan builds a 
track record, these family offices may provide a large domestic pool of capital. With 
their investments, family offices tend to be commercially oriented, investing without 
an explicit impact intention, and with little public reporting or information available 
about their activities. As a result, these activities are either purely philanthropic or 
commercial investments—impact investing activities are yet to be seen by HNWIs, 
family offices, or foundations in Pakistan.
There are 18 active impact investors in Pakistan. This includes 11 development 
finance institutions and seven funds. In addition, there are commercial banks making 
SME loans, three funds, and an unknown number of angel investors investing in 
ways that are peripheral to impact investing. These angel investors are usually tied to 
incubators and accelerators and make small investments in early-stage enterprises.
Funds operating in Pakistan fall across the two rings in our framework.70  
Approximately 36% of capital deployed by funds comes from impact investors (Ring 
1) and the remaining 64% from impact-related investors (Ring 2). The key difference 
between these funds is the articulation of an explicit impact intention. There is a view 
from many fund managers that impact is achieved by default through their activities—
whether this means increased access to capital where there was less before, or impact 
through investment in sectors like agriculture, which will affect farmer incomes, even 
without this being intentional ex ante. In terms of measurement, interestingly, even 
70 See “Defining key terms and concepts” in the introduction chapter of this report for an explanation of 
the framework used for categorizing investors using a two-ring framework, where the inner ring—Ring 
1—represents the impact investing activity and the outer ring—Ring 2—represents the activity related to 
impact investing but lacking either an explicit impact intention or measurement.
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the funds in Ring 2 have plans to introduce a metric-based measurement approach as 
they are intermediating or planning to intermediate DFI capital, which comes with a 
requirement to measure and report key impact metrics.
FIGURE 9: DIRECT IMPACT AND IMPACT-RELATED INVESTORS ACTIVE IN PAKISTAN
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews, Dalberg analysis
Impact investors have deployed nearly USD 2 billion to date (see Figure 10). 
More than 50 deals have been directly made by DFIs with certain enterprises, and 
approximately 12 deals have been made by fund managers. Meanwhile, impact-
related investors have deployed USD 481 million to date.
FIGURE 10: TOTAL CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY RING (USD MILLIONS)
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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INVESTOR MIX
Although we see a range of active investor types in Pakistan, DFIs represent 
the largest share of capital deployed and drive key trends. 92% of impact capital 
comes from DFIs, while the remaining 8% comes from fund managers. However, 
when it comes to impact-related investments, fund managers account for 59.4% of 
capital deployed and commercial banks (receiving earmarked DFI capital) for 40.5%. 
Moreover, a portion of the capital deployed by fund managers originates from DFIs 
as well, increasing their share of the total capital deployed.71 
FIGURE 11: TOTAL CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY SOURCE (USD MILLIONS)
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Direct investments represent approximately 90% of all DFI capital deployed in 
Pakistan, due in large part to the lack of country-specific impact funds through 
which capital could be intermediated. In addition to the USD 1.8 billion that DFIs 
have invested directly into enterprises, they have also invested a minimum of USD 
49 million in impact funds. DFI investments into commercial banks have been driven 
by an interest to increase access to capital for small or medium enterprises (SMEs), a 
segment that is difficult for DFIs to target directly due to their requirement of a large 
deal size (average deal size for DFIs in Pakistan is USD 27 million). However, there 
are three new impact funds being launched in the near future, which will be strongly 
backed by DFIs. 
71 Given the lack of fund breakdown in terms of sources of capital, and funds investing in more than one 
country, it is not possible to calculate the proportion of capital deployed by fund managers that originates 
from DFIs.
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Key trends of impact investing in Pakistan
The following section examines trends among impact investors, the core ring of 
investors under study. The figures quoted in this section refer only to investors in Ring 
1, who have collectively deployed approximately USD 1.99 billion. The activities of 
impact-related investors will be discussed in the section “Beyond the impact investing 
market.”
INSTRUMENT
As illustrated in Figure 12, most impact capital has been deployed in Pakistan 
through debt. This is largely driven by DFI investors, who tend to prefer debt 
investments, due to a low risk appetite, lower level of due diligence required 
as compared to making equity investments, and less active post-investment 
management. Non-DFI impact investors invest a greater percentage of capital in 
equity than DFIs (16% versus 7.3% for DFIs). The large debt percentage is driven by 
one investor who provides subsidized loans to microfinance institutions (MFIs).
FIGURE 12: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY INSTRUMENT
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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Although investors have articulated an interest in using more quasi-equity 
instruments, thus far, there have been no related deals. This interest in quasi-
equity arises from the difficulty (or perceived difficulty) of exiting pure equity 
investments. Since there have been no impact equity exits thus far, investors believe 
that structuring deals as quasi-equity creates the opportunity to exit through 
a payback-type mechanism. However, a lack of understanding of this form of 
investment—by both enterprises and regulators—as well as an aversion on behalf of 
regulators to introduce and approve new instruments, has slowed the uptake of quasi-
equity.
There is some experimentation with other instruments (guarantees, social impact 
bonds, and Murabaha) in Pakistan. DFIs offer guarantees to banks to encourage 
more private sector SME lending, since banks have mainly preferred lending to the 
public sector where rates are high and defaults low. Murabaha, or zero-interest loans 
(described in Figure 13), have been used by Middle Eastern investors, who have 
developed the instrument in line with the principles of Islamic Finance.72 In a very 
nascent stage, there are investors exploring the possibility of raising a social impact 
bond for the education sector in Pakistan as well.
FIGURE 13: ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS USED BY INVESTORS IN PAKISTAN, AND RATIONALE FOR THE INSTRUMENT
Instrument Rationale
Guarantees
• Bank lending to SME sector is low, since commercial banks view the SME sector as very risky. Hence, to increase 
the amount of commercial debt SMEs can access, some IFIs/DFIs are providing guarantees to banks
• Also provided to commercial banks by institutional investors to increase the  funding available to the microfinance 
sector, as commercial banks tend to be risk averse with respect to this sector
• Guarantees provide a multiplier effect in terms of impact, and reduce the amount of risk the investor has to bear
Social impact 
bonds 
• There are a few investors who are looking at using social impact bonds in Pakistan—in the education sector (e.g., 
a London-based merchant bank created a sample pilot for a DIB for low-cost private schools but has yet to 
implement/fund this DIB) 
Murabaha
• Murabaha is the sale of a good at cost plus an agreed profit mark-up; occurs when an intermediary purchases from 
the bank at the ‘purchase price’ and sells to the customer at the ‘sale price’
• It is different to short-term debt because it is the sale of a tangible asset on a fixed profit margin rather than 
money advanced
• Murabaha is being used by a Middle Eastern investor in Pakistan, where there is a better understanding of Islamic 
banking principles
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
72 Institutions that practice Islamic banking principles mobilize financial resources and invest them in an 
attempt to achieve predetermined acceptable social and financial objectives, wherein both mobilization 
and investment of funds should be conducted in accordance with the principles of Islamic Shari’a.
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GROWTH STAGE AND DEAL SIZE
Mature companies have absorbed most of the overall impact capital deployed to 
date. This trend is again driven by DFIs who are the leading investors in this field and 
have a preference for larger deal sizes (given the transaction cost of investments), 
and have invested approximately USD 1.2 billion in mature organizations. Only 
companies at this stage can absorb these large amounts of capital. Additionally, 
mature companies have an established operating history, are legally registered, and 
keep accurate financial records—factors that lower the risk for investors and ease 
the monitoring process. Meanwhile, investments from fund managers have been 
exclusively in venture and growth stage organizations (see Figure 14). Unfortunately, 
for non-DFI investors, information is unknown for a large percentage of investments 
by stage of business.73 
FIGURE 14: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY GROWTH STAGE (DFI AND NON-DFI)
Mature, private
Growth
Venture
Unknown
1,218.8 
(61.3%)26
(1.3%)
9
(0.5%)
735.4 
(37.0%)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
As in most markets, seed and venture stage enterprises find it difficult to access 
impact capital as these earlier stages are relatively risky and require a more active 
engagement by investors both pre- and post-investment. However, in Pakistan, 
there is a deep-rooted and widespread philanthropic culture that has resulted in a 
large number of foundations, charities, and other institutions that channel start-up 
grant capital to entrepreneurs. HNWIs, often themselves successful entrepreneurs, 
also serve as a source of grant capital. This relative ease of access to philanthropic 
73  A large percentage of invested funds are unknown with respect to the maturity of the enterprise as the 
portfolio breakdown of significant investors such as the ADB and the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund 
is unknown.
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capital, while a positive marker for entrepreneurs, is also a deterrent for early or 
venture stage investors who may perceive a lesser need and opportunity to invest in 
early-stage ventures. 
Within DFI investments in Pakistan, we see a spread of deals across a range of 
deal sizes. While most of the DFI deals have been more than USD 10 million, there 
exists an active market in the USD 1–10 million range. No DFI deals have been below 
USD 1 million.
Within impact investment funds, we see a range of deal sizes below USD 10 
million, including a handful below USD 1 million. Recognizing the gap and need 
for small to mid-sized deals, particularly for SMEs, the new funds being launched 
are likely to target this segment, focusing on deals in the USD 3–15 million range. 
Interestingly, more commercially focused funds are willing to make smaller deals 
(typically around USD 3 million) if they are in high-impact sectors such as education. 
However, even this amount of capital is probably more than what many enterprises 
in these sectors can absorb. The reason for the relatively high minimum ticket sizes is 
the fact that the cost of due diligence in Pakistan is high—there are no intermediaries, 
it is dangerous, and the field component to establish and follow-up on investments 
and deals is essential.
FIGURE 15: NUMBER OF IMPACT INVESTMENT DEALS BY SIZE
DFI
 usd 1 million
> usd 1 million to 5 million
> usd 5 million to 10 million
> usd 10 million to 50 million
> usd 50 million
Unknown10
24
# OF DEALS
5
11
4
NON-DFI
# OF DEALS
4
4
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
116 • THE LANDSCAPE FOR IMPACT INVESTING IN SOUTH ASIA
SECTOR
Of the known deployed capital, the energy sector has received more impact 
capital from DFIs than any other sector. Capital from non-DFI investors has 
gone primarily into financial services, with small amounts in energy, housing, 
agriculture, and health. Given Pakistan’s acute energy crisis, many DFIs have 
invested heavily in renewable energy plants and other infrastructure projects that are 
key to the country’s growth and development. These projects also enable large ticket 
size investments that align with DFI mandates.
FIGURE 16: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY SECTOR
DFI NON-DFI
622.9 
(34.1%)
131.4 
(7.2%)
96.3 
(5.3%)
88.1 
(4.8%)
58.5 
(3.2%)
608.4 
(33.3%)
129.3 
(7.2%) 154.9 
(95.8%)
1.3 
(0.8%)1.6 
(1.0%) 2.4 
(1.5%)1.5 
(0.9%)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
2.5 
(0.1%)
3.5 
(0.2%)
Energy
Manufacturing
Infrastructure
Agriculture and food processing
Financial Services
ICT
Health
Transport
Housing
Education
Other
Unknown
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis. Notes: Unknown refers to investments for which investee details were not 
made public or shared with the research team.
The microfinance sector has received large amounts of impact capital—
predominately from one domestic fund (with source capital from international 
financial institutions (IFIs)/DFIs). The microfinance sector in Pakistan is particularly 
interesting for impact investors from both a returns and an impact perspective. 
Given the large unbanked population and the need for small enterprise loans, the 
opportunity to invest in microfinance institutions is significant. These institutions 
are also “known entities” and easier to identify, and the sector is very well regulated, 
making investments attractive and lowering the risk profile. However, the leading 
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microfinance fund (with a current portfolio of USD 127 million), which has been 
instrumental to the growth of the industry, can also lend at subsidized rates. This is 
somewhat of a deterrent for investors as, while attractive to organizations seeking 
capital, this access to subsidized capital limits opportunities for investors to engage 
in the sector with market rate expectations. Some impact investors have taken equity 
stakes in microfinance institutions, but debt is not a viable instrument if not provided 
at the same subsidized rates.
Larger funds are generally sector agnostic, with a preference for consumer-
focused sectors. The large domestic consumer base is attractive to investors as 
they see a high growth potential in consumer-facing sectors such as fast moving 
consumer goods (FMCG), healthcare, and agriculture. Thus far, we have seen 
fairly low levels of impact investing activity in service sectors such as healthcare and 
education, in large part because service provision and financing in these sectors have 
been heavily dominated by the charitable and philanthropic segments. Subsidized 
financing available from HNWIs, foundations, and family offices limits the demand 
for market-rate capital. From the perspective of business model/service provision, 
most non-public provision is through NGOs, although private provision exists for the 
very high-income segments. A proliferation of low-cost private schools provides some 
cause for optimism about opportunities for impact investment in the education sector, 
but currently few of these schools are high quality or operating at scale.
Return expectations and exit possibilities
Equity investors in Pakistan have a wide range of return expectations, but 
typically expect a return higher than most other asset classes as well as their own 
cost of capital. Commercial bank interest rates in Pakistan are typically pegged at 
15%–20%, and other asset classes provide returns up to about 7%–13% (fixed deposits, 
government securities, etc.). Capital market gains have been much higher, with the 
Karachi Stock Exchange offering returns as high as 40% in 2013, much better than the 
world average.74 
Equity investors expect returns that are adjusted for a higher level of risk. For 
fund managers, this ranges from 20%–40%. Part of the reason for this variation in 
expectation is the type of deal used as a benchmark. In the absence of equity exits 
by impact investors, fund managers are setting expectations using a broader set. 
In the past, there have been equity exits that returned close to 40% internal rate of 
return (IRR) or even 10x multiples on capital. However, these were rare cases and 
usually a result of particular circumstances. For example, in concessionary sectors 
such as ports and other infrastructure where there is government backing, very 
high returns are possible. In independent power producer projects, for instance, the 
government ensures at least a 20% return. In other sectors where markets are not 
perfectly competitive and pricing is distorted, high returns are possible, but these are 
potentially risky investments to make. Pragmatic fund managers looking at the current 
market suggest that the 30%–40% returns expectations are overly ambitious; however, 
74 Economist, How did Karachi get a world beating stock exchange?, 2013.
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20%–25% is more achievable, with up to 28% being a very good result. That said, as 
with other countries in our study, these are largely hypothetical considerations at this 
stage and the results will only be seen over the next few years as equity investors start 
to exit.
Equity investors expect that trade sales will be the most likely exit mechanism 
given the prevalence of large business conglomerates that traditionally acquire 
and grow smaller businesses. Some experts have also hypothesized that there is 
an opportunity to leverage the preference of local family offices for direct equity 
investments to create secondary sale exits by selling stakes directly to family offices 
that are otherwise averse to deploying capital through funds. Overall, however, there 
is still little clarity on what is possible and what the best mechanisms will be since there 
is little track record.
Impact measurement
With respect to impact measurement, the options for investors are to either 
adopt an existing standardized framework or to create a custom framework. We 
see DFIs largely using frameworks developed in-house; these frameworks are based 
on global standardized metrics, such as Impact Reporting and Investment Standards75 
(IRIS) or Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) factors, and are used across 
their portfolios in all countries. ESG metrics measure the environmental, social, and 
governance performance of enterprises, and metrics for measurement include the 
number of employees (socio-economic impact) and governance ratings. IRIS is a 
catalogue of recognized performance metrics, from which investors can choose those 
that best match their impact strategies and their investees’ business models.
Fund managers in Pakistan are largely taking a cue from the DFIs that they work with; 
where they are required to adopt standardized metrics, some do, and in other cases, 
they take a more customized approach based on the metrics relevant for their sectors 
of investment.
75 IRIS is a set of standardized metrics for impact measurement managed by the Global Impact Investment 
Network (iris.thegiin.org).
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FIGURE 17: INVESTOR IMPACT MEASUREMENT
METRIC-BASED IMPACT MEASUREMENT ANECDOTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Rationale 
for this 
approach
• If DFI/IFIs acting as LP for fund, metric-based reporting 
is required
• International impact investors have a defined set of 
metrics that can be applied for their investments in 
Pakistan without having to develop a new set of metrics 
• For more commercially oriented investors,  
metric-based impact measurement is difficult and 
is secondary to launching and managing a fund, so 
anecdotal assessment used as default
• Belief that impact is inherent because of the sectors they 
work in (e.g. agriculture and education) and therefore 
measurement is not required
Key 
indicators 
measured
• Social impact is primarily measured by economic metrics 
(e.g., number of jobs created) with assumption that 
economic impact will have social benefits 
• Some investors are using IRIS metrics or ESG metrics
• Stories of lives touched and entrepreneurs supported by 
investment
Rationale 
for 
indicator 
selection/ 
preference
• Selection of indicators is case specific (differs by sector 
and type of enterprise)
• Indirect impact (e.g. quality of life) is difficult to measure, 
and thus, there exists a preference for economic metrics
• Preference for ESG compliance driven by widespread 
recognition that ESG compliance satisfies basic impact 
criteria and mitigates risk of non-compliance for investor 
and investee
• Desire to share qualitative benefits of investment
Sources: Dalberg analysis; Stakeholder interviews
Beyond the impact investing sector
Outside of the “core” impact investors, there exists a peripheral group of impact-
related investors who have deployed USD 481 million to date. As discussed above, 
these investments come from commercial banks who are backed by DFIs (USD 195 
million), funds or fund managers (USD 286 million), and a small group of known 
angel investors (a minimum of USD 265,000).
Approximately 80% of capital invested by these impact-related investors is through 
equity deals and 82% of the investments have been made in mature companies. 
While sector breakdown for a significant portion of this capital is unknown (USD 271 
million), we see that a large percentage of the remaining known capital (93% of USD 
210 million) has been invested in the financial services sector, outside of microfinance. 
Angel investors (usually tied to incubators and accelerators) prefer information and 
communication technology (ICT)-related enterprises as they see more exit potential 
with these companies, primarily through acquisition by overseas companies or 
investors (e.g., those from Silicon Valley).
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Challenges facing impact investors in Pakistan
While investors see enormous potential in Pakistan, a large number still perceive too 
much risk related to the security threats and political instability to make Pakistan a 
viable, investible market at this stage. Importantly, much of this perception is held 
by investors abroad and understood through the lens of the international media. 
However, investors already active in Pakistan, or those with personal links to the 
country, do not consider these severe deterrents, although of course, caution is 
important. The key implication of the current security situation for local investors or 
those with experience in investing in Pakistan is the limitation on geographies in which 
investment (and even broader business) activity is possible. The regions of Punjab 
and Sindh have historically had the most vibrant entrepreneurial environments, but 
recently, due to security concerns, much of the rest of the country is inaccessible, and 
hence, investors concentrate heavily in these two regions.
For investors who can overcome these perceptions of risk, Pakistan has a relatively 
welcoming investment environment. Getting started in the country in terms of 
licenses and approvals to start businesses is relatively straightforward and not too time 
intensive. The few challenges that are experienced at this stage are related to private 
equity regulation in particular. As an industry that is relatively less well understood, 
investors are having to work with regulators to develop and reform existing policies 
(e.g., private equity licenses are only valid for three years, which is too short for the 
life of most funds). 
Beyond this initial entry stage, the key challenges for investors are in the screening 
and due diligence stage and then at exit, which by nature affect equity investors more 
than debt investors.
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FIGURE 18: CHALLENGES AND SEVERITY OF CHALLENGES FACED BY INVESTORS, BY INVESTMENT STAGE
Severity of investor challenges, by stage of investment
Key challenges faced by investors and severity of impact
Identification of 
potential investees 
through networks—
few organizations 
in the ecosystem 
to help
Few enterprises 
have the financial 
and operational 
management 
skills that make 
them investment 
ready (e.g., 
poor corporate 
governance and 
transparency, and 
presence of double/
triple books) 
Need to educate 
good enterprises 
about the benefits 
of equity and 
convince them to 
take on equity
Need for long-
term horizon and 
engagement to 
get investee up to 
exit point or able 
to access follow-on 
funding 
Uncertainty 
around likelihood/
feasibility of 
exits via different 
mechanisms—no 
track record yet
Some competition 
for equity investors 
from commercially 
oriented family 
offices but few 
debt providers 
competing (except 
in microfinance)
Difficult to conduct 
due diligence—
either have to 
visit in person 
(difficult for foreign 
investors), or 
travel to rural areas 
(difficult for both 
local and foreign 
investors)
Misalignment 
of preferences 
between investor 
and entrepreneur 
shareholding 
desired
No local M&A 
market—need 
to look abroad 
for trade sales; 
secondary sale 
may be possible 
as mainstream PE 
market grows 
Repatriation of 
capital difficult 
in practice—long 
and bureaucratic 
approval process
Entry into  
Pakistan
Pipeline  
development
Screening and  
due diligence
Structuring 
investment
Managing  
investment/ 
follow up
Exit
Perceptions of 
insecurity and 
volatility are 
strong deterrents 
for international 
investors; additional 
externalities 
from insecurity in 
the region, e.g., 
Afghanistan 
Business climate 
supportive; PE 
regulation still 
weak—funds 
prefer offshore 
domiciliation to 
start (e.g., need five 
investors to get FM 
license; PE license 
valid only for three 
years)
Least severe                Most Severe
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
The identification of investment targets in Pakistan is less challenging than in 
the other countries considered in this study—with the exception of India—due to 
the strongly entrepreneurial culture of Pakistan. Most investors report a significant 
amount of opportunity in the country. Networks in Pakistan are extremely strong, 
and pipeline companies are mainly identified through these personal networks. This 
highlights the importance of having a ground presence and is a large part of why 
international investors find it challenging to invest in Pakistan from abroad without 
going in as part of a group. As a stronger support ecosystem develops, players who 
can provide matching services for relatively small-ticket and angel investors are 
emerging, but this is not true for large-ticket funds or DFIs.
122 • THE LANDSCAPE FOR IMPACT INVESTING IN SOUTH ASIA
The key constraint to investing in Pakistan is getting through the middle stages 
of screening and due diligence to convert opportunities into investable deals. 
Given the nature of an equity relationship, this is a particularly severe challenge 
for equity investors who need to have a much clearer picture of the health and the 
potential of the business as well as an understanding of the entrepreneurs themselves. 
Few enterprises have the financial and operational systems and structures in place 
that make them investment ready. Many enterprises lack transparency and proper 
corporate governance structures, maintain double or triple sets of accounts, and lack 
appropriate registrations. There is also concern about the political connections and 
business practices of business owners in a climate where corruption is rampant. These 
concerns are held equally by equity and debt investors, particularly given the potential 
reputational damage to investors who are associated with malpractice. Therefore, 
investors have to spend several months working with companies to educate them on 
the requirements for investment (particularly for equity) and building the appropriate 
systems and structures before a deal can actually be closed.
Conducting formal due diligence is also a challenge for investors, particularly equity 
investors, for whom the process involves a physical visit to enterprise operations. For 
foreign investors, this means traveling to Pakistan, which many are wary of given the 
political and security concerns. Even for local investors, traveling to rural areas to 
assess value chains is rather tricky.
When it comes to structuring a deal, investors in Pakistan are fairly 
experienced; however, training may be required to improve the local enterprises’ 
understanding of equity. Family businesses in particular are extremely wary of 
opening up to external investors and are nervous about the equity timeline, which 
they perceive to be quite short. Therefore, impact investors report having to spend 
time convincing business owners of the benefits of equity. Investors also report facing 
competition for deals from domestic family offices that are (a) more flexible in the 
terms that they offer, (b) more lenient with respect to the enterprise’s corporate 
governance structure, and (c) more willing to take longer equity time horizons as they 
do not have limited partner (LP) capital to return.
In addition to the timeline, transparency, and understanding of equity instruments, the 
other challenge reported by some investors and entrepreneurs is a misalignment of 
preferences around the stake that investors want and the stake that entrepreneurs are 
willing to give up. Investors express a range of preferences from a controlling stake 
to minority stakes, but this is often not aligned with the entrepreneurs’ preferences 
or perceptions of value. Hence, there is a need for education and understanding on 
both sides, including understanding of when investors should take a controlling stake 
(e.g., distressed buyout) versus when they should not (e.g., seed or venture stage 
investments). 
As discussed earlier, the lack of a track record in exits makes investors uncertain 
of the potential exit mechanisms for their equity investments. While there is 
some expectation that trade sales will be possible domestically, the local mergers and 
acquisitions market has been fairly slow. Therefore, investors are considering foreign 
sales either to senior funds or larger enterprises for exits. Moreover, exit horizons 
in Pakistan are expected to be long—while the traditional five-year horizon is still a 
target, most investors take a pragmatic view and expect a slightly longer tenure, some 
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as long as 10 years.
While the entrepreneurial activity and business management skills of Pakistani 
entrepreneurs are perceived to be quite strong, there is a need for ongoing 
support and development both pre- and post-investment. In response to this 
need, a few investors have taken an increasingly active role in providing technical and 
managerial support as well as strategic guidance, but by and large, this function is 
left to the actors in the broader ecosystem. In fact, some investors active in support 
services have their own advisory divisions (e.g., the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC)), and others contract with specialized providers. Incubators and accelerators 
either provide assistance along with funding or arrange for funding from their angel 
networks. Furthermore, several equity investors may take a Board seat to provide 
strategic inputs during operations.
FIGURE 19: NON-FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED BY INVESTORS TO ENTERPRISES
Key Enterprise-Side 
Gaps Identified By 
Investors Severity
Organizations Offering  
Non-financial Support Services Offered
Lack of business 
management skills
• IFC • Advisory team to provide technical 
assistance to clients
• Web-based SME toolkit
Poor operational/
financial management 
skills
• USAID
• DFID
• Funding allocation for technical 
assistance to SMEs
Lack of access to 
information/networks
• i2i
• Plan 9
• Seed Incubation Center
• Integration into entrepreneur and 
funding networks through the incubator/
accelerator model
Least severe
Most severeSources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
Looking forward
The impact investing industry is evolving rapidly in Pakistan with current 
investors committing significant additional capital and new funds being raised 
for deployment. Despite the security and stability concerns, investors are optimistic 
(driven by domestic investors and fund managers who can support international 
investors who otherwise would not likely be able to engage in the Pakistani market). 
To date, an additional USD 103 million has been committed but not yet deployed by 
existing investors, and four fund managers have raised USD 215 million for Pakistan-
specific funds (three of which are seeded by USAID’s Pakistan Private Investment 
Initiative). 
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Furthermore, several regional funds have raised capital for deployment, with Pakistan 
being a focus country. Even with the increased competition due to the new funds 
entering the market, investors are confident that there are more than enough 
investable opportunities and that the ecosystem is now becoming sufficiently robust 
and vibrant to support a rapid scale-up of the industry.
NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES: 
THE DEMAND SIDE
The majority of impact capital in Pakistan is directed to large-scale mature 
infrastructure enterprises, primarily in the energy sector. As highlighted in the 
section titled “Investing in Pakistan: The supply side,” this preference for infrastructure 
development and large companies is driven in large part by DFI investment mandates 
and is also reflected in the preference for financial services and telecommunications 
companies, as described above. Moreover, while other sectors such as education and 
healthcare are considered interesting, they have yet to receive significant investments.
Given that Pakistan has one of the most vibrant impact enterprise76 landscapes in 
the region, we do see a reasonable share of impact capital directed into impact 
enterprises—primarily into microfinance institutions. To date, according to investors 
interviewed in Pakistan, the SME sector has been relatively unattractive, although 
some impact capital has been channeled through commercial banks by DFIs with the 
intention to increase SME access to capital. However, this is likely to change over the 
next few years as four new SME-focused funds that are currently raising capital begin 
to invest. 
Overview of impact enterprise ecosystem in 
Pakistan
SECTOR TRENDS
Looking specifically at the impact enterprise sector, we find that the landscape 
in Pakistan is evolving rapidly with an increasing number of enterprises defining 
themselves as impact-oriented and with entrepreneurs establishing businesses 
across a wide range of sectors (see Figure 20). Currently, the most common type of 
impact enterprises, as in most of the countries considered in this study, is microfinance 
institutions. There is increasing activity in broader financial services as well as in the 
76 Impact enterprises for the purposes of this report are defined as those that have articulated a core 
objective to generate a positive social or environmental impact (i.e., as a part of their operating model 
rather than an ancillary activity as with CSR programs) and seek to grow to financial viability and 
sustainability.
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sectors of energy, food and agriculture, and education. Moreover, consumer-facing 
products, such as handicrafts and textiles, are increasing and have huge potential 
given Pakistan’s sizeable and growing middle class.
FIGURE 20: RELATIVE NUMBER OF IMPACT ENTERPRISES BY SECTOR, WITH EXAMPLES
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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Microfinance is a particularly attractive sector for investors in part due to 
factors that are standard across all countries—they are better known and easier 
to identify, and have measurable impact in terms of economic and gender 
empowerment as well as rural reach—and in part due to the strong and attractive 
regulatory environment in Pakistan.77 Pakistan ranks third of 55 countries for 
favorable regulatory and operating conditions for microfinance. It is one of the 
few countries in the world that has a separate legal and regulatory framework for 
microfinance banks and is regarded as one of the most enabling environments for 
microfinance both regionally and globally.78 In addition, the State Bank of Pakistan 
(Pakistan’s central bank) mandates that all microfinance banks educate their clients 
on the terms and conditions of their products, and has institutionalized a procedure 
for managing and addressing client complaints.79 Moreover, as of 2013, Pakistan had 
more than 50,000 fixed microfinance branches, more than 200 mobile branches, and 
a total gross microfinance loan portfolio of around USD 97 million.80 In comparison, 
the number of microfinance branches in Bangladesh in 2009 (latest data year 
available) was less than 18,000.81 
The microfinance sector has seen particularly strong growth in recent years 
and has been identified as a sector with a continued strong growth potential. 
Opportunities for growth are understood to be in terms of both scale (e.g., reaching 
new unbanked clients), and innovation and development of new products (e.g., 
leveraging branchless and mobile technologies). The sector is undergoing significant 
transformation with nonprofits increasingly restructuring to become microfinance 
institutions to increase their sustainability and formalize under the regulatory 
umbrella, and microfinance institutions looking to restructure into microfinance banks, 
which would enable deposit taking and growth. Both sets of transformations create 
significant opportunities for impact investors.
The education sector is also seen as a sector with enormous potential for impact 
enterprise models and as a destination for impact capital across the full value 
chain from pre-school to tertiary education and vocational training. For now, while 
there are many thousands of low-cost private schools,82 few are structured as impact 
enterprises, having been started out of a recognized opportunity to make a quick 
commercial return in a relatively unregulated industry. Given the lack of regulations, 
many of these schools are of low quality and not necessarily established with the long-
term scale in mind. There is strong investor interest in exploring the opportunities to 
develop some higher-quality, larger-scale, sustainable and affordable private schools 
out of this landscape, but these efforts are in their nascent stages and will take time to 
develop.
77 There is a separate legal and regulatory framework for microfinance banks (by the State Bank of 
Pakistan) under the MFI Ordinance 2011. The act provides a framework through which microfinance 
banks can be established or commercial banks can scale down.
78 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Global microscope on the microfinance business environment, 2013.
79 Op Cit. Economist Intelligence Unit (2013).
80 Pakistan Microfinance Network, Microwatch, 2013.
81 South Asia Micro-entrepreneurs Network (2009).
82 Some estimates suggest 70,000–80,000 across the country. Source: stakeholder interviews.
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A second potential area of opportunity is in the transforming NGO sector. NGOs 
have traditionally been heavily involved in the provision of educational services, but 
some are beginning to consider revenue generation to increase their sustainability and 
move away from the donor-dependent model. A few investors have already indicated 
that they are keen to invest in the education sector if the models are right, and even 
to make smaller deals with lower returns at the beginning in order to encourage 
growth. 
Given Pakistan’s severe energy deficit, and the implications of this deficit 
on growth and development, increasing access to energy is another growing 
focus for impact enterprises and a source of promise for investors. There are 
several impact enterprises (such as Eco Energy Finance) and foundations (e.g., 
Buksh Foundation) active in Pakistan, building business models around renewable 
energy access for rural populations. Social enterprises, nonprofit organizations, and 
foundations in the renewable energy sector are working independently, rather than 
partnering with the government, to provide access to energy for off-grid low-income 
populations. One of the most exciting features of this sector for investors and 
entrepreneurs alike is the availability of a wide range of business models tried and 
tested globally that can be replicated and adapted for the Pakistani context.
Given the importance of agriculture in the Pakistani economy, it is an attractive 
sector for impact-oriented entrepreneurs, although land ownership laws 
and working with rural communities can be challenging for business models. 
Agricultural enterprises have a range of models and missions, from organic farming 
for increased product value to better irrigation for improving crop yields. More 
entrepreneurs seem to focus at the moment on improving productivity and value 
chain strengthening rather than exploring niche markets and products (although this 
is likely to change). However, certain key challenges remain for entrepreneurs in the 
sector, including security considerations in rural areas and a lack of clarity around farm 
ownership laws and land titles. 
Despite the low quality of public health provision in Pakistan, healthcare services 
is a difficult sector for impact entrepreneurs. First, capital costs to start such service 
facilities are high; therefore, entrepreneurs who are active in the sector target the 
high-end market segments where prices can cover costs. Second, service provision 
for lower income populations has been dominated by NGOs and charitable models 
(e.g., clinics sponsored by big conglomerates and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) initiatives); therefore, it is difficult culturally to develop a fee-based model for 
these low-income populations. However, while direct service provision is difficult, a 
number of interesting models are emerging in ancillary or related services, such as 
microinsurance (e.g., Neya Jeevan and MicroEnsure), or for enhancing services and 
processes through ICT (e.g., Sehat First and TeleDoctor). 
The housing sector has been a very challenging sector for entrepreneurs because 
of issues related to land ownership, a need for a large number of permits and 
approvals (which are costly and take significant time to obtain), and the large 
costs involved in projects. Issues related to land ownership include the fact that 
post-independence Pakistan has retained a feudal system of land tenure in which 
a small elite class owns a majority of land worked by tenant farmers and laborers. 
Between 20% and 40% of rural households are reported to be landless or have very 
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little land. Although the government has attempted to address the issue of land and 
tenure rights, these efforts have largely failed to take effect and change the system.83 
Therefore, this sector is not very attractive despite some interest from investors. In 
fact, an organization that had received impact investments for a low-cost housing 
project had to put its project on hold due to administrative and legal constraints. 
ICT is likely to be a huge growth sector for entrepreneurs; however, these 
entrepreneurs are likely to be interested in commercial applications of new 
technologies rather than focus on social impact. The low start-up capital 
requirements and the greater perceived opportunities to access international 
investment and/or eventually sell the company to international buyers make this 
sector attractive for entrepreneurs. There are also several incubators and accelerators 
focused on technology-related enterprises emerging in Pakistan that will help launch 
start-ups in the ICT sector. Hence, having access to additional support is attractive. 
Even though access to clean water is an issue, there are only a few enterprises 
(e.g., SaafWater and Pharmagen) in this sector due to the presence of NGOs 
and the difficulty of generating profits through low-margin business models. As a 
result, NGOs and foundations (e.g., The Orangi Project, Participatory Development 
Initiative, and Buksh Foundation) dominate the landscape in trying to serve the nearly 
16 million people in Pakistan who do not have access to safe drinking water.
While not as dominant a sector as in the other countries in the region (such as 
Sri Lanka and Nepal), there are a few viable and visible enterprises working in 
the handicrafts sector, where they seek to increase employment of women84  
and create opportunities for income generation. In addition to some well-known 
enterprises (e.g., Popinjay), there are several rural microenterprises in this sector, 
financed initially through microcredit, but not necessarily with an intention to scale. 
Given the number of microenterprises, this could potentially be a relatively easy 
sector to promote for impact investors—the so-called “low-hanging fruit” that could 
be nurtured and supported to grow.
ORGANIZATIONAL TRENDS
Provision of services to the low-middle income population tends to be the 
primary theory of change (ToC) adopted by impact enterprises in Pakistan. 
Unlike other countries in the region where supply chain integration is a common 
ToC (except within the MFI space), the poor public provision of key services such 
as education and energy has resulted in a large opportunity for private enterprises 
and NGOs to fill these gaps (e.g., Neya Jeevan, Ecoenergy Finance, and Kashf 
Foundation). Similarly, provision of financial services is the impact thesis for 
microfinance enterprises. Although employment creation and generation is less 
common than models that engage BoP populations as consumers or customers, 
models that create employment and livelihoods are common particularly in the 
83 USAID, Country Profile, Property Rights & Resource Governance, 2011.
84 The labor force participation rate for women above the age of 15 years in 2012 was 16%, as compared to 
80% for men. World Development Indicators, The World Bank, modeled on ILO estimate, 2012.
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agriculture and handicrafts sectors (e.g., Polly&me and IdeaCentricity).
In Pakistan, most of the impact enterprises have been established either by 
diaspora/Pakistani returnees or by locally well-educated entrepreneurs; very few 
enterprises have been started by foreigners. The diaspora/returnees are familiar 
with the concept of impact enterprises, are well-connected both overseas and within 
Pakistan, and have sufficient start-up capital from working abroad to start their own 
enterprises (e.g., Neya Jeevan and Popinjay). Locally, an entrepreneurial culture 
is being nurtured and further developed by schools such as Lahore University of 
Management Sciences (LUMS) that have launched business plan competitions and 
incubators to encourage entrepreneurs (e.g., Jasser Farms and IdeaCentricity). It is 
relatively uncommon to have foreigners start enterprises due to security concerns and 
the difficulty in getting the appropriate visas. 
The potential for financial sustainability of impact business models is not yet 
clear. Most impact enterprises are very new, making it difficult to identify trends at 
this stage, and experiences to date are mixed with several enterprises having already 
been unsuccessfully closed, while others are on track to break even within the next 1–2 
years. However, even as they grow to sustainability, many impact enterprises choose 
hybrid organizational structures, registering both for-profit and nonprofit entities. This 
structure enables access to both commercial capital through their for-profit structure 
and grants and philanthropic capital through their nonprofit structure.
Access to finance
The most significant constraint to impact enterprise growth in Pakistan is access 
to finance. However, the severity of this constraint varies by growth stage. As in other 
markets, the financing challenges enterprises face can be grouped into identification 
of capital, appropriateness of capital, and the actual access to this capital (see Figure 
21). Moreover, impact capital that is available is not well aligned to the needs of 
impact enterprises in terms of deal size, risk appetite, and perceived alignment of 
values. Banks, for their part, have high collateral requirements that are difficult for 
SMEs to meet. Even some larger businesses, such as MFIs, struggle to access bank 
capital, as banks consider these businesses risky and unattractive, particularly if these 
banks can make similar returns by lending to the government.
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FIGURE 21: SEVERITY OF ACCESS TO FINANCE CHALLENGES BY ENTERPRISE GROWTH STAGE
Least severe                    Most Severe
Severity of access to finance challenge, by stage of growth
Key challenges faced and severity of impact
Public listingSeed Venture Growth Mature
Appropriateness of capital
Terms of bank loan not appropriate—requires operating history,  
existing cash flows and  asset collateral 
Lack of clarity on ease of 
IPO process—very little 
capital market activity—
no investor has exited 
through IPO
Low levels of understanding of non-debt instruments and what type of capital is 
most appropriate for needs/stage
Identifying sources of capital
Limited formal sources of capital for start ups; most 
seed funding from friends, family or philanthropy 
Limited number of capital sources; banks don’t lend  
easily to SMEs
Few domestic investors offering equity—when they do it’s within their networks where they can easily vet
“Missing middle” deal size– very small amounts accessible through MFIs, informal 
channels; small needs for growth and scale up hard to access
Companies have weak financial records and corporate governance, increasing risk-aversion of investors
Collateral requirements are high, too high for new/young enterprises; entrepreneurs often take personal loans  
or use unregulated financial institutions, both of which have higher interest rates
Difficult to secure reliable third party valuation—
difficult for foreign investors to invest
Accessing capital
 Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
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Due to significant challenges in accessing capital for start-up enterprises, seed 
financing is predominantly accessed through informal sources (personal savings, 
friends, and family), as well as through grants or business plan competitions. In 
addition, numerous enterprises access capital through donations and grants from local 
philanthropists or from the Pakistani diaspora.
The availability and familiarity with sources of philanthropic capital create a strong 
preference for grant capital. Interestingly, relatively new entrepreneurs tend to be 
more comfortable with equity than managers of larger, more mature companies. 
These new entrepreneurs tend to be more familiar with international business models 
and structures, whereas established entrepreneurs who have built businesses with 
traditional family-based corporate governance structures are uncomfortable with 
external equity investments, strongly preferring bank debt, which is easier to access 
through established business networks.
FIGURE 22: PREFERENCES FOR CAPITAL BY SEED AND VENTURE STAGE ENTERPRISES
Instrument Preference Drivers of preference Key barriers
Private Debt
• Strong banking sector and awareness of how 
debt operates
• Excessive collateral requirements, short 
grace periods
• High interest rates, up to 20%
• Taking debt as start up is risky for both banks 
and entrepreneurs
• Cultural aversion to private debt because 
Islam discourages charging interest rates
Equity-like debt
• A good way to reduce risks for investors 
while aligning their interests with those of 
enterprises 
• Instrument is not well understood by both 
enterprises and investors 
Public equity Not appropriate instrument for seed or venture stage companies
Private Equity
• Less risky for early-stage enterprises 
• Investors provide mentorship, strategy 
support, access to networks, etc., in addition 
to capital
• Concept well understood by new 
entrepreneurs (well educated, diaspora) who 
may also work with incubators/accelerators
• Few equity investors offering capital to 
venture stage companies
Least severe
Most severe
 Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
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FIGURE 23: PREFERENCES FOR CAPITAL BY GROWTH AND MATURE STAGE COMPANIES
Instrument Preference Drivers of preference Key barriers
Private debt
• Strong awareness of how debt operates
• Established businesses with collateral, profits, 
and strong networks find it easy to access 
commercial debt
• Less involved diligence than for equity
• Debt more appropriate for working capital
• High collateral requirements and interest rates
• Banks may still be unwilling to lend to some 
sectors like microfinance, which is deemed 
risky because they can make same returns on 
government lending
Equity-like debt
• Creates flexibility—can pay back equity as debt 
to exit for equity shareholders, or vice versa
• Not a common instrument offered by 
investors
• Little understanding among enterprises
Public equity
• Creates exit option for promoter • Family-owned businesses averse to increased 
transparency and external shareholding
Private equity
• Growing number of equity investors
• Increasing recognition of value of equity 
investments—investors bring experience, 
networks, and additional support other  
than capital
• Long-term relationship and financial horizon
• Some enterprises reluctant to give up equity 
in their company—need education and 
convincng by investors (especially since 
mature companies tend to be family owned 
businesses)
• Few private equity investors
Least severe
Most severe
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
Constraints to enterprise growth
While access to finance is a key constraint to enterprise growth in Pakistan 
(as it is in other markets), there are other business and operational challenges 
commonly faced by entrepreneurs. The three challenges, in particular, that are 
worth highlighting are as follows:
• HR management, particularly hiring and retention: Despite poor literacy 
among a majority of the population, Pakistan has a significant talent pool with a 
well-educated and internationally exposed cadre. However, many professionals 
migrate overseas or prefer to work locally in large corporations or multinational 
corporations (MNCs) rather than with smaller or impact-oriented enterprises.
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• Corporate governance and financial management: Governance structures 
are usually weak and not designed for enterprise growth. Financial management 
skills are similarly often weak, including low capacity for financial record keeping 
and planning, which limits the development and growth of SMEs and start-ups in 
particular.
• Marketing and market access capabilities: This is generally a weak area for 
entrepreneurs in consumer-facing industries as the customer acquisition expertise 
of these entrepreneurs is low; this constrains growth in an environment where 
consumers are very distrusting until the product or service has been proved to 
be significantly credible. In particular, entrepreneurs have limited expertise in 
assessing markets and developing sales plans for growth.
ENABLING IMPACT 
INVESTING: THE ECOSYSTEM
Political instability, sectarian strife, the chronic energy crisis, and macroeconomic 
governance continue to be the key challenges to investment in Pakistan 
(see Figure 24). However, the perceptions of the severity of the security and 
regulatory environments as key constraints to investment differ between 
domestic and foreign investors. While foreign investors perceive sectarian strife and 
violence as a leading constraint to investment in Pakistan, domestic investors perceive 
it as a significant constraint but not the leading one, given that they have learned to 
adopt a “business as usual” approach within such a volatile environment. For domestic 
investors, challenges in the regulatory environment are seen as more critical.
Given that Pakistan has largely maintained an open investment regime since 
1997, the regulatory environment is generally perceived as favorable to foreign 
investors. However, the implementation of these regulations and the everyday 
experience of navigating them are reported as greater concerns for domestic 
investors. The Government of Pakistan (GoP) offers incentives to attract new foreign 
capital inflows, such as tax exemptions, reduced tariffs, and investor facilitation in 
designated special economic zones.85 To continue attracting investment, the GoP also 
announced the 2013 Investment Policy, which further liberalized investment policies 
to almost all sectors. With respect to PE laws for foreign investors, the minimum initial 
capital investment required in all sectors—including services—was eliminated in the 
2013 Investment Policy. There is currently no minimum requirement for the amount of 
foreign equity investment needed in any sector; moreover, there is no upper limit on 
the share of foreign equity allowed. 
In contrast, domestic investors perceive challenges navigating the regulatory 
environment, including particular challenges around upholding contractual 
obligations, property registration, the settlement of tax disputes, and the management 
85 US Department of State, Investment climate statement, Pakistan, 2014.
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and process of acquiring construction permits.86 Moreover, domestic investors 
perceive and encounter corruption as a more significant issue than foreign investors, 
particularly with respect to government procurements and establishing a business. 
While Pakistani law provides criminal penalties for corruption, implementation of the 
law is incomplete, and thus, in practice, it forms a significant barrier to smooth and 
efficient business operations.87  
FIGURE 24: INVESTMENT CLIMATE OVERVIEW BY SEVERITY RATING
Key  
components Key ecosystem constraints in Pakistan
Severity 
(foreign 
investors)
Severity 
(domestic 
investors)
In
ve
st
m
en
t c
lim
at
e
Political stability 
and governance
• Pakistan has been embroiled in high political insecurity, and there is worry that 
governments are taking a short-term approach to policy making
• Security and terrorism threats remain high—while only certain areas are still in 
active conflict, violence and instability is a worry in all areas
• Human rights violations are also a concern to foreign investors due to 
reputational risk
Infrastructure
• Acute power shortages in most parts of Pakistan; high proportion of the 
country remains under- or un-electrified 
• High government and foreign direct investments in infrastructure—extensive 
rail and road networks, established networks of dry ports, and seaports  
Macroeconomic 
governance
• Between 2008 and 2013, FDI into Pakistan declined by approximately 70%
• Growth rates lowest in the South Asia region 
• High inflation rates, high interest rates, and high tax rates
• Several macroeconomic reforms have been implemented in the recent years—
especially as a result of entering into a three-year Extended Fund Facility 
arrangement with IMF
Regulatory 
environment
• Liberal regulatory environment; open to foreign investment—foreign equity 
up to 100% allowed, no government permission required, attractive incentive 
packages
• Strong governance of banking and financial sector; well-established  
banking system.
• Board of Investments attached to PM’s office since 2009 to ensure  
ease of process
• Regulation “criminalizes good actors and rewards bad actors,” encouraging 
enterprises to take short-cuts or illegal measures
• Locals find the process of starting a business, launching a fund, or launching a 
new financial mechanism inefficient, requiring several levels of bureaucracy 
Least severe
Most severe
Sources: 2014 Investment Climate Statement, Pakistan (US Department of State); Dalberg analysis
86 World Bank 2014 “Doing Business” rankings; Pakistan and US Department of State (2014).
87 Pakistan ranked 127th of 177 countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
(2013).
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With respect to macroeconomic governance, Pakistan has a liberal foreign 
exchange regime and its policies support the free flow of resources for domestic 
and foreign investors,88 but its taxation and inflation rates remain a significant 
barrier for both foreign and domestic investors. Investors are faced with a complex 
assortment of both federal and provincial taxes and controls, which are overseen with 
much administrative discretion, resulting in inefficiency and corruption. The GoP and 
the World Bank launched a multi-year tax reform program in 2004 that was extended 
until 2011; while there are still major issues with the taxation system, this initiative 
helped the GoP reorganize its Federal Board of Revenue in establishing a large 
tax unit. However, political tensions prevented the GoP from presenting an IMF-
mandated tax measure to the Parliament in 2010, and Pakistan’s tax-to-GDP ratio still 
remains among the lowest worldwide. In addition, the other macroeconomic barriers 
faced by investors include high inflation and a relatively volatile currency that can 
depreciate dramatically.
In terms of investor support, there are an increasing number of service providers, 
and a network of ecosystem support players is developing quickly (see Figure 
25). However, there is still a range of issues that need to be addressed, particularly 
for incoming investors with respect to deal sourcing and due diligence, as they are 
restricted by security concerns in their ability to undertake due diligence and pipeline 
development on the ground. Due to the fact that the investor advisory services 
landscape is still thin, equity investors provide informal advisory support through their 
participation on investee boards.
88 US Department of State, Investment climate statement, Pakistan, 2014.
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FIGURE 25: CONSTRAINTS TO INVESTOR AND ENTERPRISE SUPPORT IN PAKISTAN
Key  
components Key ecosystem constraints in Pakistan
Severity of 
constraint
In
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t
Investor support
• Presence of general service providers (e.g., for legal, accounting, and registration support); 
however, few specialized investment advisory firms are present that can help with 
specialized functions such as deal sourcing and due diligence
• Key areas of need include
 » Firms that can do due diligence on the ground, given security concerns that prevent 
investors from traveling to Pakistan 
 » Need for firms who can help investors with pipeline development given closeness of 
social and business networks and importance of relationships to navigate these
 » More asset management support providers or BDS providers that can work with 
international equity investors who are wary of setting up a local presence due to 
security risks
Enterprise 
support
• Other than access to finance, key challenges for enterprises include access to markets, 
difficulty in hiring and retaining qualified staff, and security concerns 
• While there is a growing presence of enterprise support and development organizations, 
including incubators, accelerators, and BDS providers, the overall landscape is still 
developing
• A few new aggregators are emerging who help enterprises access support
• Key areas of need include: 
 » Vocational/skills training institute to increase pool of qualified staff
 » Increase in the number of BDS providers
 » More incubators and accelerators, especially having a non-tech focus
 » Efforts to change mindset about working at SMEs
Least severe
Most severe
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
The enterprise support ecosystem is also growing, with a number of incubators 
and accelerators (particularly those with a focus on technology enterprises) 
established over the last few years, as well as support from traditional providers 
and funders of technical assistance (donors and DFIs). While a positive trend, 
and one that creates investor confidence and optimism, there is still a lot to do 
to fully establish these support players and, more importantly, to ensure a good 
quality of service. As with all nascent ecosystems, in the rush to create new support 
organizations for enterprises out of the recognition of a serious need, the quality of 
service and the impact of these organizations may not be a foremost concern but will 
be an important area of focus going forward.
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FIGURE 26: SAMPLE ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN’S SUPPORT ECOSYSTEM
USAID Department for International  Development (DFID)
International Finance  
Corporation (IFC)
TA Providers
SMEDA Buksh Foundation Youth Engagement Services (YES) Network Pakistan
Advisory Services
Incubators/Accelerators
invest2innovate dot zero Plan9 WBIC LUMS Center for Entrepreneurship*
Credit Rating Services
PACRA
* Beyond these organizations there are several co-working  
spaces such as DotZero, Basecamp, etc. that offer passive support
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH
There are several areas of further research that would amplify our understanding of 
the vibrant impact investing landscape in Pakistan. 
First, given the investor interest in innovative financial instruments, such as quasi-
equity, social impact bonds, and murabaha, additional research on these would be 
beneficial to address the problem of the lack of familiarity among regulators and 
enterprises. Issues to be explored include a) a detailed overview of instruments 
employed in current investments, b) conditions under which various instruments are 
ideal, c) examples from other countries that could be replicated in Pakistan, and d) 
the necessary requirements for investors to engage in these instruments.
Second, it would be important to further understand the critical role of HNWIs 
and family offices in Pakistan, including clarity on who is investing in what. As we 
know now, these stakeholders either primarily engage in philanthropic activities 
or in conventional commercial investments. Further research that focuses on 
the requirements that would stimulate or compel impact investments would be 
interesting.
Third, given a regulatory openness to foreign investment but a need for local 
presence for effective capital deployment, there exists an opportunity to explore 
methods for collaboration among foreign and domestic investors and ecosystem 
players. Further research can explore how these stakeholders can combine their 
respective resources and strengths to develop the impact investing market in Pakistan.
Lastly, additional resources on intermediary ecosystem players, including those 
that support both enterprises and investors, would be of value. A catalogue of 
intermediary support organizations for enterprises (e.g., organizations that support 
the structuring of deals) as well as service providers for investors (e.g., providers who 
conduct due diligence on investees) would significantly help in generating awareness 
of the players in this market. While there has been an increase in the number of 
such support organizations, the quality of their service and their impact is unknown. 
A landscape of optimal models and specific organizations, as well as best practices, 
could strengthen the ecosystem for enterprises and investors alike.
SRI LANKA
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COUNTRY CONTEXT
Overview
Sri Lanka, a country that has recently emerged from a 26-year-long civil war, is 
now showing signs of strong recovery and positive economy-wide growth. Since 
the end of the civil war in 2009, the country has experienced dramatic GDP growth 
and is forecasted to grow at nearly 8.5% annually through 2016.89
Throughout the period of the civil war, in addition to widespread political instability 
and insecurity, Sri Lanka suffered from several natural disasters, including a 
devastating tsunami in 2004. As a result, there was a heavy inflow of international 
aid into the country. More recently, however, allegations of human rights violations 
by the government have made many of these aid organizations wary of engaging in 
Sri Lanka. Some have, in fact, begun withdrawing from the country, and there has 
been a continued push from the international community for investigations into these 
allegations. 
FIGURE 1: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN SRI LANKA’S POLITICAL HISTORY
Assisanation of Indian PM
• LTTE inmplicated in 
assassination of Indian Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi
• Indian government ends its 
active involvement in conflict
End of civil war
• Official end to the 
26-year-long civil 
conflict with the 
Sri Lankan army 
captured areas 
controlled by LTTE
Tsunami
• Tsunami claims more than 
30,000 lives and leaves around 
1.5 million people displaced
• Large inflow of relief and  
humanitarian aid and 
organizations
Human rights abuses 
investigated
• International organizations such 
as UN Human Rights Council 
and Amnesty International urge 
SL to investigate human rights 
allegations and war crimes
Rajapaksa appointed 
President
• Incumbent Rajapaksa wins 
presidential elections and 
General Fonseka is arrested 
on corruption charges
Start of the  
“First Eelam War”
• War between the Sri Lankan 
government and Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
a separatist movement in  
Sri Lanka
State of emergency
• State of emergency imposed 
in Sri Lanka after foreign 
minister is assassinated by 
an LTTE assassin; violence 
begins to mount
Cease fire
• Government 
and LTTE sign 
a Norwegian-
mediated ceasefire
1991 2004 2009 2010
1983 2002 2005 2010
Source: BBC, 2013. Sri Lanka Profile 
89 International Monetary Fund estimates.
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The implications of these changes for investors are mixed. The improved political 
climate and engagement by government are promising, but the scrutiny of the 
international community presents reputational risk and, as such, many potential 
investors are wary. Still, strong macroeconomic fundamentals, including rapid current 
and forecasted GDP growth, are positive indicators.
GDP growth and drivers of foreign direct 
investment (FDI)
Sri Lanka is predicted to be one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. Sri 
Lanka’s GDP in 2013 was 136 billion (PPP, current international $) following nearly a 
decade of average annual growth of 9%. At a forecasted GDP growth rate of 8.5% 
from 2014 to 2016, Sri Lanka is poised to be the third fastest growing economy in the 
region, behind Myanmar and Bangladesh but ahead of India.
FIGURE 2: GDP GROWTH OVER TIME (PPP, CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR BILLIONS) AND 2014–2016  
FORECASTED GROWTH RATE AS COMPARED TO REGION (%)
Average annual 
growth rate
MYA
9.8
BAN
8.6
SL
8.5
IND
8.4
NEP
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PAK
5.7
200
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40
80
2004 2006 2008 20122010 2016
160
+8%
+9%
2014
Sources: International Monetary Fund estimates; Dalberg analysis
Service sector growth has been the strongest contributor to this economic 
performance. In 2013, industry contributed to 32% of GDP (strongly driven by the 
textile and garments, and food and beverage sectors) while services such as tourism, 
transport, telecommunications, and financial services contributed to 57% of the GDP. 
Tourism in particular showed strong growth—tourism income rose from USD 362 
million in 2005 to USD 1.04 billion in 2013, and is expected to double again in the 
next five years. Interestingly, while agriculture only contributes a small share of GDP, 
approximately 32% of the population is employed in the sector, and Sri Lankans still 
view their country as heavily agricultural, with even formal sector workers retaining 
ownership of agricultural land that they return to during harvest season to help 
harvest the yield.
144 • THE LANDSCAPE FOR IMPACT INVESTING IN SOUTH ASIA
FIGURE 3: CONTRIBUTION TO GDP BY SECTOR (PPP, CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR BILLIONS)4
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Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
Alongside this robust growth, the Sri Lankan government has developed a 
strong provision of basic services for the public. Public expenditures on education, 
housing, healthcare, and other services more than doubled from 2005 to 2012 and 
accounted for 22% of government revenue as of 2012. Expenditures on public services 
are expected to increase further, improving both access and quality. While there is 
increasing private interest in serving the high-end market segments, the widespread 
and good-quality public provision of basic education and healthcare for lower- and 
middle-income segments makes these sectors less attractive to the private sector 
(although some regional variation and inequity are still visible).
Widespread public sector provision has also resulted in Sri Lanka’s Human 
Development Index (HDI) score of 0.72, which is much higher than the South 
Asia weighted average (0.54) and all regional comparators. Life expectancy at 
birth is now 75.1, higher than the world average of 70.1. Ninety-three percent of the 
population has access to improved drinking water, compared to 89% for the world 
average.
90  Services, Industry, and Agriculture are used as defined by ISIC Rev 3. Services include wholesale and 
retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional, and 
personal services such as education, healthcare, and real estate services. Industry includes mining, 
manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas. Agriculture includes cultivation of crops, 
livestock production, forestry, hunting, fishing, and other associated activities.
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FIGURE 4: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX FOR SOUTH ASIA 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX
(SCALE OF 0 TO 1, 1 BEING THE HIGHEST)
HEALTHCARE
• Life expectancy at birth is now 75.1, higher than world average of 70.1, 
and within the high development index category (>73.4)
• Infant mortality rate is 8 per 1000 live births and 99% of births are 
attended by a healthcare worker
EDUCATION
• Sri Lanka’s expected years of schooling for a student starting school 
is 12.7 and mean years of schooling for adults is 9.3; these figures are 
both more than South Asia and World averages, and within the medium 
human development index category
• Literacy rates among men and women are 97.7% and 98.6% respectively
WATER AND SANITATION
• 93% of the population have access to improved drinking water sources 
and 91% of the population have access to improved sanitation, both of 
which are higher than the world averages of 89% and 63%, respectively
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Sources: UNDP, 2013 Human Development Index; UNICEF 2013 Sri Lanka Statistics
Investors have generally responded positively to the stability and growth in Sri 
Lanka. FDI inflows have been volatile but increasing since the mid-2000s, rising 
to USD 1.2 billion in 2013. Key constraints to increased investor confidence and 
smoother, stronger FDI inflows include concerns over growth being fueled primarily 
by government infrastructure spending, concerns over limited action to address 
allegations of human rights violations, and allegations by some investors of corruption 
and inconsistent application of investment policies.91
FIGURE 5: FDI INFLOWS TO SRI LANKA OVER TIME (CURRENT USD MILLIONS) 
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Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
91  News reports: Ranga Sirlal, “Sri Lanka targets $2 Bln in FDI again for 2014.” Reuters, May 29, 2014.
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Key constraints in Sri Lanka
Despite a relatively high HDI score, a large majority of Sri Lanka’s population still 
lives below USD 4 per day (70% in 2011), and a quarter lives below USD 2 per 
day.92 Income inequality is high, although it varies significantly by region. The Gini 
coefficient93 for Sri Lanka is 0.36 (compared with the South Asia average of 0.33), 
and it is estimated that the richest 20% earn 45% of the income while the poorest 20% 
earn only 7%. Eighty-five percent of Sri Lanka’s population lives in rural areas, and this 
statistic has remained fairly constant since 2009.94
One other key factor deterring investors from investing in Sri Lanka is the small 
size of the population and the domestic market. With a population of just over 20 
million, Sri Lanka is the smallest of all countries in South Asia. This small domestic 
market means opportunities for local scale are limited. Although Sri Lanka does enjoy 
geographic proximity to India and its large market, the advanced nature of many 
Indian industries means that Sri Lankan businesses struggle to compete there.
FIGURE 6: 2012 TOTAL POPULATION BY COUNTRY (IN MILLIONS)
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Source: World Bank Development Indicators, The World Bank
92 World Bank 2011; ECHO 2012.
93  The Gini coefficient represents the income distribution of a nation’s residents. This is the most 
commonly used measure of inequality. The coefficient varies between 0, which reflects complete 
equality, and 1, which indicates complete inequality. Source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Gini_coefficient.
94 Rural Poverty Portal, Rural Poverty in Sri Lanka.
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Sri Lanka’s stock market is also relatively small in terms of market capitalization. 
The market saw huge year-on-year growth between 2008 and 2010, but then 
contracted as investor confidence dropped (Figure 7). In 2011–2012, there were 
several cases of market manipulation reported in the media—including allegations 
of price manipulation and insider trading—which have left domestic and foreign 
investors wary. The markets have been recovering only sluggishly since.
Furthermore, capital markets are perceived to be extremely volatile, which again 
acts as a deterrent for investors. This holds true even for foreign investors for whom 
public equities would otherwise present an easier, lower-risk asset class with which to 
enter and gain country exposure.
FIGURE 7: SRI LANKA TOTAL MARKET CAPITALIZATION (USD BILLIONS) AND COLOMBO ALL SHARE INDEX OVER TIME 
(USD, JULY 2013–JULY 2014)
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Sources: World Development Indicators, The World Bank; Bloomberg Stock Market and Financial Markets Overview. 
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Interestingly, Sri Lanka has a fairly long history of institutional venture capital. In 
the 1990s, the government recognized the need for increased risk capital in the 
market and encouraged banks to establish venture capital (VC) investment arms. 
Through the 1990s and into the early 2000s, 101 investments were made by seven 
VCs, totaling around USD 8 million. However, few of these seven VCs still exist, 
and the practice of investing risk capital has never truly become embedded in the 
economy. The investments made during this period were fairly high risk, and returns 
were not strong, in part due to the limited experience of fund managers at the time, 
and in part due to aversion on behalf of strong entrepreneurs to open their ideas and 
companies to bank-linked VCs out of fear that they would be taken over (see Figure 8 
below). Therefore, these early VC funds have either morphed into more conservative 
private equity (PE) funds, been acquired by investment banks/commercial 
organizations, or closed down completely. Nonetheless, positive implications have 
been a greater familiarity with equity instruments and a relatively active (although 
small) mainstream PE market. However, the negative perceptions created by these 
unsuccessful efforts have left a sour taste for many domestic investors who remain 
wary of deploying risk capital.
FIGURE 8: PATHWAY FROM EARLY VC TO CURRENT CONSERVATIVE COMMERCIAL PE IN SRI LANKA
Venture capital (VC) financing was development oriented
• Sri Lankan DFIs provide equity to support projects, 
particularly in the medium term
• 101 investments made by seven VCs, totaling around $8 million
• Instruments: equity, convertible debentures
VC industry was formally introduced through 
amendments in 1990
• Amendments made the Inland Revenue Act arising 
from new industrialization strategy adopted by the 
government
 » Set of formal guidelines principally addressed 
technology-oriented start-ups and infrastructure 
projects that required patient capital
 » Tax exemptions to both investors and investees
Few of the original seven VCs still make seed and venture stage investments 
• Many have transformed to PE, been acquired by investment banks/
commercial organizations, or have exited the market completely
Key challenges faced by industry include
• Insufficent deal flow—especially in the ‘90s and early 2000s
• Limited intermediaries—e.g., merchant banks, accounting/ consulting firms  
to help with deal flow
• Lack of nuanced understanding of VC
• Investees averse to equity, preferring to retain control, sensitive to mode of 
divestment by VC
• Limited exit options
<1980 1900s- early 
2000s
1990s
2004- 
present
Sources: “Venture capital financing—Sri Lankan experience,” Lanka Ventures, 2004; Stakeholder interviews
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More recently, there were a handful of attempts by both domestic and regional fund 
managers to raise a Sri Lanka-focused impact investing fund, but these too were 
unsuccessful for a range of reasons, as outlined in Figure 9. At least two to three funds 
have tried to raise capital in the past and have failed. The goal was to raise capital 
committed solely for Sri Lanka, out of recognition that capital committed for South 
Asia through regional funds was heavily directed to India. However, given the size 
and immaturity of the Sri Lankan market at the time (post-war) as well as the internal 
constraints on DFIs as limited partners (LPs), these attempts were unsuccessful. The 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), for example, had a USD 10 million mandate 
for investing into a fund, but this expired due to the inability to find co-investors for 
the fund.
FIGURE 9: CHALLENGES TO RAISING COUNTRY-SPECIFIC IMPACT INVESTING FUNDS FOR SRI LANKA 
Challenge
Severity of 
Challenge Explanation of Challenge
Difficulty raising 
LP capital
• Attempts to raise funds right after the war were unsuccessful in part because they coincided 
with the global economic downturn, and in part due to the challenges of coordinating multiple 
DFIs to invest at the same time:
 » DFIs often have both minimum investment amounts into funds (e.g., $10 million) but also 
limitations around their exposure within the fund and will only want to be 15–25% of the 
total—this means funds have to be large, and multiple anchor investors are needed.
• It is difficult to find co-investors who see the potential of Sri Lanka and have a similar mandate 
as DFIs to invest the other ~80% needed to start a country fund—the ability for the GP to co-
invest provides a strong signal and credibility, allaying some LP concerns.
• For private investors who are still not familiar with the market and haven’t seen any success, 
it seems too risky—so need DFIs as the anchors initially; private investors would prefer early 
exposure through public debt rather than private equity.
• Sri Lanka is also a smaller market compared to India, and so investors see a risk in having too 
large of a fund dedicated to Sri Lanka where they are unsure of pipeline potential and would 
prefer a regional fund that can invest in multiple markets.
Lack of 
experienced 
fund managers 
• Given the nascent opening up of the market, there are few fund managers who have experience 
in raising and running a fund—some stakeholders suggest that this lack of experience was a key 
part of the challenge in convincing early investors to participate in a fund. 
• Many fund managers are expatriate investment professionals who see the potential of Sri Lanka 
and want to raise a fund.
Difficulty 
domiciling in Sri 
Lanka
• Fund structure is relatively new in Sri Lanka, and there are no benefits provided to domicile 
there, as compared to Mauritius, which gives tax benefits.
• Repatriating money from Sri Lanka can also be difficult, making it harder for foreign investors to 
invest in a fund. 
Least severe
Most severe
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
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INVESTING IN SRI LANKA:  
THE SUPPLY SIDE
There is increasing interest and activity in Sri Lanka, which provides a number of 
advantages to investors compared to other countries in South Asia. Compared 
with its neighbors, Sri Lanka has perhaps the easiest regulatory environment to 
navigate, which gives investors the required confidence in their ability to invest and 
exit. Another key feature of the market is the growing maturity of entrepreneurs—
primarily in terms of the diaspora/returnees who tend to be active and the domestic 
business community that has grown businesses over a long time. The small size 
of Sri Lanka—in terms of both market and geography—is both an advantage and 
a disadvantage. It is an advantage in that it is easy to identify entrepreneurs and 
partners as networks are strong and easy to access, and in the ease of getting around 
the country to rural areas to work with a diversity of enterprises. On the other hand, 
in such a small market, scale becomes a challenge as the domestic economy is 
limited and investors sometimes need to find deals that present opportunities to scale 
offshore.
The broad impact capital market in Sri Lanka
USD 386 million has been deployed to date by DFIs and a further USD 100 
million has been deployed by other impact investors95 (see Figures 10, 11 and 
13). At least 12 international finance institutions (IFIs) and development finance 
institutions (DFIs), 11 funds, and one foundation have active impact investments in 
Sri Lanka. These investors have a total of 31 current investments. More information 
on the observed investment preferences for this set of investors can be found in the 
section “Key trends of impact investing in Sri Lanka.” 
Overall, despite the large number of actors, the total volume of impact capital 
deployed is not proportionally large as compared to other regional markets. 
Given the small size of the market, the deal sizes for both funds and DFIs tend to be 
smaller in Sri Lanka than in other countries in the region. Moreover, while there are 
a large number of DFIs active in Sri Lanka (as many as are currently active in India), 
several have engaged only through syndicated loans with other DFIs; therefore, the 
number of deals made overall is relatively small.
95 These Figures represent the best effort to scope the total impact investing market in Sri Lanka. However, 
it is possible that not all impact capital has been captured due to investor confidentiality or other 
limitations. These figures should be treated as approximate representations of the market.
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FIGURE 10: NUMBER OF DIRECT IMPACT AND IMPACT-RELATED INVESTORS IN SRI LANKA
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
There are also a set of impact-related investors (Ring 2) with approximately 
USD 281 million invested (Figure 11). These investors include two fund managers, 
one angel network, and commercial banks lending to small or medium enterprises 
(SMEs) with DFI-backed capital. This group currently has 22 known investments, but 
the number is probably very high due to sizeable capital being used for SME loans by 
commercials banks. As there is no portfolio information publicly available for these, 
the exact number of investments made is unknown.96
 
FIGURE 11: TOTAL KNOWN CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY RING
281.1
(37%)
488.1 
(63%)
Ring 1: Impact investors
Ring 2: Impact-related investors
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
96 See “Defining key terms and concepts” in the introduction chapter of this report for an explanation of 
the framework used for categorizing investors using a two-ring framework, where the inner ring—Ring 
1—represents the impact investing activity and the outer ring—Ring 2—represents the activity related to 
impact investing but lacking either an explicit impact intention or measurement.
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Active impact and impact-related investors in  
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka has a large number of actors and varied investor types with a mix of 
both local and international players. Figure 12 provides specifics on the active 
impact investors in Sri Lanka, which includes funds managers, DFIs, foundations, 
family offices, HNWIs, and banks.
There are significantly more international investors than domestic investors in 
the impact investment market (as domestic investors tend to be commercially 
oriented rather than impact focused), but these investors are only deploying 
a small share of their total capital in Sri Lanka. Of the 13 funds currently active, 
one is a domestic fund, two are regional (i.e., focused on South Asia), and ten are 
international. Traditionally, local funds in Sri Lanka have prioritized financial returns 
and had little interest in the impact investment market. While we see a large number 
of international funds deploying impact capital, the small size and uncertainty of the 
Sri Lankan economy have led these investors to invest only a small share of their 
portfolios in the country. A few additional funds are currently raising small amounts of 
domestic capital, although these will likely fall within Ring 2 in our framework. 
DFIs and IFIs are the most active investors by amount of capital deployed, 
with all 12 DFIs/IFIs making investments directly into enterprises. DFIs/IFIs are 
responsible for USD 386 million, or about 79%, of the USD 488 million deployed by 
impact investors. While the amount of capital is sizeable, the number of companies 
absorbing this capital is not. To minimize their risks and due to the difficulty in finding 
large, investable companies, most DFIs/IFIs have invested only in syndicated loan 
deals with other DFIs/IFIs, implying that the number of enterprises receiving DFI/IFI 
capital is actually quite small. 
DFIs and IFIs are also engaging indirectly in the impact-related market by 
channeling capital through commercial banks for SME lending and in small 
amounts deployed through foreign funds as intermediaries. As we have seen 
throughout the region, DFIs and IFIs are heavily backing SME loans through 
commercial banks (through both loans and guarantees). Overall, 42% of capital 
deployed by DFIs in Sri Lanka has been invested into financial institutions, with the 
goal of increasing access to finance.
Unlike in many of the other countries under study, DFIs are not currently 
investing in any country-specific funds in Sri Lanka. However, this is to change in 
the near future as a new Sri Lanka-specific fund is being set up through a joint venture 
between a domestic bank and a regional fund manager.97 As DFIs now understand the 
market better, they are ready to increase their exposure in the country by investing in 
local funds. 
Foundations have mostly exited Sri Lanka; hence, we see only one foundation 
providing impact capital. Following the end of the civil war, the country faced a 
97 “Zephyr charts $50-million Sri Lanka plan,” Economic Times, 2014.
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humanitarian crisis, and in 2004, the country suffered from a devastating tsunami. 
These events sparked a wave of philanthropic capital from foundations. Sri Lanka 
has since recovered and has transitioned to a middle-income country, reducing the 
perceived need. Accusations against the government of widespread human right 
violations have further isolated foundations. Thus, we see only one foundation 
actively deploying impact capital in Sri Lanka today. 
A large number of high net-worth individuals (HNWIs) and family offices are 
active as investors primarily due to one domestic angel network with more than 
70 members, but the amount of capital deployed by these investors is relatively 
small. Domestic and diaspora HNWIs and family offices have been engaged in the 
impact capital market, both as direct investors into enterprises and as contributors 
to funds. One angel network has about 70 members—including HNWIs and family 
offices—but despite their large number, the network has deployed less than USD 
100,000. Of these members, 10–12 are from the region and the remaining are 
members of the Sri Lankan diaspora. Domestic HNWIs are likely to increase their 
engagement in the future, as a number of them have already pledged capital to 
upcoming domestic funds and are expected to make up a significant share of new 
domestic funds.
As in other countries in the region, family and friends are a significant source 
of seed and venture capital through informal investments that do not have set 
timelines or contracts. While the exact amount of capital deployed through family 
and friends is unknown, it is likely to be the predominant source of capital in these 
early growth stages.
The most active institutional investors are commercial banks lending DFI capital 
to SMEs; one pension fund is scoping the market. Seven commercial banks are 
investing on the periphery of the impact investing market by making loans to SMEs 
with DFI/IFI capital. As discussed above, DFIs and IFIs have provided capital to 
these banks that has been earmarked solely for SME lending in an effort to catalyze 
investments to these businesses, leading to economic growth and higher financial 
inclusion. Beyond banks, one pension fund is looking to back a domestic fund. 
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FIGURE 12: IMPACT INVESTORS AND IMPACT-RELATED INVESTORS ACTIVE IN SRI LANKA
TYPE OF INVESTOR ESTIMATED NUMBER DETAILS OF INVESTORS IN SRI LANKA
Fund managers 13
Ten international funds (that have invested only a small share of their capital in Sri 
Lanka), one domestic fund, and two regional funds are currently making investments, 
and a few funds are scoping and preparing to launch in Sri Lanka.
DFIs and IFIs 12
All DFIs and IFIs are making direct investments into enterprises in Sri Lanka, and 
a few are also channeling capital through commercial banks for SME lending and 
investing small amounts in foreign funds. 
Foundations 1
Only one international foundation is making investments in Sri Lanka, as many have 
exited the country with Sri Lanka being considered a middle-income country and 
facing concerns about human rights violations during the recently concluded civil war. 
HNWIs and family offices 70+
Over 70 HNWIs and family offices are members of a domestic angel network, and 
several HNWIs have pledged capital to upcoming domestic funds. Family and friends 
are a predominant informal source of seed and venture stage capital. 
Institutional investors 7 banks,  1 pension fund
Seven commercial banks are lending to SMEs with capital provided by DFIs. One 
pension fund is potentially backing a domestic fund. 
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Key trends in impact investing in Sri Lanka
The following section examines trends among impact investors, who collectively have 
about USD 488 million currently deployed. The activities of impact-related investors 
will be discussed in the section “Beyond the impact investing market.” Looking across 
the landscape of currently deployed capital in Sri Lanka, we can observe several 
trends in investment preferences of impact investors by instrument, stage of growth, 
sector, and deal size.
INVESTOR MIX
FIGURE 13: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY SOURCE (USD MILLION)
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Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
DFIs and IFIs have the most capital currently deployed among impact investors 
(about 79%), with funds and foundations contributing the remainder. There are a 
large number of DFIs and IFIs active in Sri Lanka, but their prevalence in the market 
can also be explained by the large deal sizes that DFIs and IFIs tend to make relative 
to other investors. Funds and fund managers are also active, with USD 99 million 
currently deployed. One foundation makes up the remaining 0.6% of active capital 
among impact investors, with about USD 2.8 million deployed.
156 • THE LANDSCAPE FOR IMPACT INVESTING IN SOUTH ASIA
INSTRUMENT
Overall, impact investors in Sri Lanka have deployed more capital through debt 
than other instruments. Sixty-two percent of direct investments are debt, compared 
with 25% through equity. This is an interesting trend since equity is not a new 
concept to Sri Lanka (as described earlier), unlike in the other markets where both 
investors and enterprises are less comfortable with the instrument. This preference 
for debt is driven more by enterprise preference for debt than by investor preference, 
particularly for growth and mature stage companies, and is consistent across investor 
type–both DFIs and non-DFIs.
FIGURE 14: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY INSTRUMENT (USD MILLION)
NON-DFIDFI
Debt
Equity
Quasi-equity
Guarantee
Unknown
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
67.6 
(66.4%)
32.0 
(31.4%)
233.8 
(60.5%)
89.4 
(23.1%)
14.4 
(3.7%)
48.6 
(12.6%)
1.9 
(1.9%)
0.3 
(0.2%)
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
Investment instrument also partly depends on growth stage. Seed, venture, and 
growth stage companies have seen more equity investments from investors. Due 
to the inherent risk of earlier-stage companies, equity investments allow investors 
to be more strategically involved. Moreover, investors understand that in early 
stages, debt can actually constrain enterprise growth. In contrast, DFIs investing in 
large enterprises tend to invest through debt, driven largely by the capital needs of 
enterprises.
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Investors are experimenting with new instruments. Besides debt and equity, 
which are more familiar instruments in Sri Lanka, impact investors have made some 
small to mid-sized guarantees to support access to finance for SMEs and non-bank 
microfinance institutions. Figure 15 provides an overview of investors providing 
guarantees; the IFC investments outlined in the figure do not qualify as direct 
investments into enterprises and therefore have not been captured in the totals in the 
analyses.
FIGURE 15: EXAMPLES OF GUARANTEES BEING USED BY IMPACT INVESTORS
Investor Offering  
Guarantee
Organization Receiving 
Guarantee Amount and Purpose
International  
Finance Corporation  
World Bank Group
Commercial Bank
• USD 14.87 million 
• Used to back SME loans provided by the bank
NDB Bank
• USD 13.11 million 
• Used to back SME loans provided by the bank
Helps commercial banks increase their capacity and encourages SME lending. For DFIs, this is a less risky investment that creates a multiplier 
effect as commercial banks lend money to enterprises. 
Grameen Crédit Agricole 
Microfinance Corporation Berendina
• USD 0.26 million 
• Help partially secure a bank loan from domestic bank for 3 years 
Guarantees to Berendina Microfinance have been given to enable the enterprise to access commercial bank loans. The guarantee makes it 
easier for microfinance companies that lack collateral to access capital.
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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SIZE OF INVESTEE COMPANIES
A majority of impact capital has been invested in large companies. While it is 
expected that large companies will absorb the most capital, as deal sizes tend to 
be larger for these companies, only a very minimal amount of known capital (USD 
300,000 or 0.1% of all capital) has flowed to SMEs. This is likely a function of the 
predominance of DFIs in Sri Lanka and their preference for large ticket sizes, which 
only relatively large companies can absorb.
FIGURE 16: IMPACT CAPITAL BY SIZE OF INVESTEE COMPANY (USD MILLIONS)
NON-DFIDFI
Large Enterprises
SMEs
Unknown
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
291.8 
(75.5%)
94.5 
(24.5%)
101.6 
(99.7%)
0.3 
(0.3%)
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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GROWTH STAGE AND DEAL SIZE
As with the other markets under study, there is strong preference for mature 
companies—both listed and private—among all types of impact investors. DFIs 
need to make large investments and therefore, target enterprises that can absorb 
large amounts of capital, leading to a focus on larger and more mature companies. 
We also see non-DFI investors providing capital to listed and private, mature 
companies. As a result, 79% of total capital from impact investors has been invested in 
mature companies.
FIGURE 17: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY GROWTH STAGE
Mature, public
Mature, private
Growth
Venture
Seed
Unknown
NON-DFIDFI
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
67.9 
(66.7%)
171.0 
(44.3%)
115.0 
(29.8%)
5.0 
(1.3%)
95.2 
(24.7%)
32.0 
(31.4%)
1.9 
(1.9%)
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
While they still represent a small proportion of capital, angel investors, VCs, 
and bank SME portfolios (to a lesser extent), are targeting smaller and earlier-
stage companies, despite the inherent higher risk. A major constraint to increased 
investment is the dearth of investible enterprises where the entrepreneurs have strong 
financial and operational management skills. Unlike in markets with established VC 
industries, in Sri Lanka, company directors (including equity investors) are personally 
liable in case of any default by the company. Therefore, for early-stage companies 
where the failure risk is extremely high, the appetite to take this risk is extremely 
low given the limited regulatory protection in case of bankruptcy. The result is that 
even angel investors or other seed and venture capital providers tend to be quite risk 
averse in their investment decisions and their decisions depend in great measure on 
their trust in and relationship with the entrepreneur.
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Unlike in other markets, impact investments in Sri Lanka show wide variation in 
terms of deal size. A reasonable number of deals in each progressive size bracket 
suggests a growing maturity in the market and potential for development of the 
industry into a well-coordinated market with impact capital available across the range 
of capital needs.
FIGURE 18: IMPACT CAPITAL BY DEAL SIZE
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SECTOR
In Sri Lanka, financial services and microfinance have drawn the bulk of impact 
capital by sector (where “financial services” includes banks and commercial 
leasing companies). Tourism and hospitality have also been attractive to 
investors, alongside some investment in high-end private healthcare. It is 
important to note that even within the financial services/microfinance sector, a 
handful of companies have been the target of the majority of investments—in part 
due to the legal structure of many microfinance organizations (as guarantee-limited 
companies that cannot absorb foreign capital, as will be discussed in later sections) 
as well as to some level of risk aversion and preference for partnering with investee 
companies that have already worked with international investors in the past.
FIGURE 19: IMPACT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY SECTOR
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
Financial Services
Manufacturing
Health
Energy
Other
Unknown
DFI
NON-DFI
69.8 
(68.6%)
32.0 
(31.4%)
134.7 
(34.9%)
29.5 
(7.6%)
20.7 
(5.4%)6.8 
(1.8%)
100.0 
(25.9%)
94.5 
(24.5%)
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
Certain sectors, particularly those that focus on base of the pyramid (BoP) 
segments, have seen limited interest to date. The key constraint to increased 
impact investment in the BoP-focused business models is the scale and capacity to 
absorb large investment. With the increase in investment activity in relatively small 
ticket sizes (largely by investors in Ring 2), impact capital directed to businesses 
focused on the BoP is likely to grow. In particular, we observe an interest in BoP-
focused enterprises in the sectors of ICT, energy, healthcare, and technology. At 
present, with the concentration of actors in large deal sizes, investment in these 
sectors has been limited.
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Return expectations and exit possibilities 
Equity investor return expectations are between 20% and 25%. Commercial bank 
interest rates in Sri Lanka are typically pegged at 8%–12%, and other asset classes 
such as fixed deposits or government securities provide similar returns up to about 
12%. Equity investors, on the other hand, expect returns that are adjusted for a higher 
level of perceived risk. For PE/VC funds, this is usually 20%–25%. This figure might 
be slightly lower for DFIs, but most impact investors target returns as close to market 
rates as possible. 
Some entrepreneurs have stated concerns about having limited access to below-
market impact equity, which they believe should have lower financial return 
expectations to account for the value of the social/environmental impact. For 
example, agricultural enterprises articulate a preference for a greater share of their 
profit/value return to the farmers, resulting in a lower return to investors as well 
as difficulty in incorporating a dividend payout. However, in general, low investor 
competition in the market increases confidence that these high returns will be 
possible.
In terms of exits, investor preferences are not always aligned with likely 
mechanisms, given the contextual and circumstantial realities (Figure 20). As 
commonly seen in other countries, IPO is the preferred means of exit, but has not 
been used widely among impact investors to date. There have been no exits through 
IPO for impact investments (with the exception of one investment in a publicly listed 
company, which was later exited). Instead, trade sale and owner buyback are more 
viable exit options.
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FIGURE 20: INVESTOR PREFERENCE FOR EXIT MECHANISMS IN SRI LANKA
Exit Mechanism 
Est. # of 
Exits by 
Impact  
Investors
Investor 
Preference 
Likelihood 
of Exit Reasons for Preference/Likelihood of Exit 
IPO/Divest 1*
• Serves the best interest of both investor and investee by ensuring fair 
valuation
• No IPO exit from impact investor seen in the market so far
• Reporting requirements are high; high governance standards make this 
difficult for even mature companies
• Unlikely that SMEs will be able to list in medium-term IPO
Trade sale 2
• Likely to achieve the best value for the investor 
• Entrepreneurs hesitant about trade sales—worry over control of the 
company
• Most viable exit option for angel investors—presence of many 
companies in the region that would buy venture stage companies, 
especially in sectors such as ICT
Secondary sale 0
• Likely to achieve good value for the investor
• Very few senior funds in the market and little diversity in size and target 
make secondary sales less likely though possible with entry of regional/
Indian funds
Sale to promoter 1
• Low alignment of valuation interest and incentives between investor and 
entrepreneur—entrepreneur would want lowest valuation 
• Most likely given this is what promoters strongly prefer; particularly likely 
for mature enterprises where promoter might have the financial means 
to buy back
Least severe
Most severe
Source: Dalberg analysis; * Note: Thus far, the market has not seen a genuine IPO exit; in this case, the investee company was already a publicly 
listed company before impact equity investment.
Impact measurement 
With respect to impact measurement, impact investors tend to use established 
measurement systems for their investments in Sri Lanka. Given that there is only 
one Sri Lanka-specific fund and the majority of investors in Sri Lanka have more 
established investments elsewhere in the region, there are very few nuances to impact 
measurement specific to Sri Lanka, differentiating this market from the others.
DFIs and funds receiving DFI capital tend to have more defined metric systems 
(generally, an ESG framework) to measure impact, with job creation as a key metric. 
For funds, measuring impact is typically seen as a lower priority than managing 
the business and financial aspects of their investments. Social impact is primarily 
measured by economic metrics (for example, number of jobs created, products sold, 
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and amount of money disbursed) with the assumption that economic impact will have 
social impact. 
Anecdotal assessment, including stories of lives touched and benefits to 
entrepreneurs, is often used while funds are in the process of developing tailored 
metrics for a specific investment. 
Beyond the impact investing market
The peripheral set of investors (Ring 2) primarily includes commercial banks 
making SME loans with DFI capital. This capital makes up nearly 96% of 
investments among impact-related investors (whose activity is related to impact 
investing but who lack either an explicit impact intention or measurement). The 
remaining USD 12.6 million has been deployed by funds and fund managers. For 
commercial bank loans, we see the following trends:
• Debt and guarantees are the only instruments used. 
• Sector selection depends on the lender, but most are sector agnostic.
• Growth stage varies, but in order to meet requirements for securing a commercial 
bank loan, a firm requires operating history; therefore, this capital is most likely 
absorbed by SMEs that are at growth or mature stage.
• Deal size is small, as SMEs can only absorb limited amounts of capital.
Beyond SME loans, impact-related funds are deploying capital primarily through 
long-term debt. About USD 12.5 million has been deployed by these investors as 
long-term debt (more than five years) and about USD 90,000 through equity. 
FIGURE 21: IMPACT-RELATED CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY INVESTOR TYPE (USD MILLIONS)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
Diversified financial institutions/banks
Funds or fund managers
268.5 
(95.5%)
12.6 
(4.5%)
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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Challenges facing impact investors in Sri Lanka
At the entry level, a key challenge faced by fund managers in Sri Lanka is the 
difficulty in raising a country-specific fund. It is difficult for fund managers to set 
up country-specific funds because the minimum investment sizes required by DFI/
IFIs are quite high (USD 5-10 million), and also must be below a maximum share of 
the overall fund (often around 20%). Therefore, funds must raise a substantial amount 
of capital from other investors to secure DFI/IFI capital. However, several fund 
managers are currently trying to raise country-specific funds, armed with a greater 
understanding of the market than those who were unsuccessful at their attempts 
following the end of the civil war. Fund managers and entrepreneurs seeking capital 
believe that these country-specific funds will be important additions to the landscape 
since, at present, regional funds for South Asia tend to focus strongly on India and 
little capital is available for neighboring countries like Sri Lanka. While fundraising for 
Sri Lanka has proven to be challenging, investors looking to gain exposure through 
direct investments find Sri Lanka to be one of the easier markets in the region to 
enter—as reflected in the high levels of direct investment by a range of impact 
investors.
Key constraints to the growth of the industry include the following:
• Lack of entrepreneurial culture with a low respect for entrepreneurship and a 
preference for white collar jobs, which makes identification of viable enterprises 
challenging 
• Misalignment between amount of capital demanded by enterprises and 
investment sizes preferred by investors 
• Low level of financial and operational management skills in most enterprises 
(common across the region) that makes it difficult to convert opportunities into 
actual investments
• Limited or uncertain exit opportunities given a) the different preferences and 
incentives of investors and entrepreneurs; and b) the low likelihood of IPOs.
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FIGURE 22: KEY CHALLENGES ACROSS THE INVESTMENT LIFECYCLE IN SRI LANKA
Severity of investor challenges, by stage of investment
Key challenges faced by investors and severity of impact
Difficulty in raising 
country-specific 
funds 
Few enterprises 
in Sri Lanka for 
investment—
entrepreneurial 
culture not as 
vibrant as in other 
countries; strong 
preference for 
professional jobs 
rather than business
Few SMEs are 
investment-ready, 
typically due to 
weak corporate 
governance and a 
shortfall in financial 
and operational 
management skills; 
e.g., SMEs may be 
keeping double and 
triple books, or not 
disclosing accurate 
records
Enterprises do not 
want to take capital 
in USD. Either 
convince companies 
or bear the 
exchange rate risk
Lack of 
opportunities for 
follow-up rounds 
of investments—
companies often 
too small 
Difficulty exiting 
though IPO–no 
track record yet for 
impact investors; 
low liquidity in 
capital markets Difficulty in finding 
local, experienced 
fund managers 
Misalignment 
between amount of 
capital demanded 
by enterprises 
and targeted by 
investors
Difficult to domicile 
in Sri Lanka—
particularly in terms 
of PE funds
Identifying 
potential investees 
largely through 
networks 
Many SMEs are 
heavily leveraged 
(i.e., have taken out 
multiple loans and 
are in significant 
debt)
Need to convince 
good enterprises 
to take on equity 
capital–particularly 
family businesses
Misalignment 
between investor 
preference for 
exit and investee 
preference–e.g., 
entrepreneurs 
afraid of trade sales 
that might reduce 
their control
Some sectors 
like microfinance 
reaching saturation
Entry into  
Sri Lanka
Pipeline  
development
Screening and  
due diligence
Structuring 
investment
Managing  
investment/ 
follow up
Exit
Least severe                              Most Severe
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
In an effort to improve entrepreneur capacity and investment readiness of businesses, 
investors in most other countries in the region have taken an increasingly active role in 
providing technical and managerial support as well as strategic guidance. This has not 
been a common approach in Sri Lanka, and given the relatively thin ecosystem, this 
remains a key challenge.
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FIGURE 23: INVESTORS PROVIDING NON-FINANCIAL SUPPORT IN ADDITION TO CAPITAL
Key Enterprise-side Gaps 
Identified by Investors Severity of Gap
Investor Offering 
Non-Financial Support Services Offered 
Lack of entrepreneurial 
culture
• International Finance 
Corporation
• Advisory team provides TA to clients
• Web-based SME toolkit 
Poor operational/financial 
management • Lankan Angel Network
• Provides mentorship and linkages along with some 
funding to selected entrepreneurs
• Runs the yearly venture engine competition, a funding 
competition
Lack of access to 
information/networks 
Equity investors take board seats and may provide strategic support, but in Sri Lanka, this 
tends to not be particularly active or “hands-on” 
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
Looking forward
Fund managers are currently trying to raise USD 100 million for investments in Sri 
Lanka, in addition to capital being raised regionally (some of which will probably 
be deployed in Sri Lanka). While these funds will not likely have both active impact 
intent and measurement (and therefore would be in Ring 2 rather than be considered 
impact investors), their precise mandates and strategies have yet to be defined. 
Success stories arising from the activities of these funds could play an important 
signaling effect for the impact investing industry more broadly.
FIGURE 24: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC FUNDS LOOKING TO LAUNCH IN SRI LANKA BY THE END OF 201412
SIZE INVESTMENT  TARGETS LPS RATIONALE/NOTES
Fund 1 TBD; potentially USD 50 million
• SMEs
• Sector agnostic
• Deal size:  
USD 2–6 million
• 3 DFIs
• 3 domestic 
institutional investors
• GP capital
• DFIs understand country and risk, 
wanting to move into smaller deals
• Prefer smaller fund with good 
deals for the first fund
Fund 2 Target  USD 20–25 million
• SMEs
• Sector agnostic
• Deal size: USD 3–5 
million
Onshore and offshore 
HNWIs
• See a gap in small-cap investments
• HNWIs interested as they see 
strong potential in Sri Lanka
Fund 3 Target  USD 75 million
• SMEs
• Sector agnostic
• Deal size: USD >2 
million
Confidential
• Building track record with small 
pledge fund before launch
• Will retain pledge fund for smaller 
(USD <1 million) deals
98  Note: Funds were yet to be launched at the time of study.
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NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES: 
THE DEMAND SIDE
Overview of impact enterprise ecosystem in  
Sri Lanka
As in other markets in the region, we see only a small share of impact capital 
deployed into impact enterprises99 (outside of the microfinance sector). A few 
investments have been made by angel investors into impact enterprises, but investors 
who require larger deal sizes have largely shied away, again with the exception of 
microfinance investors. In fact, even within the microfinance sector, one enterprise 
in particular has absorbed a significant share of impact capital—12 investors have 
collectively invested USD 127 million (26% of the total impact capital in Sri Lanka) 
into this institution. 
Outside of impact enterprises, a large portion of impact capital has flowed 
into SMEs and, to a lesser extent, enterprises that may not have a clear impact 
mandate but are operating in sectors that provide basic services. The commercial 
banks in the peripheral impact-related ring have substantial SME portfolios since this 
is viewed as profitable and DFIs and IFIs have backed these portfolios. In addition, 
several new funds currently being established will target SMEs. Impact capital has also 
flowed into enterprises that provide basic services, such as education and healthcare. 
However, given the strong government provision of basic services (particularly 
for the low-income segments of the population), there is minimal need for private 
intervention in these sectors. As a result, the amount of capital flowing to such 
enterprises is smaller than the capital being invested in SMEs. 
Unlike some of the other regional markets, Sri Lanka has a growing impact 
enterprise landscape. This growth is driven in part by organizations converting out of 
traditional NGO models as well as by an increasing recognition and understanding of 
the impact enterprise approach itself. This growing landscape may result in enterprises 
that serve as good targets for impact investors in the future as they scale.
99 For the purposes of this study, we define impact enterprises as those that have articulated a core 
objective to generate positive social or environmental impact (as a part of their operating model rather 
than an ancillary activity) and seek to grow to financial viability and sustainability.
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FIGURE 25: ENTERPRISE ACTIVITY BY SECTOR, WITH EXAMPLES 
Nitya
Spice Island
Sanasa 
Development 
Bank
Lonali
Health 
Ingredients 
Ceylon 
LOLC Micro 
Credit
Square  
Mobile Red Cocoon
Ecowave 
Travels
Rural  
Returns
Educate  
Lanka
Agro Micro 
Finance Fusion Barefoot Saraii
Lucky
Royal 
International 
School
Power Lanka Berendina Hybrid  Homes
Medical 
Joyworks Selyn Wild Trails
Few                   Some              Many
EnergyAgriculture Education HandicraftsHousingHealthcare Water and
Sanitation
ICTFinancial  
Services 
Tourism
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
 
As illustrated in Figure 25, impact enterprises to date are heavily concentrated 
in a handful of sectors: food/agriculture, financial services (predominantly 
microfinance), handicrafts and fashion, and tourism.
Agriculture is an attractive sector for entrepreneurs as Sri Lanka is still 
considered an agriculture-based economy and hence, the potential for impact 
is high. Although the contribution to employment from agriculture is lower than it 
is from services, many of those employed in the formal sector continue to retain ties 
to agriculture and return to farms for a portion of the year. As a result, the number 
of livelihoods affected and the potential to increase incomes are significant. Most 
models are built around improving supply chains and access to markets, as well as 
around specialty/niche products.
In the financial services sector, the microfinance model ballooned in the mid-
2000s. This could be attributed to the large amounts of capital channeled through 
MFIs to support recovery and reconstruction after the tsunami. There are currently 
over 10,000 microfinance branches across the country, though these are not evenly 
distributed—Northern Province has only 5% of branches, while Southern Province has 
24%.100
100 “Microfinance Sector in Sri Lanka,” South Asia Microfinance Network, <http://www.samn.eu/index.
php?q=mfssrilanka>.
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There is a significant opportunity to leverage traditional skills held by women 
in various handicrafts (e.g., textiles, cosmetic products, and paper products) to 
create livelihoods. Entrepreneurs with an impact focus are therefore drawn to the 
handicrafts sector and are developing varied models that enable women to work 
from homes/villages or from workshop bases, depending on their preferences. The 
creation of these locally based workshops is occasionally articulated as an alternative 
for women who would otherwise migrate to work in garment factories.
Tourism is an extremely attractive and vibrant sector and is attracting heavy 
investment. For impact-oriented entrepreneurs, Sri Lanka’s natural beauty and 
attractiveness to tourists can be leveraged for social and environmental impact 
through models that stress environmental protection and responsible sourcing of 
inputs for hospitality enterprises (such as restaurants sourcing local ingredients to 
reduce the use of water in growing crops).
There is little enterprise activity in the healthcare and education sectors as the 
government is a dominant provider of both services. Public provision of these 
services is widespread, and quality standards are fairly satisfactory, making it difficult 
for private providers to develop a financially viable offering and model with an impact 
intention. Enterprises without an impact mandate have developed in the high-end 
private market, as high prices make businesses very profitable, but the low-cost 
market remains sparse given the public alternative.
Housing and water are also heavily publically dominated in Sri Lanka and thus, 
are not attractive for impact investors. New enterprises with some environmental 
objectives are emerging in the housing market, but these are very small sectors at 
present.
In Sri Lanka, there is less variation in the theories of change (ToC) of impact 
enterprises. Incorporation of BoP and/or marginalized populations into the supply 
chain is a predominant approach, which strongly reflects the concentration of 
enterprises in the agriculture and handicrafts sectors. Employment creation is not a 
commonly articulated impact thesis except when framed as livelihood creation for 
agricultural communities or handicrafts producers.
Two models for launching microfinance organizations have been observed. These 
models are as follows: 1) institutions founded as NGOs (particularly in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, with a second surge after the 2004 tsunami with the availability of 
grants and subsidized loans); and 2) institutions spun out from commercial banks 
and finance companies who saw the opportunity in reaching an untapped market 
and were able to leverage existing capital and experience to align with government 
priorities and incentives.
For other enterprise sectors/types, we see the following three types of founding 
entrepreneurs:
• Foreigners/diaspora/Sri Lankan returnees from abroad, who tend to be familiar 
with the concept of impact-oriented business. Examples include Good Market, 
Barefoot, and Rural Returns.
• Sri Lankans from business families whose organizations have always operated with 
combined social impact and commercial objectives but never defined as such or 
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knew of the term and who are now adopting the language of impact enterprise. 
Examples include Biofoods, Saraketa, and Selyn.
• Rural entrepreneurs, who have comparatively lower levels of formal education and 
weaker English skills and who do not independently articulate a social mission, but 
who are being organized by aggregators/other actors who are working to build 
retail and processing supply chains.
Older impact enterprises and family businesses tend to be structured as private 
limited companies, as it is the “traditional” incorporation mechanism and allows profits 
to be taken out of the company. The newer impact enterprises tend to be structured 
as guarantee limited companies, as the founders believe the restriction against 
drawing profits from the company allows a stronger focus on social mission.
Access to finance
Incorporation status also affects access to capital. Without shareholders, guarantee 
limited companies cannot take equity and cannot access international debt by law. 
Therefore, with a lack of local impact capital, it is difficult for these enterprises to 
access any impact capital. 
FIGURE 26: ACCESS TO FINANCE BY ORGANIZATION INCORPORATION STATUS 
INSTRUMENT GUARANTEE  LIMITED
PRIVATE 
LIMITED
DOMESTIC
Equity N Y
Debt Y Y
Grant Y N
FOREIGN
Equity N Y
Debt N Y
Grant Y N
Irrespective of the incorporation status, most small enterprises in Sri Lanka (impact 
enterprises and others) struggle to access institutional capital and hence, are heavily 
reliant on internal financing. Although internal financing may be sufficient once an 
enterprise is generating revenue, this financing strategy makes it difficult to reach a 
stage where an enterprise is generating robust revenue, and constrains the ability to 
scale over time.
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FIGURE 27: PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS ACCESSING DIFFERENT SOURCES OF CAPITAL, BY COMPANY SIZE AND  
PERSPECTIVES OF ENTERPRISES (PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RESPONSES, 2011)
59
29
10
38
54
7
Internal
Banks
Supplier credit
Equity stocks
Others
SMALL MEDIUM
100 100
1
2 01
Sources: Enterprise Survey, IFC and World Bank, 2011; Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
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Challenges to enterprise growth
As has already been touched upon, access to finance is one of the top reported 
constraints to growth by enterprises in Sri Lanka. According to the IFC and World 
Bank Enterprise Survey, 14.1% of the firms indicated access to finance as their biggest 
constraint, and over 30% of the firms indicated access to finance as one of the top 
three constraints that they faced.
FIGURE 28: CONSTRAINTS TO ENTERPRISE GROWTH IN SRI LANKA (PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS CITING AS 
LEADING CONSTRAINT)
16.0
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Transporation
While 14.1% of Sri Lankan firms indicated access to 
finance as their biggest constraint, over 30% of firms 
across South Asia indicated access to finance as one of 
the major constraints they faced
South Asia
Sri Lanka
Sources: Enterprise Survey, IFC and World Bank, 2011; Dalberg analysis; Note: 610 enterprises included in the surveys—52% small, 29% medium, 
and 19% large enterprises; 34% from the Western Province, 19% from the North-Western Province, 11% from the Central Province, the remaining 
36% from all other provinces; approximately equal split between five sectors (food, garments, other manufacturing, retail, and services). 
In addition to the challenges reported in the enterprise survey, entrepreneurs, and 
ecosystem support, actors report three additional constraints:
1. Entrepreneurial mindset and culture:  Entrepreneurial mindset was particularly 
emphasized as a challenge unique to Sri Lanka, where there is a strong 
preference for white collar jobs (e.g., working for banks, government agencies, or 
multinational corporations) over entrepreneurship or business.
2. Business skills: Gaps have been identified in marketing/access to markets and 
human resources management—both recruiting and retention. In terms of market 
access, there are at least two main challenges. First, entrepreneurs do not know 
how to access markets outside their immediate areas and conventional customers 
(e.g. larger cities or even overseas markets). Second, they typically do not have 
the capacity to identify and implement solutions to constraints to reaching these 
markets, such as improved packaging for perishable goods in the agriculture 
sector.
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3. Access to information and networks:  There are few aggregators or networking 
and knowledge-sharing platforms that can help enterprises in sharing, learning, 
sourcing mentorship, and collectively addressing common challenges.
Interestingly, poor English language and technical skills were highlighted as 
compounding all the three abovementioned issues. The Government of Sri Lanka’s 
Sinhala-medium mandate for schools means that English is poorly grasped by many 
entrepreneurs. This situation limits access to information and the ability to engage 
with foreign investors. Similarly, poor technical skills make it harder for entrepreneurs 
to access information and online networks. 
FIGURE 29: BUSINESS CONSTRAINTS TO ENTERPRISE GROWTH
Challenges for 
entrepreneurs ENTREPRENEURIAL CULTURE
OPERATIONAL/FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION/NETWORKS
Key Issues
• Lack of an entrepreneurial 
culture 
 » Coming out of civil war, 
people prefer to stay in 
agriculture or take steady 
jobs—low risk appetite  
 » Culture prioritizes 
professional careers rather 
than business—youth 
are not encouraged or 
supported; low respect for 
entrepreneurship
• Entrepreneurs do not have 
the skills to develop their 
ideas and source capital—little 
initiative by universities, etc., to 
promote entrepreneurship to 
grow this skill and ambition
• Poor English language and 
technological savvy 
• Weak financial management—
poor records and planning
• HR recruiting and retention:
 » Challenge around staffing 
due to poor technical skills 
and productivity of labor 
force
 » Crucial gap is in middle 
management where 
MNCs, banks, corporate 
salaries are attractive
 » Difficult to attract 
board members due to 
regulations on personal 
liability of directors
• Weak corporate governance—
particularly in traditional family-
owned business structures
• Low marketing and market 
access capabilities—
particularly  in rural areas and 
northern/eastern provinces 
• Poor ecosystem to support 
entrepreneurs—lack of service 
providers, incubators, and 
accelerators offering advisory 
or business development 
services
 » Particular need for 
mentorship and support to 
entrepreneurs
• Few aggregation/networking/ 
knowledge sharing 
platforms—that could help 
in sharing learning, sourcing 
mentorship, collectively 
addressing challenges
• Low levels of understanding 
about different financial 
instruments and how to access 
them
Severity for SMEs
Severity for large 
enterprises
Least severe     Most severe
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
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In terms of access to finance, not unexpectedly, we see the most severe constraints 
in the earlier stages of growth. The constraints are particularly severe in the venture 
stage in Sri Lanka since formal venture capital is scarce and entrepreneurs rely on 
informal sources for their early capital needs (as in many of the other countries 
studied).
FIGURE 30: CONSTRAINTS TO ENTERPRISE ACCESS TO FINANCE IN SRI LANKA
Severity of access to finance challenge, by stage of growth
Key challenges faced and severity of impact
Least severe Most Severe
Public listingSeed Venture Growth Mature
Identifying sources of capital
Limited formal sources of capital for start-ups; most 
seed funding from friends and family Limited number of capital sources outside banks
Enterprises’ lack of formal knowledge of sources, amount or type of finance needed
For impact enterprises, difficulty in identifying investors with aligned values; 
entrepreneurs perceive risk that values will shift
VCs  have low risk appetite and are not willing to compromise on returns for social 
enterprises 
Appropriateness of capital
Terms of bank loan not appropriate —requires operating history, existing cash flows, 
and asset collateral; short grace periods
Low levels of understanding of non-debt instruments 
and which is most appropriate for needs/stage
Deal size often not aligned to capital needs—whether debt or equity preference for large deals versus entrepreneurs 
who are often looking for smaller sizes
“Missing middle” deal size– very small amounts accessible through 
MFIs, informal channels; small needs for growth and scale up hard to 
access
High  “cost” of reporting, 
disclosure during and after 
IPO
Accessing capital
Companies have weak financial records and corporate governance, increasing 
risk aversion of investors
While capital is available, access is difficult due to limited knowledge and capacity 
(e.g., in writing business plans, communicating with loan officers/investors, etc.)
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
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Figures 31 and 32 highlight the varied drivers of preference for, and barriers to, 
accessing different instrument types. As in other markets, entrepreneurs in the early 
stages have a strong preference for grant funding. However, interestingly in Sri Lanka, 
there is sufficient understanding of equity and debt for there to be some enterprise 
interest in equity, unlike in other markets where the instrument is largely unknown.
For growth stage and mature companies, debt is strongly preferred as it enables 
retention of greatest independence and control. Interestingly, there is a greater 
wariness of equity capital by leaders of mature companies. Mature companies in Sri 
Lanka tend to be family businesses that have been successful but that still have a 
fairly conservative business perspective and are therefore less open to shareholding 
by equity investors, who they worry will “take over the business.” That said, this 
perspective is starting to change with the new generation becoming leaders in these 
companies. In the case of newer impact enterprises that are being established by 
young returnees, diaspora, and foreigners, we see a greater understanding of and 
openness to equity capital.
FIGURE 31: SEED AND VENTURE STAGE ENTERPRISES’ PREFERENCES FOR CAPITAL
Instrument Preference Drivers of Preference Key Barriers
Private debt
• Strong banking sector and awareness of 
how debt operates
• Low interest rates
• No concern about value alignment 
• Excessive collateral requirements, short 
grace periods
• Entrepreneurs may not have knowledge/
capacity to access debt
• Taking debt as start up is risky for both 
banks and entrepreneurs
Equity-like debt Not a common instrument in Sri Lanka
Public equity Not appropriate instrument for seed or venture stage companies
Private equity 
• Decent understanding of equity and its 
benefits (i.e., strategic perspective of 
investor) among entrepreneurs (foreign-
educated Sri Lankans, expatriates)
• Most investors prefer a ticket size too large 
for seed/venture stage enterprises
• Very few early seed and venture capitalists
• Many VCs do not have a high risk appetite 
• Some concern over values alignment
Least preferred
Most preferred
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FIGURE 32: GROWTH STAGE AND MATURE ENTERPRISES’ PREFERENCES FOR CAPITAL
Instrument Preference Drivers of Preference Key Barriers
Private debt
• Relatively easy to access—banks 
comfortable lending to growth and 
mature companies that have collateral and 
operating history
• Strong awareness of how debt operates
• Low interest rates
• High collateral requirements
Equity-like debt • Less risky for investors; and they can convert to equity if company does well
• Not a common instrument offered by investors
• Little understanding among enterprises
Public equity
• Prestige that comes with being a listed 
company
• Creates exit option for promoter
• Not much liquidity in capital market
• High volatility in the public equity markets
• Culturally, companies are built for generations, 
entrepreneurs unwilling to divest/dilute and 
often do not want to open the company to 
public scrutiny
Private equity 
• Increasing understanding of benefits 
of equity—investors offering additional 
support 
• Enterprises reluctant to give up equity in their 
company—need education and convincing  by 
investors
• Few private equity investors
• Ticket size, even in mature companies, is small 
for many investors (e.g., DFIs)
Least preferred
Most preferred
Despite these constraints, there have been various reports of high rates of over-
leverage, particularly in mid-sized to large companies. Highly liquid banks are willing 
to lend without stringent diligence processes, leading to significant over-borrowing, 
which makes further investment by equity providers difficult.
FIGURE 33: SHARE OF INVESTMENTS FINANCED BY BANKS/BORROWINGS, BY ENTERPRISE SIZE (2011)
AVERAGE SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
35
19 17
29
16 14
54
19 18
34
26 22
% 
of
 in
ve
stm
en
ts
Sri Lanka     South Asia     World Only 8.5% of firms had loans rejected in Sri Lanka as compared to 
16.3% in South Asia and 14.5% globally. Moreover, 0% of medium-size 
enterprises had loan applications rejected suggesting that access to 
bank credit less difficult.
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Indika Hettiarachchi, “Time to reduce borrowings in Sri Lankan enterprises (Data from World Bank/IFC 2011 
data),” 2010; Dalberg analysis
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ENABLING IMPACT 
INVESTING: THE ECOSYSTEM
Sri Lanka’s government has made strong efforts to create a conducive 
environment for foreign investment. Sri Lanka’s Ease of Doing Business Ranking 
is much better than that of other countries in the region, with the regional average 
being 121. Chinese and Indian investors in particular have responded positively and 
are investing heavily in Sri Lanka.
FIGURE 34: WORLD BANK “DOING BUSINESS” RANKINGS FOR SRI LANKA
DB 2014 
RANK
DB 2013 
RANK
CHANGE 
IN RANK
Overall DB rank 85 83 -2 
Starting a business 54 47 -7 
Dealing with construction permits 108 116 +8 
Getting electricity 91 107 +1
Registering a property 145 136 -9 
Getting Credit 73 71 -2
Protecting investors 52 51 -1
Paying taxes 171 175 +4
Trading across borders 51 54 +3
Enforcing contracts 135 136 +1
Resolving insolvency 59 51 -8
Change in rank largely due to 
improvements in other countries
Sri Lanka ranks 52, below 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India
Improved due to process improvements 
at utility—important especially for 
manufacturing industries
Given the small size of the Sri Lankan 
domestic market, for enterprises to gain 
real scale it likely needs to be offshore—
ease of cross border trade will be key
Source: World Bank Doing Business Rankings
However, despite this relatively strong performance on key business environment 
elements, as well as strong infrastructure and conducive regulatory frameworks, other 
considerations such as uncertainty about security, potential issues in legal protection 
for investors, and allegations of human rights violations continue to deter some 
investors.
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FIGURE 35: ECOSYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS FOR INVESTORS
Least severe 
Most severe
Key  
Components Key Advantages and Constraints in Sri Lanka 
Severity of 
Constraint
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Political stability 
and governance
• Residual spurts of violence
• Protests have occurred, but they have been well contained
• Allegations of human rights violations have prompted many donors and international 
organizations to exit and pose a significant risk for investors
Infrastructure
• Investment by government to improve public infrastructure (roads, airports, ports), into 
urban renewal, and tourism-related infrastructure (e.g., hotels)
• Expensive but reliable electricity; over 90% of the country electrified
Macro-economic 
governance
• High growth rates and low interest rates (around 8-12% in 2013); however, high inflation rates 
(at 8% in 2013) and declining exports (18% decrease between January 2012 and January 
2013)
• Low levels of consumer spending
• High disparity between regions—over 40% of GDP from Western Province
• Deliberate currency depreciation in order to boost overseas sales
• Lack of overall entrepreneurial culture does not translate into dynamism in the economy
Regulatory 
environment
• Fairly liberal regulatory environment
• Government has made progress in regulating the banking, finance, and microfinance 
industries
• A number of export processing zones have business-friendly regulations and improved 
infrastructure for foreign investors
• There are still some anecdotal concerns with repatriation of money 
• Tax regime is a concern, particularly to PE funds that are choosing to domicile in places like 
Mauritius because of more favorable tax regimes
Sources: 2013 Investment Climate Statement—Sri Lanka, US Department of State; Dalberg analysis
Beyond the macro considerations, at political and economic levels, key to the 
successful growth and development of the impact investing industry are the support 
systems and enablers for investors and enterprises. In general, this landscape is 
extremely sparse in Sri Lanka. For example, while a few providers of professional 
services are active in the market, there are few specialized providers of investor 
support services (e.g., deal sourcing and due diligence). More important, the 
enterprise support landscape is thin and heavily dominated by the public sector, which 
is a concern for entrepreneurs who are uncertain of the quality of service given the 
large mandate on small teams of staff. Further, these services are not accessible to 
rural entrepreneurs.101
101 “Female entrepreneurship and the role of business development services in promoting small and medium 
women entrepreneurs in Sri Lanka,” Oxfam, IPS, 2014.
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FIGURE 36: STATUS OF INVESTOR AND ENTERPRISE SUPPORT SERVICES IN SRI LANKA
Key  
Components Key Constraints in Sri Lanka 
Severity of 
Constraint
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Investor 
support
• Generic service providers (e.g., legal, accounting) who can support with registration process 
exist; however; few specialized investment advisory firms can help with functions such as 
deal sourcing and due diligence
• While investors need approval from Board of Investments and Central Bank pre-investment, 
the process is not considered very difficult (in terms of both requirements and time taken to 
get approval)
• Few organizations provide training and support to new fund managers—many locally raised 
funds are being managed by first-time managers and stakeholders believe the key reason 
for failed attempts to close previous funds or to build a successful track record was lack of 
experience 
Enterprise 
support 
• Enterprise development landscape is thin and heavily dominated by the public sector—e.g., 
few high-quality, private BDS providers (other than some small consulting firms); rather, 
a wide range of government agencies trying to meet enterprise needs, e.g., National 
Enterprise Development Authority (NEDA)
• Government schemes and training exist, however, there are issues of quality and 
accessibility of these services to rural entrepreneurs
• A few new aggregators emerging that try to help enterprises access markets—e.g., Good 
Market and SME.lk 
• Almost no incubators and accelerators that encourage entrepreneurship—the original 
impetus to entrepreneurship being a key barrier to overcome for the growth of the sector, 
this gap is important to fill
• Key areas of need include
 » Vocational/skills training institute to create a pool of qualified staff
 » Increase in the number of BDS providers, particularly by private sector to tackle 
targeted challenges faced by enterprises
 » More incubators/accelerators 
 » Efforts to change mindset about working at SMEs
Least severe 
Most severe
Sources: “Female entrepreneurship and the role of business development services in promoting small and medium women entrepreneurs in Sri 
Lanka,” Oxfam, IPS, 2014; Dalberg analysis
Considering this enterprise development landscape, overall, there are very few 
players active in the market. Interestingly, in recognition of this gap, some domestic 
microfinance banks are now starting to provide business planning and financial 
record keeping training to support entrepreneurs (at a subsidized rate). Commercial 
banks are increasingly interested in providing a similar service to their clients.
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FIGURE 37: LANDSCAPE OF ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT IN SRI LANKA
International Finance Corporation 
World Bank Group Lankan Angel Network
TA Providers
Good Market Rural Enterprise Network SME.lk SMED Sri Lanka
Several business associations at the national, provincial, and district level
Aggregators
Incubators/Accelerators
Venture Engine MIT Global Startup Labs Ruhuna Business Incubator
Credit Rating Services
Fitch Ratings Plan to establish a credit rating system for microfinance
Advisory Services
SEEDS SIYB Sri Lanka National Enterprise Development Authority
Several public sector agencies including: Ministry of Rural Industries, Small and Medium Enterprise Development (SMED),  
Sri Lanka Handicrafts Board, and Sri Lanka Business Development Centre
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AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH
In order to deepen the understanding of the impact investing market in Sri Lanka, we 
believe there is a need for further research in at least three specific areas. First, as in 
other countries, the role of the diaspora in the entrepreneur and investor community 
in Sri Lanka is worth further study. While it is evident that, currently, the most mature 
entrepreneurs are those who have returned to the country from abroad, it would be 
interesting to develop a more nuanced understanding of the effect of this diaspora on 
both the supply and demand aspects of impact capital. 
Second, with a growing yet sizeable market in comparison to population size, further 
exploration of the fund economics for country-specific funds would be valuable. For 
example, for a market with a small population and currently limited entrepreneurial 
culture, a deeper understanding around the saturation point, turnover, and life 
cycle of a Sri Lanka-focused fund would support an understanding of the domestic 
challenges and opportunities. 
Finally, our current understanding is that the support system for enterprises in Sri 
Lanka is yet to fulfill the needs—there are very few incubators or accelerators that 
provide advisory support services. Not only this, but perhaps a more deliberate, 
innovative engagement with potential and early stage entrepreneurs (such as business 
plan competitions or other catalytic activity), would encourage the entrepreneurial 
spirit in Sri Lanka. A more focused assessment of the feasible options within the local 
context could help shape the ecosystem for investors and investees in the future.
MYANMAR
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COUNTRY CONTEXT
Overview
In the early 1960s, Myanmar was one of Asia’s leading economies, with a per capita 
income of approximately USD 670, more than three times that of Indonesia and twice 
that of Thailand. However, the military coup in 1962 that launched the “Burmese 
Way of Socialism” and nationalized all non-agricultural enterprises contributed to a 
dramatic shrinking of the economy. By 2010, according to International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) estimates, Myanmar had the lowest GDP per capita in purchasing power 
parity in Asia. Strict sanctions imposed by the United States, Canada, the European 
Union, and others after the imposition of martial law in 1988 were eased only in 2011, 
following democratic reforms and the election of President Thein Sein.
FIGURE 1: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN MYANMAR’S POLITICAL HISTORY
Currency devaluation
• Wipes out people’s savings.
• Triggers anti-government 
riots.
Release of 200  
pro-democracy activists.
First stringent sanctions imposed 
by major markets including the 
US and the EU. Sanctions became 
increasingly severe through 1997.
Elections
President Thein Sein 
sworn in to nominally 
civilian government.
Cyclone Nargis
Death toll estimated at 
140,000.
One-party  
military-led state 
established 
• Military coup led by 
General Ne Win.
Admitted to ASEAN  
beacuse of:
• Shifting geopolitical power 
and desire for increased 
security alignment.
• The desire to expand 
incentives in the area.
Anti-government riots; Martial law
• Thousands killed in riots.
• State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC) formed.
• Martial law declared.
1987 1990s 2001 2011
1962 1988-1989 1997 2008
Military  Rule Democractic reforms begin
Sources: Dalberg research and analysis. 
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FIGURE 2: TIMELINE OF KEY LEGAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS UNDERTAKEN IN MYANMAR SINCE 2011
Easing of economic sanctions 
imposed by EU and the US.
Chair, ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC).
New Central Bank of Myanmar Law
• New FIML (pending).
• New Securities Exchange Law.
Myanmar Stock Exchange 
(planned).
Microfinance Law 
• Legalization of MFI 
operations.
• Introduction of interest 
rate caps.
SME Development Law 
(pending).
• Regulations to facilitate 
SME growth (including 
Credit Guarantee Scheme).
Myanmar Payment Union
• First debit card ATMs.
• Foreign exchange law.
2012 2013 2014-2015
2011 2012 2014 2015
Elections (Nov 2015)
Sources: GIZ Banking Sector analysis, Dalberg research and analysis. Notes: New bank law provides the new Central Bank autonomous power to 
implement monetary and exchange rate policies. New securities law includes the ability to establish a stock exchange, securities exchange compa-
nies, and counter markets.
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GDP growth and drivers of foreign direct investment 
(FDI)
Since 2012, Myanmar has experienced rapid GDP growth. From a purchasing 
power parity (PPP)-adjusted GDP of USD 82.6 billion in 2011, Myanmar’s PPP-
adjusted GDP grew to USD 95.4 billion in 2013.102 Moreover, Myanmar is forecasted 
to grow annually at a rate of 10% between 2014 and 2016, outperforming regional 
neighbors including India.103 It should be noted that since Myanmar has only recently 
opened its economy and begun democratic reforms, the task of sourcing high-quality 
macroeconomic data is more difficult than in other countries. However, the following 
sections rely on the most reputable sources available, such as the World Bank and IMF.
FIGURE 3: HISTORIC AND FORECASTED GDP IN MYANMAR; GROWTH FORECAST VERSUS REGIONAL PEERS
GDP OF MYANMAR
(PPP, INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR, BILLIONS)
FORECASTED GDP GROWTH RATE
(% P.A., 2014 TO 2016)
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Sources: World Bank Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund database, Dalberg analysis
Recent GDP growth has been driven by a significant shift from agriculture 
towards industry and services. Moreover, within the services sector, travel and 
tourism have significantly contributed to growth with a recorded 79% increase in their 
direct contribution to GDP between 2010 and 2013 (Figure 4).
102 International Monetary Fund (2014). World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014.
103 It is important to note that the data collection, monitoring, and forecasting capacity of the relatively new 
bureaucracy is still low. Therefore, it is challenging to make confident assessments of the real state of the 
economy.
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FIGURE 4: MYANMAR’S GDP GROWTH: BY SECTOR AND IN TRAVEL AND TOURISM CONTRIBUTION TO GDP OVER 
TIME
GDP GROWTH RATE BY SECTOR
(VALUE ADDED % OF GDP)
1995 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
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TRAVEL AND TOURISM  
DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO GDP
(USD MILLION, % REAL GDP GROWTH)
79%
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Sources: World Travel and Tourism Council (2013); ADB online data (2014)
In addition to strong GDP growth, the following three key elements are attracting 
commercial investors to Myanmar: 
• Natural resource endowments: Myanmar has significant reserves of natural gas 
(currently a crucial source of export revenue), oil (with 2.1 billion barrels of known 
reserves and offshore wells largely unexplored), and precious stones such as ruby 
and jade (according to industry estimates, Myanmar accounts for more than 90% of 
the global trade of precious stones by value).
• Large market and labor force: With a total population of 60 million, a median age 
of 27 years, and a nearly 93% literacy rate, Myanmar is an attractive destination for 
investors from the perspective of both labor force and consumer market. The labor 
force makes sectors such as light manufacturing particularly promising. Meanwhile, 
rapid urbanization is expected to create a strong consumer market, particularly 
among the urban upper-middle class.
• Geo-strategic location: Bordering China, Thailand, India, Laos, and Bangladesh 
and with control of access to the Bay of Bengal, Myanmar has strong trade and 
business potential and strong influence in the region, which could further leverage 
regional networks and bi-lateral relationships.
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FIGURE 5: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MYANMAR, ACTUAL AND PROJECTED (USD BILLIONS)
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14p 2014/15p 2015/16p
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38%
Sources: World Travel and Tourism Council (2013); ADB online data (2014)
As a result, there is strong investor interest in Myanmar, reflected in steady 
growth in FDI inflow since 2012, projected to reach over USD 2.9 billion by 2016. 
Notably, while over 85% of FDI between 2005 and 2013 was in gas, oil, mining, and 
power,104 data for 2013 and 2014 show a different trend, with a strong movement out 
of the extractive sectors and into manufacturing and tourism. In addition, the telecom 
sector is expected to attract USD 1 billion in 2014.105 
Despite recent FDI inflows and steady economic growth, Myanmar’s per capita 
income is still among the lowest in the region. With such low GDP (PPP) per 
capita (see Figure 6), Myanmar’s significantly large BoP population creates both a 
need and an opportunity for enterprise innovation in the development and delivery 
of basic products and services, as well as a need and an opportunity for investment to 
support this enterprise development.
FIGURE 6: COMPARATIVE GDP, PURCHASING POWER PARITY (PPP) PER CAPITA, 2012 (CURRENT INTERNATIONAL 
DOLLARS)
Sri Lanka India Pakistan Bangladesh Myanmar Nepal
6,043
3,900
3,056
1,957 1,627 1,457
Source: IMF (2012)
104 “OECD investment policy reviews: Myanmar,” OECD, 2014.
105 International Business Times, March 2014.
MYANMAR • 191
Key constraints in Myanmar
Myanmar is one of the more challenging countries in which to start and run a 
business. Because of its long period of military dictatorship and extended isolation, 
and despite momentum towards reform, Myanmar remains the most challenging 
country in the world in which to start a business, and the seventh most challenging 
in which to do business.106 Key constraints include the regulatory environment, weak 
infrastructure, and a hugely underdeveloped financial sector. As will be discussed 
later in this report, regulatory constraints include complex and opaque screening 
and investment approval mechanisms, foreign equity restrictions, and complicated 
separate laws governing foreign and domestic investment.107
The new government that took over in 2011 has been actively working with 
development agencies such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) to ease these constraints; however, the environment remains 
challenging.
The government has been implementing legal, policy, and economic reforms to 
increase the attractiveness of Myanmar to investors. For example, the new Foreign 
Investment Law (FIL), introduced in 2012, repealed the 1988 FIL and provides a more 
open and secure legal environment for investment. While a positive step and signal, 
the report of the UN’s Special Rapporteur108 in 2012 expressed concern that the 
government’s haste to provide a new legislative framework may be at the expense of 
credible, suitable laws that are implementable given existing government capacity.109
In terms of infrastructure, Myanmar’s electricity supply is limited and unreliable. 
As of 2011, less than half of Myanmar’s population has access to electricity. Of the 
total installed power generation capacity, only 50% is reliable because of the fact that 
weather-dependent hydropower plants account for 75% of total electricity generation. 
This weak power infrastructure makes it challenging to grow the industrial base 
and limits investor interest. In 2011, the energy consumption in Myanmar stood at 
110 kilowatt hour (kWh) per person, which was the second lowest among the other 
countries of study (ranging from 106 kWh per person in Nepal to 685 kWh per 
person in India).
106 World Bank “Doing Business” rankings, 2014. These rankings include ease of getting electricity, 
registering property, obtaining construction permits, paying taxes, and enforcing contracts. The World 
Bank “starting a business” rankings include indicators such as length of time and number of procedures to 
complete for registration/start-up, as well as the associated costs of start-up procedures.
107 OECD’s 2013 FDI regulatory restrictiveness index seeks to gauge the restrictiveness of a country’s 
FDI rules and market access restrictions—a critical determinant of a country’s attractiveness to foreign 
investors.
108 The UN Special Rapporteur reported in 2012 that “there remains no clear and comprehensive strategy 
for legislative reform, resulting in a somewhat ad hoc and uncoordinated process.” OECD, 2014.
109 “OECD investment policy reviews: Myanmar,” OECD, 2014.
192 • THE LANDSCAPE FOR IMPACT INVESTING IN SOUTH ASIA
FIGURE 7: COMPARATIVE ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (2011, % OF POPULATION)
Sri LankaIndiaPakistanBangladeshMyanmar Nepal
49
60 69
75 76 85
Sources: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
Other key infrastructure, such as information and communication technology (ICT) 
and telecommunications, is also currently limited (Figure 8), but is expected to vastly 
improve in the next few years. Telecommunication giants Telenor and Ooredoo won 
licenses in 2013 to launch a communications network in Myanmar, with the goal to 
grow mobile penetration to 80% by 2016.
In addition to weak infrastructure, economic isolation has severely constrained 
the development of the formal finance sector. Only 4% of Myanmar’s adult 
population has an account at a formal financial institution (Figure 9). Individuals 
have relied on informal practices (e.g., cash safes, gold savings, personal networks, 
and money lenders), and Burmese migrants have largely used hundi operators110 to 
undertake transfers into Myanmar. As a result,
• Formal savings are low, which hinders the stability of investments made from 
domestic banks.
• Financial literacy and trust are low. Thus, entrepreneurs have low capacity to work 
with investors’ requirements and processes, and are wary of investment. 
Moreover, Myanmar has a very small and nascent banking infrastructure. 
Myanmar’s banking industry is dominated by four state-run and 22 domestic private 
banks. Foreign banks are currently not allowed to fully operate in Myanmar; their 
banking presence is relegated to in-country local representation. According to 
recent 2014 regulations, a select number of foreign bank branches will be able to 
provide loans to foreign corporations in Myanmar; however, this is currently under 
development and is likely to be tightly regulated.111
110 The hundi is an informal cash transfer system consisting of a combination of agents and middlemen 
along a word-of-mouth chain from a sender abroad to a recipient in Myanmar.
111 Ferrie, J., “Burma to grant foreign banks licenses by end of September,” Reuters, May 2014.
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FIGURE 9: ACCESS TO FINANCIAL SERVICES AND BANKING INFRASTRUCTURE IN MYANMAR
PERCENTAGE OF ADULT POPULATION  
(AGE 15 AND ABOVE) WITH ACCOUNTS  
AT A FORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
(2011 DATA; 2014 FOR MYANMAR)
REGISTERED/FORMAL FINANCIAL SERVICES
(MYANMAR, 2014)
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Sources: Global Findex; World Bank; UN MAP Project (May 2014, Myanmar Data); PwC Myanmar Business Guide, 2014. Note: Myanmar Eco-
nomic Bank (MEB); Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB); Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB)
Nevertheless, as demonstrated by GDP growth and FDI inflows, the difficult 
investment climate has not been a deterrent to all investors. Despite significant 
regulatory and infrastructural constraints, and a limited formal financial services 
system, investors are actively scoping investment and deploying capital into 
Myanmar.
FIGURE 8: COMPARATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN ICT AND TRANSPORT
FIXED BROADBAND AND INTERNET 
SUBSCRIBERS
(PER 100 PEOPLE, 2012)
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INVESTING IN MYANMAR: THE 
SUPPLY SIDE
The broad impact capital market in Myanmar
Despite the nascent economy and restrictive regulations, there is strong investor 
interest in Myanmar; some investors have actually deployed capital, and most are 
still raising funds or developing pipelines. To date, approximately USD 12 million 
has been deployed by impact investors in Myanmar, of which USD 8 million has been 
deployed by DFIs. A further USD 44 million has been deployed by impact-related 
investors. DFIs (development finance institutions) and IFIs (international finance 
institutions) as the “first movers”112 play a significant role, having deployed over 
USD 40 million in both direct and indirect investments into microfinance and real 
estate.113 However, we will only be taking a deeper look at direct investments made by 
DFIs in this report to avoid potential double-counting of impact capital. In contrast, 
angel investors and funds have deployed around USD 9 million to smaller ticket-
size investments towards seed, venture-stage, and mature enterprises in a variety 
of sectors, including energy, information and communication technology (ICT), 
financial inclusion, and rural infrastructure. Further, fund managers and DFIs have 
raised or committed more than USD 119 million for future deployment. Moreover, 
fund managers are targeting to raise a minimum of an additional USD 180 million for 
deployment in Myanmar in the next two to five years. 
While there is significant excitement on the part of investors to enter Myanmar, 
they are hesitant to invest prior to the establishment of more favorable investor 
regulations. Many investors are adopting a “wait-and-see” approach to investing until 
after the November 2015 elections for greater clarity on their political and regulatory 
impact. However, despite political uncertainty and current regulatory constraints, 
investors are encouraged by the continued movement of new regulatory reforms 
passed in the past year.114
112 A majority of DFIs and IFIs restarted their activities and investments around 2012, when the US and 
European sanctions had been relaxed and/or lifted.
113 For the purpose of this analysis, a large DFI investment into an infrastructure fund, which has deployed 
the entire portfolio amount, is classified as a direct investment from the fund manager.
114 GIIN/Myanmar expert panel discussion, July 2014.
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Active investors deploying impact capital in 
Myanmar
There is a range of investor types active and interested in deploying capital into 
Myanmar, including funds, development finance institutions (DFIs), angel and 
institutional investors, foundations, and high net-worth individuals (HNWIs). 
While investment activity in Myanmar is currently in its very early stages, we have 
seen deployments by close to ten investors (of which four are impact investors), 
albeit in small amounts. However, there are strong efforts underway towards raising 
additional capital and building pipelines for deployment. The low levels of current 
fund activity are due in part to the sparse landscape of investment-ready enterprises—
and the intensive support required to help enterprises become investment ready—and 
in part to the early stage of the broader market (Figure 10). 
Currently, diversified financial institutions (including banks) have fairly low 
levels of activity with respect to making impact or impact-related investments. 
However, we are starting to see international banks exploring opportunities to invest 
in financial inclusion, particularly by investing in microfinance institutions (MFIs). In 
addition, a few state-run banks (such as the Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank 
and the Small and Medium Industrial Development Bank) have increasingly started 
lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with specialized loan products. 
However, private commercial banks have not developed tailored products for SMEs 
as the regulations set by the Central Bank around terms like collateral requirements 
and repayment periods make the segment highly risky and not financially attractive. 
Regulations also inhibit entry by foreign banks as they cannot yet be licensed for 
banking operations in Myanmar. Still, select banks such as Standard Chartered and 
Yoma Bank (which has a focus on sustainability) are scoping the market and exploring 
opportunities to increase SME lending in key impact sectors in the future.
Foundations and HNWIs are also active in Myanmar, but they largely engage 
through the provision of grants rather than instruments for which there is a 
return expectation. Established foundations such as the Skoll Foundation, the 
Mulago Foundation, and the Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship have 
already provided grant-based funding to social enterprises in Myanmar and, by 
doing so, are attempting to send a signal to other investors about the potential 
viability of the impact investing market in Myanmar. In addition to the international 
foundations mentioned above, there is increased activity from domestic foundations, 
corporate foundations, and the corporate social responsibility (CSR) divisions of large 
businesses (such as City Mart, Myanmar’s leading supermarket chain). In fact, CSR 
activity and donations to social impact sectors and enterprises are likely to increase as 
multi-national corporations (MNCs) start to enter Myanmar and seek to build strong 
brands.115 Some companies may invest on a capital-recovery-only basis and/or more 
broadly support the SME ecosystem through training grants or other means. 
115 Examples of MNCs undertaking CSR activity across sectors include Coca-Cola providing a USD 3 
million grant to the Pact Global Microfinance Fund to create women-based community banks that fund 
start-ups, Hewlett Packard’s support/training to SMEs, Procter & Gamble’s focus on clean water projects, 
and Ooredoo’s plan to provide targeted training in information technology and human resources.
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As in other markets, HNWIs are a significant source of informal, donated start-
up capital for many enterprises in Myanmar, typically accessed through personal 
networks (and difficult to access without these networks). Another nascent source of 
seed funding for impact enterprises is angel investors. There is a small but emerging 
angel investment landscape, with at least two angel foreign investment networks 
(based in Asia) deploying small ticket-sized equity investments to seed and venture-
stage impact enterprises.
FIGURE 10: DIRECT IMPACT AND IMPACT-RELATED INVESTORS ACTIVE IN MYANMAR (DEPLOYED CAPITAL)17
2
1
3  DFIs
1 International bank
1
2 Domestic fund managers
1 Fund manager/project implementer
2 Angel investor groups 
2
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
The following analysis should be viewed as reflective of the early stage of the 
impact investing market in Myanmar but not necessarily as indicative of trends 
going forward. As only a few impact investors are currently active in the market, 
capital deployment and analysis of key variables to follow reflect the activities of only 
four current impact investors and five future impact investors.
Overall, only a small portion of capital has been deployed to date. Approximately 
USD 12 million has been currently deployed by impact investors, and a total of 
approximately USD 43.6 million by impact-related investors (Figure 11), who have a 
less explicit impact intention but still consider impact as an element or outcome of 
their investment. 
116 See “Defining key terms and concepts” in the introduction chapter of this report for an explanation of 
the framework used for categorizing investors using a two-ring framework, where the inner ring—Ring 
1—represents the impact investing activity and the outer ring—Ring 2—represents the activity related to 
impact investing but lacking either an explicit impact intention or measurement.
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FIGURE 11: TOTAL CURRENT CAPITAL DEPLOYED BY RING
43.6
(78%)
12.0
(22%)
Ring 1: Impact investors
Ring 2: Impact-related investorsUSD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
Two DFIs, two fund managers, one institutional investor, and one commercial 
bank with DFI backing have all committed to deploy capital in Myanmar. Given 
the limited amount of risk capital in Myanmar overall, at least three commercial 
private equity (PE) funds are also being raised by domestic fund managers. Figure 12 
maps the stakeholders who have committed capital for deployment in Myanmar in 
the future. 
FIGURE 12: PROSPECTIVE INVESTOR LANDSCAPE (CAPITAL YET TO BE DEPLOYED)
2
1
1 Institutional investor
2  DFIs
2 Fund manager
1
1 Commercial bank  
 with DFI partner
2
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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Approximately USD 109 million has been committed or raised by impact 
investors for direct investment into enterprises in the future (Figure 13). In 
addition, several investors are actively raising funds and are expected to commit 
a minimum of an additional USD 180 million in the next two to five years. This 
is, in part, due to investors awaiting upcoming regulatory changes and elections 
(November 2015) and due to some investors being wary of engaging while current 
ethnic conflict in some parts of the country is still active. This category of committed 
and raised capital includes disbursements that are still pending but likely to be 
deployed, and capital earmarked to be deployed into Myanmar in the next one to two 
years.
FIGURE 13: FUTURE COMMITTED CAPITAL BY RING
10.0
(8%)
109.0
(92%)
Ring 1: Impact investors
Ring 2: Impact-related investorsUSD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
These direct investments, including USD 109 million by impact investors, include DFI 
investments allocated to financial services and real-estate development; other 
investors include institutional investors and PE funds targeting high-growth SMEs and 
large-scale MFIs. Unlike the trend observed with current capital deployed, the 
majority (92%) of future committed and raised capital is being invested by impact 
investors. 
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INVESTOR MIX
For both currently deployed and future committed impact capital, DFIs represent 
the significant share of investment and therefore, tend to drive the trends in 
the market. As Figure 14 illustrates, DFI investments represent approximately 67% 
of currently deployed impact capital and 87% of future committed impact capital. In 
addition to the crucial roles as a direct source of capital for enterprises and as anchor 
investors in funds, DFIs play two important roles: (i) As “first movers,” they send 
a critical market signal to other investors, which should help to catalyze additional 
investments (although it is too early to see these effects); and (ii) as international 
investors with government links, they engage on policy issues and provide extensive 
policy support.
FIGURE 14: IMPACT CAPITAL BY INVESTOR TYPE 
DFI
Fund or Fund Manager
Institutional Investor
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
8.0
(67.0%)
4.0
(33.0%)
CURRENTLY DEPLOYED CAPITAL 
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
94.7 
(87.0%)
11.7 
(11.0%)
2.7 
(2.0%)
FUTURE COMMITTED CAPITAL 
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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Key trends of impact investing in Myanmar  
The following section examines trends among impact investors, who have collectively 
deployed USD 12 million and committed approximately USD 109 million for future 
deployment. The activities of impact-related investors (Ring 2) will be discussed in 
the section “Beyond the impact investing market.”
INSTRUMENT
The majority of currently deployed impact capital and future committed impact 
capital is in the form of debt. This is largely due to the type of investor deploying 
capital—since the majority of current and future capital is from DFIs, as stated above, 
the preference for debt is more visible. However, regulations in Myanmar prohibit 
debt-lending by most foreign investors (as they require a local banking license or 
must be registered as financial institutions). Therefore, they are restricted to equity 
or other instruments. It is actually fairly challenging for Burmese enterprises to take 
on debt from foreign investors, as these enterprises require special permission and 
a waiver from both the Central Bank of Myanmar and the Myanmar Investment 
Commission (MIC) to be able to accept foreign debt. Given this, one would expect 
to see a greater amount of equity funding as a greater number of impact investors 
engage in Myanmar in the future.
FIGURE 15: IMPACT CAPITAL BY INSTRUMENT 
Debt
Equity
Quasi-equity
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
8.0
(66.7%)
4.0
(33.3%)
CURRENTLY DEPLOYED CAPITAL 
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
91.0 
(83.5%)
18.0 
(16.5%)
FUTURE COMMITTED CAPITAL 
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis. Note: Equity calculation in future capital includes quasi-equity instruments, as 
exact breakdown between pure equity and quasi-equity is unknown.
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Impact investors deploying equity have returns expectations that vary between 
10% and 20%. While impact investors have return expectations ranging from 10% to 
20%, conventional investors generally seek 20%–30% returns. In terms of tenure, or 
time horizon, investors are targeting five- to seven-year tenures but recognize that 
seven to ten years is more feasible given the maturity of the enterprise market. Lastly, 
a majority of equity investors seek a minority stake in the enterprise and often provide 
technical assistance/management support alongside capital (e.g., by seconding staff 
directly to the enterprise).
GROWTH STAGE AND DEAL SIZE
The majority of current investments are in growth-stage enterprises, while close to 
84% of future committed capital is planned to be invested in mature companies 
(Figure 16). A primary driver of investments flowing into mature companies, 
particularly for future committed capital, is the continued preference of DFIs to invest 
in private, large-scale real-estate projects. Other features of mature companies that 
make them attractive include
• ability to absorb a larger amount of capital;
• ability to meet investor operational requirements—i.e., have established financial 
histories as well as operational and management experience as compared to the 
lack of financial records, business knowledge, and management experience that 
characterizes many start-ups/SMEs; and
• being easier to identify when entering the market.
However, investors are conscious that many of the large local enterprises have links 
to the previous regime and are wary of investing in organizations with these ties, 
reporting a preference for internationally backed large-scale enterprises instead.117
117 Under the previous regime, enterprises were often seized by the military, or when successful, would have 
“cronies” inserted on their boards.
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FIGURE 16: IMPACT CAPITAL BY GROWTH STAGE OF INVESTMENTS 
CURRENTLY DEPLOYED CAPITAL 
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
10 
(83.3%)
2 
(16.7%)
FUTURE COMMITTED CAPITAL 
Mature, public
Mature, private
Growth
Venture
Seed
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
8 
(7.3%)
10 
(9.2%)
91 
(83.5%)
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
Few current and expected future impact investment deals in Myanmar range 
from USD 2 million to USD 80 million. With so few deals known, it is not possible 
to comment on average deal sizes or investor preference vis-à-vis deal sizes. For 
future committed capital, we see a few larger deal sizes as DFIs plan to deploy larger 
ticket-size investments into growth- and mature-stage enterprises.
FIGURE 17: IMPACT CAPITAL BY DEAL SIZE 
< usd 1 million
> usd 1 million to 5 million
> usd 5 million to 10 million
> usd 10 million to 50 million
> usd 50 million
# OF DEALS
4
# OF DEALS 3
1
1
1
CURRENTLY DEPLOYED CAPITAL FUTURE COMMITTED CAPITAL 
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis. Note: One co-investment deal was evenly split across three investors due to 
lack of further information; this does not skew the results.
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SECTOR
While all the impact capital currently deployed has been invested in the financial 
services sector, a majority of future committed capital has been directed towards 
non-impact enterprises in the tourism sector. As seen in other countries, impact 
investments in the financial services sector seem to be an entry point for investors to 
engage. Opportunities for investment are seen in MFIs and banks that can on-lend to 
SMEs. The following factors drive interest in the microfinance and financial services 
sectors: 
• Investor familiarity with MFIs/banks. Their model is well understood, and they 
are easy to both identify and access. In addition, there are simply a large number 
of MFIs in Myanmar (see the “Needs and opportunities: The demand side” section 
for more details).
• High demand for microcredit due to low access to finance. The market is far 
from being saturated—signaling high growth potential in the sector. The formal 
banking sector has limited outreach (recent research suggests only 4% of the 
population is formally banked), and informal providers of credit are risky and 
expensive (10%–20% monthly as credit, or around 200%–300% at an effective 
annual compounded rate of interest).118 Demand for microcredit is estimated at 
USD 1 billion by industry experts,119 with demand for microfinance in Myanmar 
outstripping supply by a factor of four.120
• Favorable regulations for MFI investments as compared to those for other 
sectors. The new Microfinance Law (passed in 2011) allows local and foreign 
investors to establish fully privately owned MFIs,121 which has allowed ACLEDA 
Bank (a well-known leading global provider) to open in Myanmar, and may 
encourage other big international MFIs to follow suit.122 The ability to invest in 
banks that can on-lend to SMEs will depend on implementation of the new SME 
Law (2014).
Future investments are driven by DFIs’ aim to stimulate the economy through the 
development of tourism infrastructure and the dearth of investible enterprises in other 
sectors. USD 91 million has been committed by investors to tourism infrastructure in 
the next two to five years.
118 “Baseline survey results,” LIFT, 2012. Accessible at - http://lift-fund.org/lift-in-action/content/
liftbaseline-survey-results-2012
119 “UNDP formative strategic review of microfinance investments in Myanmar: Issues and 
recommendations for the future,” United Nations Capital Development Fund, (2012).
120 Duflos, E., Luchtenburg, P., Ren, L., and Yan Chen, L., “Microfinance in Myanmar sector assessment,” 
IFC Advisory Services in East Asia and the Pacific, CGAP, 2013.
121 “Op Cit.,” CGAP, 2013.
122 Although revisions are expected, the MFI law still has issues that need to be ironed out; for example, 
some law directives do not follow global best practices such as a capped interest rate spread and low 
minimum capital requirements.
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FIGURE 18: IMPACT CAPITAL BY SECTOR 
FUTURE COMMITTED CAPITAL CURRENTLY DEPLOYED CAPITAL 
Tourism and hospitality
Financial services
Energy
Agriculture and  
      food processing
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
12 
(100.0%)
91.0 
(83.5%)
10.0 
(9.2%)
4.0 
(3.7%)
4.0 
(3.7%)
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis. Note: For future committed capital, an assumption has been made that one 
investor will invest equal share of committed capital in energy and agriculture.
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Impact measurement
With respect to measuring impact, investors who have deployed, or who plan to 
deploy capital, either use established measurement systems such as the Global 
Alliance for Banking on Values (GABV) scorecard or customize their metrics 
(typically using IRIS123). As in most markets, there are standardized, customized, 
and anecdotal forms of impact assessment. DFIs and banks tend to use established 
impact measurement systems or customize their metrics. Currently, the most 
common forms of assessment are standardized assessments due to the use of these 
by DFIs. However, when funds and fund managers start to enter the market, we will 
most likely see a change in the types of assessments used, including an increase in the 
use of customized and anecdotal impact assessments. 
FIGURE 19: IMPACT MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS BEING EMPLOYED BY INVESTORS
Metric-based Impact Measurement Anecdotal Impact Assessment
Rationale for 
approach
• To assess effectiveness and imrpove operations
• To report performance in ways that reinforce public trust
• To present impact in a way that is understandable to 
stakeholders
• To understand progress towards mission of social and/or 
environmental impact
• Difficult for studies to quantitatively demonstrate the 
impact of microfinance. Do so by anecdote or have 
investee report its impact.
• Quantitative impact studies face two fundamental 
challenges: (a) their ability to capture and analyze all 
the benefits of microfinance, and (b) the duration of 
the study itself (researchers usually examine impact 
over 14-18 months; however, during this period, 
impact does not necessarily manifest itself).
Key indicators 
measured
• Based on financial, economic, environmental, and social 
performance, and private sector development impact
• IRIS indicators with proprietary metrics that reflect 
impact requirement or fund
• Global Alliance for Banking on Values scorecard metrics
• Customized metrics in quarterly report dependent on 
sector of enterprise and impact it seeks to have
• Dependent on investee’s report/uses individiaul 
stories or anecdotal evidence
Rationale 
for indicator 
selection
• Use DOTS as it is recognized as a leading system for 
development-results measurement among IFIs/DFIs and 
allows for real-time tracking
• Use IRIS because of clarity of data and user-friendly 
interface, and because it provides independent, third-
party set of metrics
• Customization of metrics needed given variation in the 
type of impact/sectors that the investees are involved in
N/A
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; company websites
123 IRIS (formerly known as Impact Reporting and Investment Standards) is a set of standardized metrics for 
impact measurement managed by the Global Impact Investment Network (iris.thegiin.org).
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Beyond the impact investing market
Capital invested by impact-related investors in Myanmar totals approximately 
USD 43.6 million. A majority of this capital has been deployed by one infrastructure-
focused fund manager (who received initial investment from a DFI) who is investing 
in mature companies. Other smaller investments have been in energy, microfinance, 
and ICT. The initial presence of angel investor groups and conventional investors 
making impact-related investments, along with the evidence of future commitments 
for capital in Myanmar, suggests the growth of the broader impact investing 
landscape in the future.
Challenges facing impact investors in Myanmar
In Myanmar, investors face challenges across the investment lifecycle. The 
most severe constraints are regulations pertaining to market entry, and low levels of 
enterprise investment readiness, which constrain pipeline development (Figure 20). 
As they look to enter the market, investors face restrictive investment policies and 
struggle to navigate complex investment approval processes. In particular, it is difficult 
to set up a new organization or office through official channels. For example, high 
fees (the company registration fee is USD 1,500) and complex procedures (extensive 
background checks and letters from the township and the local police station are 
required) restrict company registration. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ranks 
Myanmar as having the second most restrictive FDI regulations in the world.124  In 
particular, Myanmar ranks particularly poorly in two out of the four criteria considered 
in this ranking. Myanmar’s foreign equity restrictions and its screening and approval 
processes for entering investors were rated as the most severe restrictions faced by 
foreign investors. Moreover, Myanmar is the only ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
Asian) country to have two laws for investment: one for local firms, and the other for 
foreign investors. 
124 The OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (FDI Index) gauges restrictiveness of a country’s 
FDI and market access rules. The index examines four types of restrictions: approval or screening 
mechanisms for investment, foreign equity limitations, restrictions on the employment of foreigners as 
key personnel, and operational restrictions (e.g., capital repatriation and land ownership).
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FIGURE 20: SEVERITY OF CHALLENGES FACED ACROSS THE INVESTMENT LIFECYCLE
Severity of investor challenges, by stage of investment
Key challenges faced by investors and severity of impact
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development 
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enterprises are 
investment ready; 
poor business skills 
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Challenge in 
separating 
military/political 
interests and ties 
with investments 
in large-scale 
enterprises
Interest rates 
capped by 
government at level 
that does not reflect 
investor risk
Limited local talent/
capacity to oversee 
fund management
Unclear laws for 
protection of 
investor funds; 
uncertainty about 
legal recourse for 
lost investment2
Lack of at-scale 
enterprises due to 
risk and need to 
remain small and 
diversify under 
previous regime1
Companies lack 
financial and 
operational records; 
not uncommon that 
they have not paid 
taxes
Weak entrepreneur 
business skills 
implies that 
investors have to 
be more engaged 
strategically and 
operationally
Majority of equity 
investments 
likely need to be 
structured with a  
7-10+ years due to 
nascent enterprise 
market
Entry into  
Myanmar
Pipeline  
development
Screening, 
due diligence
Structuring, 
investment
Managing  
investment Exit
Lack of basic and 
accurate macro-
economic data for 
Myanmar
Complex and 
restrictive regulations 
for investors to enter
Limited expertise and 
overlapping processes 
in investment  
approval authority
Least severe Most Severe
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis; 1Previous regime could seize businesses without notice, so to remain “below the radar” entre-
preneurs tried to remain small scale and did not focus efforts too much on one business but rather saw diversification as an insurance policy or a 
hedging tactic. 2Companies doing business in Myanmar are not allowed to conduct arbitration for business disputes in foreign tribunals despite the 
dearth of dispute resolution mechanisms in country (e.g., commercial arbitration, mediation, and conciliation).
As highlighted in the FDI index, one of the most pressing challenges to entry is 
the level of complexity of the current regulatory framework in Myanmar, with 
over half a dozen laws regulating the entry of investors—many of them dating 
back to colonial times—depending on the sector and location of the investment. 
The laws include an extensive list of sectors in which foreign investment is prohibited 
or restricted, with banking, fisheries, retail, and food as the most restrictive sectors for 
foreign investment.125
Furthermore, despite initiatives to streamline investment procedures, the 
current system for investment remains complex, with investors needing to make 
a number of contacts with different ministries and local authorities. This further 
exacerbates the fact that the regulatory procedure provides significant discretion to 
125 OECD, 2014, and FDI Index online, 2013.
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different government entities, minimizing transparency and equity in the process. In 
addition to the confusing approval processes, regulators have limited expertise and 
knowledge of financial instruments and investments, making the whole process slower 
and more cumbersome.126
In terms of pipeline development, the most significant challenge is that there 
are few investment-ready enterprises. Poor business, financial, and operational 
knowledge and skills among enterprises compounds this issue, particularly for 
conducting due diligence and screening of the organization (see the “Needs and 
opportunities: The demand side” section for more details). In addition, due to the 
constant takeover and nationalization of large-scale enterprises during Myanmar’s 
recent military regime, entrepreneurs today are still in the habit of diversifying 
businesses rather than specializing in and growing a specific business to a large scale.
Finally, at the end of the investment cycle, weak investor protection laws remain 
a challenge. While the enactment of the FIL (2012) was a step forward to opening 
up the market to investors, it still leaves questions unanswered, particularly those 
related to investor protection in the management of investments and exits. Although 
under the new FIL, the level of protection granted to investors has been enhanced, 
mechanisms for enforcing contracts and property rights and for settling disputes 
remain weak. 
126 Myanmar impact investor interview, July 2014.
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NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES: 
THE DEMAND SIDE
Overview of the impact enterprise ecosystem in 
Myanmar
When examining the flow of impact capital, we see very little directed to impact 
enterprises.127 However, there is increasing investment interest in enterprises in the 
financial inclusion sector (almost 40% of current capital has been deployed into 
financial inclusion, and potentially 24% of future committed capital will flow to this 
sector) and fast-growing SME sectors such as tourism. Although a majority of impact 
enterprises interviewed in Myanmar had not taken or solicited capital from impact 
investors, two angel networks have invested around USD 630,000 into two different 
seed-stage impact enterprises. 
Besides the presence of large or expanding international MFIs, the formal 
impact enterprise space in Myanmar is extremely small and active only across 
a few sectors. These MFIs include established large international MFIs (e.g., Pact, 
World Vision, Proximity MFI, and GRET), that helped pioneer microfinance models 
and sustained the models through sanctions. As a result, these MFIs have had a 
much longer period of operation than emerging impact enterprises. More recently 
established impact enterprises are emerging in the education/vocational training 
space and in rural areas (Figure 21).
According to some impact investors, there are more at-scale impact enterprises 
started by local entrepreneurs in rural Myanmar (e.g., in the agriculture sector) 
than there are in urban areas. However, a combination of the facts that investors 
tend to focus on urban centers and that these rural enterprises do not self-define 
as impact enterprises (or are not necessarily aware of the concept), makes the 
identification of rural impact enterprises more challenging. The implication of 
these two trends is that investors will likely need to reach outside of urban centers 
to seek these emerging rural impact enterprises in order to increase their pipeline 
development and, ultimately, impact. Moreover, this unusual concentration of impact 
enterprises in rural areas means investors need to seek enterprises directly through 
hands-on pipeline development (e.g., field visits with local contacts).
127 Impact enterprises for the purposes of this report are defined as those that have articulated a core 
objective to generate positive social or environmental impact (i.e., as a part of their operating model 
rather than an ancillary activity as with CSR programs) and seek to grow to financial viability and 
sustainability.
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FIGURE 21: RELATIVE NUMBER OF IMPACT ENTERPRISES BY SECTOR, WITH EXAMPLES
Opportunities Now Save the Children
Snow Ball  
Soy Food Good Job
Myanmar Eco 
Solutions
ACLEDA MFI 
Myanmar
Shwe Sa Bwe Goodnight Kant Kaw  Education Center Proximity World Vision
Yangon 
Bakehouse Good Sleep Pomelo
Green Wave Social 
Enterprise Indigo|Energy Proximity Pact
Few                         Some              Many
MicrofinanceEnergy AgricultureEducationHandicraftsFMCG/retailServices
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Organization websites; Dalberg analysis; British Council (2013) Social Enterprise Landscape in Myanmar 
Despite high official literacy rates, a large population of working-age adults (the 
median age in Myanmar is 27 years) lacks skills training and education; skill 
development is therefore essential for Myanmar’s growth. The education and 
vocational training sector includes impact enterprises that work in targeted skill 
building, or education across different fields—from basic preparation for higher 
education and college (Kant Kaw Education) to industrial garment training (Good 
Job) to rural development (Green Wave Social Enterprise) to entrepreneurship 
(Opportunities Now).
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FIGURE 22: FIVE LEGAL FORMS OF INCORPORATION FOR ORGANIZATIONS IN MYANMAR
Least severe
Most severe
Legal Form Characteristics Challenges in incorporation
Difficulty of 
incorporation Examples
Foundations
• Normally financially supported by private 
sector company
• Typically funded from donations from a 
single source and/or small donations
• Activities/direction may be 
driven by founder interests 
rather than being needs-based
Shwe 
Minn Tha 
Foundation
Cooperatives
• Owned/controlled by its member
• Legal status makes it easier to introduce 
revenue generation activities
• History of government support
• Closer control by the 
government, decreased 
independence Good Sleep
Associations
• Focus on religious or specific social issues
• Legal form adopted by many local NGOs 
due to faster/easier registration process
• Difficult to generate revenues 
due to law limiting their ability 
to issue invoices for services
Byamaso 
Social 
Services
NGOs
• Despite challenges, local NGOs are 
becoming more active players in 
addressing community issues
• Face suspicion by government as vehicles 
for opposition movements
• Registration process is long, 
unpredictable, and costly
• Regulations pose restrictions 
on operations (e.g. use of bank 
accounts, inability to generate 
revenue)
Proximity
Private 
Companies
• Relatively easier to register as private 
company (rather than an NGO)
• Newer impact enterprises starting to 
register as private companies
• Able to receive donations, in-kind 
donations, and grants
• Concept of for-profit impact 
enterprises still new to 
Myanmar
Yangon 
Bakehouse
Pomelo
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; British Council (2013) Social Enterprise Landscape in Myanmar
While the impact enterprise model is still a relatively new concept in Myanmar, 
government perceptions and registration processes may inadvertently create 
momentum towards it. Organizations seeking to generate social impact will likely 
register as private companies and adopt an enterprise approach rather than forming 
as NGOs; entrepreneurs may shy away from NGO structures, which have typically 
faced suspicion by government (due to perceptions that they serve as vehicles for 
opposition movements) and as such face costly and lengthy registration processes 
and monitoring of activities (Figure 22).128 This may lead entrepreneurs to either 
adopt enterprise structures or remain informal and unregistered.
128 Social enterprise landscape in Myanmar,” British Council, 2013.
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The legal form adopted by organizations also has implications for revenue generation 
and financial sustainability. NGOs and associations are limited by law in their ability 
to generate revenue from their activities. Cooperatives are allowed to establish 
a revenue stream due to their historical ties with government, but they have less 
independence and are more closely controlled by the government, making a new 
venture or revenue stream slower and more cumbersome to establish. Foundations 
typically do not seek to become revenue-generating entities; rather, they depend 
on grants and donations, and are largely supported by donations from private sector 
companies. Therefore, we see newer impact enterprises becoming established as 
private companies (e.g., Pomelo and Yangon Bakehouse) as the registration process 
is relatively easy, revenue generation is allowed, and enterprises are still allowed to 
receive donations, grants, or in-kind donations.
FIGURE 23: SEVERITY OF ACCESS TO FINANCE CHALLENGES BY ENTERPRISE GROWTH STAGE
Severity of access to finance challenge, by stage of growth
Key challenges faced and severity of impact
Least severe Most Severe
Public listingSeed Venture Growth Mature
Identifying sources of capital
Limited sources of capital for start-ups; most seed 
funding from friends, founders, and a few angel 
investors
Limited number of capital sources outside international 
foundations and DFIs
Limited options for IEs and SMEs to access formal funding due to limited network and 
availability. Lack of formal knowledge of sources, amount, or type of finance needed.
Difficulty in identifying potential investors that match expectations of IE
Appropriateness of capital
Uncertainty about legal recourse available if issues arise with 
equity investor
Terms of loans from banks not appropriate—restrictively high collateral rate (150+%), 
short-term tenures, and unfavorable interest rates
Accessing capital
Challenge in accessing capital due to the fact that IEs are too small to be attractive 
to investors, and to absorb capital in the amounts preferred by impact investors
Companies do  not have, or do not keep, accurate financial records due to environment of previous regime
Complicated process of applying for capital and negotiating terms of investment, 
due to lack of investment-related experience
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
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Although access to finance ranked as the sixth biggest challenge in a survey of 
1,100 SMEs, as in other markets, these challenges vary with growth stage and size 
of the enterprise; access to finance is more constrained for smaller, early-stage 
companies. One ecosystem player who supports SME development attributes this 
lower ranking to low entrepreneur awareness of its own finance needs. Further, due to 
Myanmar’s historical instability, SMEs are not in the habit of long-term planning and 
usually tend to not have growth plans. However, of the 1,100 enterprises surveyed, 
around 60% responded that they would like to access a formal loan, while only 14% 
have actually been able to do so.129
As illustrated in Figure 23, access to finance constraints are driven not only 
by availability of capital, but also by factors such as the lack of networks to 
identify capital, knowledge of appropriateness of finance to suit the needs of 
the enterprise, and the process of accessing capital. In terms of availability of 
capital, there are few formal options available to entrepreneurs: only the Small and 
Medium Industrial Development Bank has a specifically tailored SME product. By 
and large, commercial debt products are inappropriate for the needs and capacities 
of small enterprises: They require 150–300% of the loan value in immovable capital as 
collateral; have short tenure terms of less than one year rather than providing longer-
term capital with grace periods appropriate to the business model; and have high 
interest rates (13%) fixed by the Central Bank.
As a result, enterprises lacking access to capital in appropriate forms have had to 
self-finance through their informal networks, donations, and grants or try to sustain 
themselves through their revenues. However, this trend may change as the scale and 
exposure of impact enterprises increases. 
129 “Survey results of 1,100 Building Market-affiliated SMEs in Myanmar,” Building Markets, 2014.
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FIGURE 24: SOURCES OF FINANCE AND FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY FOR A SAMPLE OF IMPACT ENTERPRISES IN  
MYANMAR
Financial sustainability of sample impact enterprises
Not generating profit, 
do not seek to do so
Not generating profit; aiming to  
grow to profitability Break even
Operationally  
profitable
Profitable and capital 
investment recovered
Smile Project Hub Proximity Yangon Bakehouse Pomelo ACLEDA MFI Myanmar
Byamaso Social 
Services Goodnight Opportunities Now Good Sleep World Vision
Indigo|Energy Kant Kaw  Education Center Pact
40-50% of Kant Kaw Education 
Center’s revenue comes from its night 
classes. Additional finance comes from 
international donors and foundations.
Good Sleep (structured as a 
Cooperative) re-invests all 
profits (~USD 1,000 annually) 
into its management and 
subsidiary social enterprises —
Good Night and Good Jobs.
Yangon Bakehouse is almost entirely self-sufficient, with 
80% of its revenue generated from its sales. Remaining 
finance from crowd funding, corporate sponsors, in-kind 
donations (real estate/equipment), and private donors.
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; British Council (2013); Dalberg analysis
MYANMAR • 215
Other constraints to enterprise growth 
According to a survey of 1,100 SMEs,130 the top three challenges to SME growth 
in Myanmar are infrastructure, business skills, and government policies. Access 
to finance ranked sixth out of 14 options. Weak infrastructure (see Country context: 
Challenges to investment) is a major challenge for enterprises that require strong ICT 
infrastructure, transport for goods, robust supply chains, and access to consistent and 
reliable power.
The second most significant constraint to enterprise growth is business 
capability. The most significant barrier to the growth of enterprises, and to their 
investment-readiness, is their lack of operational and financial management skills. Skill 
gaps include the following:
• Low levels of understanding of financial instruments needed to fund/grow their 
enterprise
• Lack of familiarity with business plans or growth plans
• Weak operational and human resources management systems
• Limited service providers supporting business development services
130 According to the 2011 Revised Private Industrial Enterprise Law, SMEs are defined as having annual 
revenues up to USD 2,600, with 10 to 50 employees, while medium-sized enterprises are classified as 
having annual revenues between USD 2,600–USD 5,000, with 50 to 100 employees.
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FIGURE 25: ENTERPRISE RANKING OF CONSTRAINTS TO GROWTH; SURVEY OF ~1,100 SMES IN MYANMAR, 2014
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
CONSTRAINT
PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONSES RATED 
AS TOP TWO  
CONSTRAINTS
Infrastructure 21%
Lack of business skills 13%
Exchange rate 13%
Government policies 13%
Competition 11%
 Access to finance 7%
Political instability 5%
Lack of information 4%
Lack of equipment 4%
Taxes 3%
Lack of customer base 2%
Corruption 1%
Language 1%
Insurance 1%
Sources: Building Markets, Overview of the SME Sector in Myanmar (Emmanuel Maillard, 2014). Note: Respondents to survey were not evenly 
distributed across sectors or functions, and this bias may affect the extent to which some challenges are perceived and represented. Respondents 
as follows: 36% Wholesalers, 29% Service providers, 22% Manufacturers, 10% Traders, and 2% Retailers.
In addition to skill gaps, another constraint is the general mindset of business 
managers. To respond to the risks faced under the previous military regime, in which 
all non-agricultural medium to large enterprises were nationalized, entrepreneurs are 
accustomed to diversifying their businesses into numerous micro-enterprises, rather 
than focusing on one enterprise and growing it to maturity. In addition, enterprises 
undertake little to no financial record-keeping either due to a lack of financial skills, or 
as a deliberate strategy that has lingered from the days of the previous military 
regime, which used financial records to the detriment of the enterprise.
MYANMAR • 217
Enabling impact investing: The ecosystem
As previously discussed, Myanmar’s investment climate—including its macro-
economic governance, infrastructure, political stability, and regulatory 
framework—is a significant constraint to investment. More specifically, the two 
most important constraints to investment into Myanmar are its lack of infrastructure 
and complex regulatory environment. In response to regulatory and infrastructure 
challenges, DFIs, bilaterals, and the Myanmar government are prioritizing work in 
regulatory reform and infrastructure improvement (Figure 26). Ongoing efforts are 
being undertaken by the Myanmar government, particularly through the Directorate 
of Investment and Company Administration (DICA), with DFI partners (IFC, ADB, 
World Bank, etc.) to identify and implement regulatory reforms and streamline 
legislative processes. Moreover, the ADB, alongside the Myanmar government, has 
been working to help develop basic infrastructure, particularly that of the roads and 
power.
FIGURE 26: ROLES AND ACTIVITIES OF SAMPLE PLAYERS IMPROVING INFRASTRUCTURE AND INVESTMENT  
REGULATIONS
Role/Mandate in Myanmar Sample Activities in Myanmar
International Finance 
Corporation
• Began work in Myanmar in 2012
• Key functions include undertaking of infrastructure, 
legal and regulatory assessment of the country’s 
investment climate to help focus future activities; 
undertaking a business environment perception 
survey of SMEs
• Tackling regulatory issues through Investment 
Climate Reform including business registration, 
process of investment approvals, taxation regime
• Working to improve and promote public-private 
partnership initiatives and establish a business 
forum
UK Department for 
International Development
• Key functions include providing good governance 
and public financial management; promoting 
responsible investment; improving transparency; 
strengthening the work of parliament; supporting 
the process of ethnic reconciliation
• The Peace Support Fund will fund projects in 
Myanmar that provide tangible support to the 
peace process and support cross-sector dialogue, 
such as negotiations preparation and training.
Asian Development Bank
• Resumed operations in 2013
• Key functions include initial lending and 
investment grant operations focused primarily 
on access, connectivity, and infrastructure 
development, specifically in energy and urban 
planning
• Provided loans for updating the national 
electricity grid, ensuring infrastructure bidding 
process is transparent/updated to international 
standards
• Working with the World Bank on an investment 
climate assessment of Myanmar
Directorate of 
Investment and Company 
Administration
• Established in 1993, DICA is under the Ministry of 
National Planning & Economic Development
• Key functions include appraisal of projects 
proposed for investment, registration, and 
administration of investments, monitoring of 
permitted enterprises
• Taking steps to rationalize legislative framework, 
manage and streamline regulations and 
procedures for business
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis. 1UK Government call for proposals, The South East Asia Prosperity Fund: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/south-east-asia-prosperity-fund-2014-2015
218 • THE LANDSCAPE FOR IMPACT INVESTING IN SOUTH ASIA
Beyond the macro investment climate, support services to investors and 
enterprises are crucial elements to enable an impact investment ecosystem. For 
investors, there is little support available to navigate the complex and changing 
regulatory processes (Figure 27). Access to reliable financial information on 
enterprises and macroeconomic data on Myanmar is very difficult, if not impossible, 
for investors to obtain or generate. Enterprises require support in key areas including 
access to networks of investors or platforms with investor information, as well as 
training in key business management functions.
FIGURE 27: CONSTRAINTS TO INVESTOR AND ENTERPRISE SUPPORT IN MYANMAR
Key  
Components Key Ecosystem Constraints in Myanmar
Severity of 
Constraint
Investor Support
• The regulatory process to set up/register an investment entity or fund is complicated 
and difficult to navigate with little support available
• There is a lack of investor protection; for example, if an investor seeks to avoid bringing 
disputes to an unreliable court system in Myanmar, there is a scarcity of dispute 
resolution alternatives (commercial arbritation or mediation)
• Unreliable and scarce financial data are available to investors; difficult to compare these 
data as they are not prepared in a consistent manner. Most banks do not publish annual 
reports or disclose their financial data
Enterprise 
Support
• In addition to acess to finance challenges, entrepreneurs face a range of other 
constraints to enterpise start-up: costly fees for registration; lengthy processes for 
licensing; and very costly office lease rentals
• Other challenges to growth include weak business skills and knowledge as well as access 
to information and networks
• Few organizations currently exist to support/address these needs in a comprehensive, 
easy-to-access way
• Key areas of need include
 » Aggregation/networking/knowledge sharing among entrepreneurs
 » Training in key business management functions—strategic and operational 
 » Linkages to investors or platforms for accessing investor information
Least severe
Most severe
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Dalberg analysis
Lack of adequate training, advisory services, and platforms for networking and 
aggregation remain significant constraints to the growth of the impact investing 
industry. For investors, as discussed, identification of investment-ready enterprises is 
a key constraint to deployment of capital, and the cost of developing these 
enterprises is often prohibitive. Without a supportive ecosystem working to build 
these enterprise models, the industry will remain far below its potential size and 
impact.
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FIGURE 28: EMERGING PLAYERS IN THE ENTERPRISE SUPPORT LANDSCAPE IN MYANMAR
TA Providers
British Council
Building Markets
Challenges 
Worldwide
Shujog
Cuso
Standard Chartered
HP
USAID
VinaCapital
Myanmar Business 
Executives
Business Innovation 
Facility Project Hub Opportunities Now Barcamp Yangon 2014
Incubators/Accelerators
Advisory Services
British Council Hamsa Hub Building Markets Ronoc
Credit Rating Services
Sustainable Business 
Myanmar Building Markets
Business for Social 
Responsibility
Centre for Economic and 
Social Development
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
An ecosystem of support for targeting skill gaps and training impact enterprises 
in business skills, including operational and financial management, is beginning 
to emerge. In recent times, there has been an advent of both distinct organizations 
(such as Sustainable Business Myanmar and Building Markets) targeting support to 
impact enterprises and joint ventures emerging to address training and skillset gaps 
and needs. Examples of such joint ventures include the British Council working with 
Standard Chartered Bank to provide free business development training to select 
enterprises, and Hewlett Packard working alongside Vina Capital and USAID to 
provide both funds and in-kind resources for SME training. This ecosystem is aiming 
to support and address the most significant gaps that impact enterprises face and are 
an indication of the growing demand for these types of services.
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As these support services are still slowly being developed on the enterprise 
side, there is a reasonable ecosystem emerging to provide advisory services 
to investors, including logistical support, market analytics, deal sourcing, 
structuring, and due diligence. Figure 29 describes some of the services being 
offered to help investors overcome key challenges to investment in Myanmar.
FIGURE 29: INVESTOR SUPPORT SERVICES IN MYANMAR
Key gaps identified by 
investors to investment Severity of gap
Example of  
organizations offering 
advisory services Services being offered
Challenges in launching 
a new office/entity in 
Myanmar
• Fine 9
• Administrative start-up support: Assists investors to 
establish a legal entity in Myanmar, assists with approvals, 
permits, and office space.
Lack of reliable market data 
for investment decision-
making
• Andaman Capital 
Partners
• MiTA
• Ronoc
• ThuraSwiss
• Mandalay Capital
• Consultancy: Numerous enterprises provide business 
development analysis for their clients as well as sector-
specific market research, and the analysis of the risks/
returns of investments.
Lack of deal-sourcing 
information
• Andaman Capital 
Partners
• Mandalay Capital
• M Invest
• Deal sourcing: These investment advisory firms seek 
direct investment opportunities for investors (as well as 
advise local companies on raising capital). They help 
source, structure, and close deals and investment projects.
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
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AREAS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH
As the impact investing market in Myanmar is nascent, follow-up research will 
be important to monitor the nature and direction of market growth. As we are 
already seeing a large amount of committed capital by impact investors, tracking 
the deployment as well as the progress of deals already made would be valuable. 
Secondly, given a clear interest among DFIs in the tourism sector, we would propose 
an exploration of these investments in greater depth, in terms of their viability and 
potential for impact. Lastly, there are several conventional investors from other 
parts of South Asia exploring possibilities of investment in Myanmar. It would 
be worthwhile to follow-up with these investors to explore whether there are any 
possibilities for making impact-related investments.
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COUNTRY CONTEXT
GDP growth and drivers of foreign direct investment 
(FDI)
India is the leading economy in South Asia, and the third largest in the world in 
PPP terms, with a GDP of international USD 6.3 trillion in purchasing power 
parity (PPP) terms. However, growth has slowed since 2010 (see Figure 1). India has 
been at the forefront of the developing world since the early 2000s, with a rapidly 
growing economy. Between 2004 and 2009, India’s PPP GDP grew at an annual 
average of 11%. However, in the aftermath of the global debt crisis, and in the face of 
poor coalition governance as well as “policy paralysis,”131 growth slowed in 2010. Going 
forward, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts a gradual recovery for India. 
In particular, the IMF estimates that India’s PPP GDP will grow at an average annual 
rate of 8% as macroeconomic conditions improve.
FIGURE 1: GDP (PPP) OF INDIA AND COMPARISON WITH OTHER SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES  
(2013, 2014-2016: PROJECTED)
BAN
GDP OF INDIA
(PPP, CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR, TRILLIONS)
GDP BY COUNTRY
(PPP, CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR, BILLIONS, 2013)
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
5
6
4
1
2
+11%
+7%
+8%
3
IN PAK SL MYA NEP
5,069
575
325 136 113 42
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2014
131 “’Policy paralysis’ responsible for India’s slowdown,” Firstpost.com, September 8, 2013.
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India’s services sector has been the key contributor to its growth, accounting 
for more than half of GDP growth after 2000 (see Figure 2). Since India began 
liberalizing its economy in the 1980s, the services sector has grown in contribution to 
India’s GDP, whereas agriculture and manufacturing have progressed slowly and seen 
a decline in contribution. According to the Indian Economic Survey 2014, India has 
one of the fastest growing services sectors in the world, second only to China; the 
sector grew at an average annual rate of 9% between 2001 and 2012. 
FIGURE 2: EVOLUTION OF SECTOR CONTRIBUTION TO GDP (% OF GDP PPP, INTERNATIONAL DOLLAR BILLIONS)
19951990 2000 2005 2010 2013
29%
27%
44%
762 26%
27%
46%
1,090 23%
26%
51%
1,607
19%
28%
53%
2,518
18%
27%
55%
4,130
18%
25%
57%
5,069
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank; IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2014
Economists have suggested that India is experiencing a temporary “stagflation,” 
posing challenges to growth.132 Stagflation refers to a situation of slow growth 
and high inflation, which India has been facing over the past few years. In addition, 
the fiscal deficit has increased since 2008, as seen in Figure 3. In light of these 
developments, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), has raised interest rates and 
considered an inflation target to curb inflation, which hovered around 11% in 2013, but 
has fallen slightly recently. Moreover, the government has stated an aim to bring the 
fiscal deficit down to 4.1% in 2014. However, Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s 
have stated that they are not convinced that this is a realistic target.133 All in all, an 
improvement of macroeconomic fundamentals is a key requirement for sustaining 
and improving investor sentiment and the momentum of FDI inflows into India. 
132 “India in stagflation, not crisis,” Economic Times, December 22, 2013.
133 “Finance secretary Mayaram defends 4.1 percent fiscal deficit target,” Reuters, July 12, 2014.
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FIGURE 3: INFLATION RATE, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) AND FISCAL DEFICIT (% OF GDP)
2012 2014
INFLATION RATE,  
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI)
(ANNUAL, %)
2004 2006 2008 2010
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(% OF GDP)
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
7
4
6
3
2
5
1
Sources: World Development Indicators, The World Bank; Planning Commission of India
After a surge in the early and mid-2000s, India has seen unusually volatile FDI 
flows, caused largely by regulatory uncertainty and the global financial crisis. 
Mirroring India’s emergence as a rapidly growing economy, investor sentiment 
and FDI inflows grew rapidly in the 2000s, peaking in 2008 at USD 43.4 billion 
(see Figure 4). However, regulations such as the General Anti-Avoidance Rules134 
(GAAR) and frequently changing tax laws have led to uncertainties in the regulatory 
environment. This has augmented foreign investors’ perception of the risk of investing 
in India, and has led to lower inflows. This is reflected in India’s low score of 3/6 on the 
World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).135
Further, negative global forces such as the global financial crisis and the Eurozone 
debt crisis have reduced FDI inflows. In the short-to-medium term, the growth of FDI 
inflows will hinge on the creation of an investor-friendly environment, as the global 
economy recovers. There are initial signs of investor confidence improving slightly, 
but sustained improvement is required to revert to earlier levels.
134 In Indian law, the General Anti-Avoidance Rules are a set of rules designed to minimize tax avoidance, 
for example by siphoning off profits to tax havens. They are due to be implemented in April 2015.
135 The CPIA Business Regulatory Environment scale of the World Bank, assesses the extent to which the 
legal, regulatory, and policy environments help or hinder private businesses in investing, creating jobs, 
and becoming more productive.
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FIGURE 4: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) NET INFLOWS (2004-2013), CURRENT USD BILLIONS
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The General Anti-Avoidance 
Rule was proposed in 2012; 
uncertainty about its terms 
and implementation still 
plagues foreign investors
The global financial crisis contributed 
to a dip in FDI in 2008-09
FDI experienced a significant boom 
starting in 2005 and peaked in 2008
Sources: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
Key constraints in India
With 47% of its population under the age of 25, India can leverage its 
demographic dividend to great effect if it can overcome key challenges. However, 
skill deficits and a low-quality higher education system remain a key constraint to 
India achieving this potential. In a recent report, the IMF argues that a large part of 
India’s growth acceleration since the 1980s is attributable to changes in the country’s 
age structure. Building on this, they estimate that India’s young population has the 
potential to produce an additional 2% per capita GDP growth each year for the next 
two decades.136 Such a high potential for acceleration can further attract foreign 
investors to look for investment opportunities in India. Unfortunately, however, 16.3% 
of urban males who were at least college graduates in the age group of up to 29 years 
were unemployed in 2011-12; the overall unemployment rate for males is 3% and for 
females is 5%.137 Moreover, India’s expansive population dilutes the positive effects of 
growth. The average Indian is considered to be of lower-middle income status by the 
World Bank with a per capita PPP GDP at USD 5,410. If India can effectively absorb 
the added labor force, then there is likely to be a significant push to growth.
136 “The demographic dividend: Evidence from the Indian states,” IMF, 2011.
137 National Sample Survey, India.
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FIGURE 5: POPULATION AGE DISTRIBUTION (% OF POPULATION, 2014)
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Source: CIA World Factbook
Although India’s high growth has reduced poverty levels, concerns remain around 
income inequality, regional disparities, and gender inequality. As of 2010, nearly 
a quarter of the population was below the poverty line of international USD 2 a day 
(PPP).138 This is a five percentage point improvement over 2005. However, large 
disparities remain across states. Over 50% of the population of Bihar was below the 
domestic poverty line. In contrast, the figure for Kerala was 12%. Income inequality is 
quite high and has increased since the beginning of the liberalization era in the 1980s: 
the Gini coefficient rose to 0.34 in 
2010 from 0.31 in 1983.139 As seen in 
Figure 6, the contribution to GDP 
and the labor force employed by 
sectors are widely disproportionate. 
In 2012, services contributed to 
more than half the GDP but 
employed just over a quarter of the 
labor force. In contrast, agriculture 
employed nearly half of the labor 
force but contributed less than a 
fifth of the GDP. Moreover, India ranks 101 out of 136 countries for gender equality, 
the lowest of the BRICS economies. This is due to its poor performance on measures 
of health, education, and economic participation and equality for women.
138 Using the World Bank methodology.
139 The Gini coefficient (also known as the Gini index or Gini ratio) is a measure of statistical dispersion 
intended to represent the income distribution of a country. A higher co-efficient represents greater 
inequality.
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FIGURE 6: CONTRIBUTION TO GDP AND LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED BY SECTOR (2012, %)
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Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
Despite its rapid growth, India has lagged behind many emerging economies 
in ensuring a decent standard of living for its population. India is ranked 135th in 
the world on the Human Development Index (HDI), and is significantly below the 
BRICS average score, as seen in Figure 7. According to the 2014 UNDP Human 
Development Report, life expectancy at birth is at 66.4 years. This is up 11 years 
from 1983 but is still lower than in all BRICS countries, except South Africa. Further, 
healthcare provision is inadequate to meet demand: as of 2011, there were 0.7 hospital 
beds and 0.63 doctors per 1000 people in India,140 compared with 2.3 in Brazil, 3.8 in 
China, 3.6 in Sri Lanka, and 2.5 in Turkey, for example. 
India also lags behind the other BRICS countries on measures of education and 
literacy. The mean number of years of schooling in India is 4.43 years, which is up by 
2.5 years since 1980, but lower than that of all BRICS countries. Although the rate 
of school attendance is improving for primary and secondary schools, the education 
system remains inadequately developed due to a shortage of infrastructure, finances, 
and quality staff. Currently, the Indian government has focused on achieving the 
universalization of primary education through its “Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan,” i.e., 
the Education for All Movement. This program was launched in 2001 and made 
education free and compulsory to children between six and 14 years of age.
Sanitation has also remained a key problem in India. The WHO/UNICEF Joint 
Monitoring Program (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation estimates that only 
140 World Health Organization, 2011.
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25% of the rural population has access to improved sanitation facilities;141 the 
corresponding figure for urban India is 60%. For India as a whole, this figure has 
doubled from 18% in 1990 to 36% in 2012, but this is still not on track to meet the 
country’s Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target. In addition, of India’s 
700,000 rural schools, only one-sixth have toilets, deterring girls from attending 
school.
FIGURE 7: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI) SCORE FOR THE SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES UNDER STUDY (0 TO 1)
0.52
BRICS Average—0.7
South Asia Average—0.59
0.54 0.54 0.55
0.58
0.75
Sri LankaIndiaBangladeshNepalPakistanMyanmar
Source: UNDP Human Development Report, 2014
141 For Millennium Development Goals (MDG) monitoring, an improved sanitation facility is defined 
as one that “hygienically separates human excreta from human contact” by WHO/UNICEF Joint 
Monitoring Program (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation.
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INVESTING IN INDIA:  
THE SUPPLY SIDE
Overview of impact investing in India
The impact investing space in India is robust and continuing to grow; it represents 
the largest impact investment market in South Asia.DFIs have deployed close to 
USD 5 billion in direct investments in India to date, while other impact investors have 
deployed USD 438 million. In addition to this, approximately USD 2.6 billion has 
been channeled by DFIs through fund managers as indirect investments; however, 
we refrain from using these indirect investments in our calculation of overall totals in 
order to avoid possible double counting of investments.142 A majority (greater than 
90%) of both direct and indirect investments in India is made by development finance 
institutions (DFIs), suggesting that their investing behavior largely drives trends within 
the overall investment space; however, a large number of impact investment funds are 
also making a mark, independent of DFIs.
A relatively large domestic impact enterprise143 market, the emergence of several exits 
from investments made in the mid-2000s, and the perceived strong return potential 
make India an attractive market for impact investors. As a result, the impact investing 
market in India is expected to grow further. Regulatory considerations are not a 
significant barrier for foreign or domestic players to enter the market, despite posing 
specific challenges in raising and deploying capital or structuring deals. Conventional 
investors often participate alongside impact investors in many deals, increasing 
competition and sometimes cooperation between investor segments.
A range of foreign and domestic players have deployed capital in the Indian 
impact investing market. Figure 8 provides an overview of the actors in this space.
FIGURE 8: OVERVIEW OF IMPACT INVESTORS IN INDIA
 TYPE OF INVESTOR ESTIMATED NUMBER OR RANGE EXAMPLES
Fund Managers >50
• Aavishkaar
• Acumen Fund
• Elevar (Unitus Equity)
• Khosla Impact
• Lok Capital
• LGTVP
• responsAbility
• Sangam
Development Finance Institutions 10-12
• ADB
• CDC
• DEG
• FMO
• IFC
• KfW
• OPIC
• Proparco
• SIDBI/NABARD
Foundations, HNWIs, and Family 
Offices 10-12
• Michael and Susan Dell Foundation
• Omidyar Network
142  The share of the indirect investments already included in the direct investment total is not known. 
143 Impact enterprises for the purposes of this report are defined as those that have articulated a core 
objective to generate positive social or environmental impact (i.e. as a part of their operating model 
rather than an ancillary activity as with CSR programs); and seek to grow to financial viability and 
sustainability.
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Although both foreign and domestic impact funds are active in India, the 
majority are based offshore due to more favorable regulations. Of the total of 
about 50 prominent impact investment funds active in India, our estimate is that 
approximately 80% are based outside the country, to avoid issues related to taxation 
and repatriation. An increase in domestic funds is expected in the future, as local 
investors gain confidence in impact investing.
In the past 7-10 years, DFIs have invested over USD 7.5 billion into India, 
combining both direct and indirect investments. Approximately USD 5 billion has 
been invested directly into enterprises, while approximately USD 2.6 billion has been 
invested into funds. (The impact capital invested into funds has not been included in 
our overall calculations to avoid double counting of fund investments into enterprises 
as well as the possibility of including capital that has been yet to be deployed by these 
funds.) 
Foundations are initiating impact investments in India; high net-worth individuals 
(HNWIs) and family offices are a critical source of seed-stage funds in impact-
related investments (though they may lack intention or measurement). Until 
recently, foundations largely only engaged in grant provision to NGOs and non-
profits in India. Domestic foundations currently offer modest amounts of investment 
and focus on technical assistance and supportive networks for small or medium 
enterprises (SMEs) in India. International foundations tend to function as catalysts 
in specific sectors, aiming to encourage additional commercial capital in areas where 
investors are otherwise reluctant to invest, such as in education in India. Foundations 
tend to have significantly lower set expectations for returns, or sometimes none. 
Individual investors are a predominant source of seed funding; however they are 
primarily driven by commercial returns. Furthermore, these investors are largely 
connected to enterprises through family and friend networks. Well-established angel 
networks, such as the Intellecap Impact Investment Network (I3N), Mumbai Angels, 
and the Indian Angels Network, are engaging further and more formally in impact 
investments, providing greater access to enterprises seeking access to seed funding.
Large business conglomerates may contribute to the pool of domestic funds for 
impact investment in the future; however, they are currently engaging in philanthropic 
efforts or purely commercially oriented investments. 
Public sector banks are involved in SME financing. They are mandated to lend 
into government-determined priority sectors, including agriculture, education, and 
housing. On the other hand, they are wary of entering sectors deemed as new or 
uncertain, including renewable energy, water, and sanitation.
India houses the largest number of impact investors in the region. For the 
purposes of this study, due to the size of the Indian market and the difficulty of 
quantifying capital deployed by impact-related investors, the following analysis 
focuses only on impact investors (Ring 1 in Figure 9). As seen in Figure 9, there exists 
a minimum of 75 impact investors active in India. 
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FIGURE 9: NUMBER OF DIRECT IMPACT AND IMPACT-RELATED INVESTORS ACTIVE IN INDIA16
2
1
11+  DFIs and IFIs
2 Domestic  
 Development Banks
50+  Impact Funds
10+  Foundations
1
Select:
• PE/VC investors
• Angel Networks
• Domestic commercial banks  
 —public and private sector
• HNWIs
(Note: not included in fund analysis) 
2
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
The total known impact capital deployed by DFIs directly into enterprises is 
approximately USD 5 billion. A further USD 437 million has been deployed by 
other impact investors. These figures quantify capital from over 300 deals.145
RECENT STUDIES ON IMPACT INVESTING IN INDIA
The 2014 Intellecap Impact Investing Report: “Invest. Catalyze. Mainstream. The Indian Impact Investing Story,” is a recent assessment of 
the impact investing space in India produced by Intellecap and funded by GIZ. The report analyzes a total of USD 1.6 billion invested by impact 
investors in over 220 enterprises. The report focuses on the “venture approach” to investing. The higher estimate of invested impact capital in this 
study is primarily driven by the inclusion of all investments made by impact investors, as well as an enumeration of debt investments. The Intellecap 
report plays a prominent role in heightening our understanding of challenges and directions of impact investing in India.
The 2013 Unitus Capital India Impact Equity Investment Report: Unitus Capital aims to release regular reports to capture annual impact 
equity investing in India. Unitus Capital estimates that, in 2013, approximately USD 390 million was invested through impact private equity 
transactions. Yearly assessments of transactions and key trends provide the opportunity for almost real-time understanding and projections of future 
activity in the impact investing space. 
The 2013 Unitus Seed Fund Impact Investing Report: In 2013, the Unitus Seed Fund published “Impact Investing Reaches a Tipping Point in 
India,” which provides a landscape overview of the history and relevance of impact investing in the context of economic development in India. 
144 See “Defining key terms and concepts” in the introduction chapter of this report for an explanation of 
the framework used for categorizing investors using a two-ring framework, where the inner ring—Ring 
1—represents the impact investing activity and the outer ring—Ring 2—represents the activity related to 
impact investing but lacking either an explicit impact intention or measurement.
145 While approximately 100 additional deals have been captured in our database, the value for these deals 
are undisclosed; however, the majority of these undisclosed deals are between funds and enterprises, and 
therefore have relatively low investment sizes in comparison to DFI deals.
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Key trends of impact investing in India  
INVESTOR MIX
DFIs represent the largest share of capital deployed at USD 5 billion. Known 
investments from impact investment funds total approximately USD 418 million 
(Figure 10). Our analysis suggests that at least 40% of fund deals are undisclosed, 
indicating that the total for fund direct investments could be as high as USD 700 
million. Foundations, in addition, are mostly new actors in the impact investment 
space in India, and have deployed approximately USD 20 million to date. Of all 
known direct investments, DFI investments account for about 92%, while fund 
investments represent about 8%. Less than 1% of current investments originate 
from foundations; however, foundations exhibit a growing interest to make impact 
investments in addition to grants in the future. 
FIGURE 10: TOTAL IMPACT CAPITAL (DIRECT INVESTMENTS) DEPLOYED BY INVESTOR TYPE
DFIs
Funds or Fund Managers
Foundations
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
4,983.4
(91.9%)
417.6
(7.7%)
20.1
(0.4%)
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
An additional USD 2.6 billion from DFIs has been channeled through investment 
funds. This represents a sizeable additional investment to those that DFIs made 
directly into enterprises. An unknown percentage of this capital may have been 
captured in the previous total of direct investments from funds to enterprises (USD 
418 million). While this USD 2.6 billion is not included in our estimation of the total 
impact capital in India, in order to avoid double counting, our estimate is that a 
portion of this contributes to an additional amount of capital overall. 
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FIGURE 11: TOTAL DFI DIRECT AND INDIRECT INVESTMENTS, USD MILLIONS
4,983
2,557
7,540
Direct investments into enterprises
Indirect investments made through  
      fund managers
Source: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis
Outside the realm of impact investing as defined in this study, DFIs also 
contribute a significant amount of funding directly to the Indian government as 
public sector investments for large-scale programs in infrastructure and energy. 
Investments from two DFIs alone—Asian Development Bank and KfW (the German 
development bank)—in the past 5 years total approximately USD 5 billion into state- 
and national-level programming.
INSTRUMENT
Approximately 68% of the total known impact capital deployed to date in the 
Indian market has been invested as debt; this trend is largely driven by DFIs. With 
the DFI percentage of overall impact capital at approximately 92%, DFI preference 
for debt financing drives the overall trend in instrument use. When looking at DFI 
investments alone, the percentage of known investments in debt is 72% and that 
in equity or quasi-equity is 28%. DFIs have historically tended to engage primarily 
in large debt deals, citing this as a lower-risk way to engage in a particular market. 
However, anecdotally, DFIs indicate that they do have a growing interest in equity 
investments, motivated by a desire to establish deeper and longer-term partnerships 
with their investees. The debt/equity split for a DFI could be closer to 60/40 in the 
next five to ten years.
Among non-DFI investments in India, 76% of known investments are in equity or 
quasi-equity products, while only 24% are debt. There exists a strong preference 
for equity among non-DFI investors. Impact funds tend to be engaged in either all 
debt or all equity, and only engage in a mix of investment types in cases where equity 
funds agree to provide debt to an existing investee as part of a follow-on round of 
funding. Foundations that are beginning to initiate impact investments primarily 
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engage in equity (approximately 90% of the known investment sample of USD 8.77 
million146). The preference for equity indicates a willingness and desire for non-DFI 
investors to provide in-depth organizational support and take on a greater role within 
investee organizations. However, it also suggests a serious gap in debt financing for 
investees, which will be discussed later in this report.
FIGURE 12: IMPACT CAPITAL BY INSTRUMENT
Debt
Equity/quasi-equity
Guarantee
3,344.0
(72.0%)
1,294.0
(27.9%)
6.6
(0.1%)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
DFI
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL CAPITAL)
96.2 
(24.3%)
299.4 
(75.7%)
NON-DFI
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis. Note: Unknown amount (DFI: USD 338.9 million, Non-DFI: USD 42.1 million) 
not included in the graphs
Regulations prohibit most foreign providers of capital from engaging in debt 
transactions. Another reason for the high percentage of equity investments among 
non-DFI investors is the regulation against debt provision for non-domestic investors. 
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) regulations do not allow foreign 
investors to engage in debt transactions unless they are registered as a Foreign 
Portfolio Investor (FPI), a designation for which not all funds qualify. (DFIs are 
regulated as “internationally recognized sources” and thus are able to use debt.)147 
Investors often prefer to set up foreign entities, in Mauritius or Singapore for example, 
because of favorable tax structures, seamless repatriation, and a more conducive legal 
environment. As a result, given that most of the impact capital in India is invested 
through foreign entities, many are not eligible to provide debt.
Apart from a few quasi-equity instruments, structured as convertible debt, few 
146 The remaining USD 11.4 million investments from foundations are unknown in terms of instrument.
147 The Reserve Bank of India master circular from July 2014 clarifies that borrowers can raise external 
commercial borrowings from “internationally recognized sources” (which include multilateral financial 
institutions). View the circular at http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewMasCirculardetails.aspx?id=9069.
INDIA • 239
innovative investment instruments exist in the market. The presence of innovative 
financing instruments is yet to be seen in the Indian impact investment market. Social 
impact bonds (SIBs), which operate on a pay-for-success model, present a great 
amount of potential for the future of impact investing. Educate Girls was the first 
Indian organization to receive support through a pay for results program that pays 
for outcomes, rather than outputs, of an enterprise’s activities. While outcomes in the 
development sector are rather difficult to quantify, the increasing interest in pay-for-
performance models presents SIBs as a potentially relevant option for the future.  
GROWTH STAGE AND DEAL SIZE
As expected, given the large number of impact investment deals in the Indian market 
in comparison to other South Asian countries, we see a spread across a range of 
deal sizes. With exceptions, DFIs engage in deal sizes up to USD 50 million, with 
an average deal size of USD 25 million. DFI deals can range from as small as USD 
25,000 to deals in the hundreds of millions of dollars, suggesting varied investment 
behaviors and trends. Most non-DFI investors engage in deal sizes up to USD 10 
million, with an average deal size of USD 3 million, including both first round and 
follow-on investments. Figure 13 provides an overview of the distribution in deal sizes 
for all impact investors in India. 
FIGURE 13: IMPACT CAPITAL BY DEAL SIZE
< usd 1 million
> usd 1 million to 5 million
> usd 5 million to 10 million
> usd 10 million to 50 million
> usd 50 million
# OF KNOWN 
DEALS
# OF KNOWN 
DEALS
70
14 16
54
35
52
63
14 1
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis. Note: Unknown deals not included in the graphs.
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Given co-investments in deals between DFIs, non-DFI impact investors, and 
conventional investors, deal sizes do not always correspond to growth stage. On 
the whole, impact funds and foundations engage mostly with seed-, venture-, and 
growth-stage organizations while DFIs prefer to engage with growth-stage and 
mature companies. Mature companies have naturally absorbed the greatest amount 
of impact capital, given their relatively large individual deal sizes. Of the known 
investments in this analysis, the number of deals under USD 5 million represents more 
than 50% of the total number of known deals in the sample. However, despite this 
figure, investors do not perceive that access to capital for enterprises at the seed and 
venture stages is sufficient in the Indian market. 
Overall, investors indicate reluctance to engage with seed- and venture-stage 
enterprises, given that there is not yet enough confidence in the financial 
viability of investing at these early stages. As a result, growth-stage and mature 
enterprises enjoy access to capital, and there exists a clear gap in the market for 
investments into seed- and venture-stage organizations that find it difficult to prove 
their business models. 
Furthermore, given that non-DFI investors are the ones with the bandwidth and 
ability to provide smaller investments to younger organizations, and that they are 
most interested in equity investments, there is a further challenge for seed- and 
venture-stage organizations to access debt. Without sufficient domestic impact 
investment funds that can provide debt capital at small ticket sizes, access to working 
capital loans for small and young enterprises is difficult and is one of the biggest 
challenges in the impact investment market in India. 
SECTOR
The majority of investments by impact funds have been made in the financial 
services sector, primarily in microfinance 
institutions (MFIs). According to a recent 
Intellecap report, the largest percentage of 
investments into impact enterprises have been in 
the financial inclusion sector (into both MFIs and 
non-MFI enterprises) at 70%. Furthermore, within 
the financial inclusion sector, the share of capital 
invested in MFIs is 77%.148
Almost all fund managers either have funds 
specifically focused on financial inclusion, or 
have made most of their initial investments 
in financial services organizations. Even for 
DFIs, who tend to have a diversified portfolio, the 
financial services sector tends to be a top sector 
destination. 
The degree of impact as a result of investing in microfinance is a topic of 
148 “Invest. Catalyze. Mainstream: The Indian impact investing story,” Intellecap, 2014.
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continued debate. Some stakeholders do not believe that simply lending money 
to low-income populations is impactful. Others contend that access to finance is a 
critical pillar of economic development, and that financial exclusion is emblematic 
of the broader exclusion of low-income populations from economic systems. 
The relationship between financial returns and social impact in an investment will 
be discussed later in this report. The high percentage of investments in financial 
inclusion, and further in microfinance, is driven by the high expected rate of returns, 
and oftentimes a lack of sector-specific expertise in other sectors. 
The sectors receiving the most impact capital are manufacturing, energy 
(renewable and non-renewable), financial services, and agri-business. As seen in 
Figure 14, DFI investors have invested 17.3% in manufacturing, 15.9% in renewable 
energy, 15.6% in financial services (including microfinance), 9.1% in non-renewable 
energy, and 8.1% in agriculture and food processing. On the other hand, two-thirds 
of capital deployed to date by non-DFI investors has been into the financial services 
sector (including microfinance). Non-DFI players have invested approximately 
14.7% of total known impact capital into the manufacturing sector. Agriculture/food 
processing companies and enterprises in healthcare have received close to 6% each. 
 
 FIGURE 14: IMPACT CAPITAL BY SECTOR
Manufacturing
Renewable energy
Financial services  
     (Including MFI)
Non-renewable energy
Agro/food processing
ICT
Pharmaceuticals
Health
Infrastructure
Education
Housing
Other
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL 
 KNOWN CAPITAL)
863.4
(17.3%)
793.4
(15.9%)
775.0
(15.6%)453.4
(9.1%)
401.9
(8.1%)
390.6
(7.8%)
308.2
(6.2%)
222.0
(4.5%)
427.6
(8.6%)
173.5
(3.5%)
113.1
(2.3%) 61.1
(1.2%)
293.3
(67.0%)
64.3
(14.7%)
15.3
(3.5%)
12.4
(2.8%)
25.0
(5.7%)
26.6
(6.1%)
USD MILLIONS
(% OF TOTAL 
 KNOWN CAPITAL)
0.7
(0.2%)
DFI NON-DFI
Sources: Stakeholder interviews; Investor websites; Dalberg analysis.
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Two key trends among impact investors in India are a movement from an 
opportunistic selection approach to a hypothesis-driven one, and as a result, an 
increase in the presence of sector-specific funds. To date, investments across the 
board have been largely opportunistic: impact funds have often chosen portfolio 
companies from the many that reach out to them directly to seek funding. However, 
now, impact investors are eager to take on a more proactive approach when selecting 
investees. Investors wish to be more deliberate in identifying a sector focus, a key 
problem area that they wish to address, and, even further, a hypothesized mechanism 
through which to address this problem. With a clear problem and potential solution 
in mind, they seek organizations that provide this particular solution. Along these 
lines, while traditionally impact investment funds have been generalist funds focusing 
primarily on financial inclusion with limited expertise in other sectors, we are now 
starting to see sector-specific funds take prominence. These impact funds have a 
more narrow focus in their selection of investees, and provide the added value of 
specific, technical expertise and content experience. 
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Exit possibilities
As noted above, investors are beginning to diversify the sectors in which they 
invest. Contributing to this shift are the dual factors of the microfinance crisis in 
2010 and a few successful exits in microfinance that have freed up capital. Investors 
are confident in possibilities for sustainable exit models over the next five years, 
while acknowledging that India’s impact investing market is still in early stages in 
sectors outside of financial services. While most of the early investments have 
been in financial services (particularly microfinance), investors are now showing a 
greater inclination to make investments in other sectors. In particular, the sectors 
that investors identify as being most attractive in the near future include energy, 
education, water and sanitation, and technology-based solutions across sectors. There 
is also interest in agri-business, healthcare, and manufacturing.
There have been at least 17 profitable exits by impact investors, boosting investor 
confidence and signaling that the industry can generate strong returns. These 
profitable exits have been critical in building industry confidence, providing a push 
to further capital flow into impact enterprises. Over half of these exits have been in 
the MFI sector, while livelihoods,149 renewable energy and agri-business have seen 
some exits more recently. For example, 2014 saw Lok Capital’s exit from Rural Shores, 
a rural business process outsourcing center, and Aavishkaar’s exit from Milk Mantra, 
an agri-business company. While there have been a few losses made on exits as well, 
investor perceptions are largely positive. 
INVESTOR ENTERPRISE SECTOR YEAR EXIT MODE
Unitus Equity 
Fund SKS Microfinance MFI 2010 IPO
Aavishkaar Rangsutra Handicrafts 2012 Trade Sale
Aavishkaar Naveen Gram Agri-business 2012 Buyback
Aavishkaar Tide Technocrats Consulting services 2012 Buyback
Lok Capital Satin Creditcare MFI 2013 Trade Sale
Aavishkaar Milk Mantra Agri-business 2014 Trade Sale
Lok Capital Rural Shores
Rural business 
process outsourcing 
center
2014 Trade Sale
149 While “livelihoods” is strictly not a sector, the term broadly refers to a set of businesses which help 
provide employment or generate livelihoods.
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Impact measurement
A debate between the tradeoff, or lack thereof, between financial returns and 
social impact is the driving reason for erratic impact metrics among impact 
investors in India. Several players in the market contend that a tradeoff always exists 
between an enterprise generating a profit and creating social impact. Investors who 
hold this view, typically foundations or others who self-characterize as “impact first,” 
are more conscious about putting impact metrics in place. These metrics will be 
discussed subsequently. 
Conversely, a growing set of impact funds and enterprises believe that there is no 
tradeoff, and that financial returns and social impact are positively linked. For some of 
these funds, the same metrics can be tracked, by definition, to measure performance 
on both the financial and non-financial sides. Investors in this scenario believe that 
the due diligence process is sufficient for understanding whether the enterprise’s 
business model will create impact; social impact, therefore, is assumed to be reflected 
in financial indicators and hence the design of separate social impact metrics is not 
prioritized. Enterprises that hold this view tend to be those who focus on income 
generation for the base-of-pyramid (BoP) population, rather than organizations 
whose aim is to increase affordability of certain goods or services.
It is difficult to generalize the presence of these views in any specific sector or 
enterprise or investor group. However, investors and enterprises that have a similar set 
of beliefs on measurement tend to align and move forward with investment deals.
While by definition all impact investors express impact intent and attempt to 
measure social impact, investors often do not design impact metrics at launch, 
and metrics vary by investor. Given the time and resources invested in the selection 
and due diligence process, putting into place methods for impact measurement 
typically falls secondary to managing the investment itself; as a result, metrics are 
often still being developed much after the launch of a fund or finalization of a 
deal. Furthermore, several impact investors that act as limited partners do not have 
standardized indicators for measuring impact, and allow individual fund managers 
into which they invest, or even investment managers within those organizations, to 
determine the metrics used to measure success for an investee. 
Investors measure social impact using both quantitative metrics and anecdotal 
assessments. Key outcome indicators tend to be developed on the basis of the 
assumption that economic impact will have social benefits, and common metrics 
include number of jobs created by the enterprise, amount of income generated for 
beneficiary families, and number of products sold to the BoP population. These 
metrics are typically in addition to a measurement of the overall reach of the business, 
including the number of families engaged in the organization’s activities or, more 
specifically, the number of women engaged. Most impact investors also supplement 
these metrics with anecdotal assessments (in some cases, for smaller or newer funds, 
anecdotal impact assessment comes first, before more rigorous measurement tools 
are in place). In this case, investors aim to capture stories of individuals and families 
that have been supported by the investment. Another approach is to capture the 
indirect impact on the investee or industry through knowledge creation and public 
visibility for a specific problem or solution.
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Although investors and enterprises are aware of formal, standardized 
measurement tools, the use of these is not widespread. Global and national 
initiatives towards standardization of metrics used in impact investing include IRIS,150 
Global Impact Investment Rating System (GIIRS), and Portfolio Risk, Impact, and 
Sustainability Measurement (PRISM). IRIS, managed by the GIIN, is a catalog of 
standardized metrics to measure social, environmental, and financial performance 
that can be tailored by impact investors to measure performance of their investments 
and to increase credibility within the industry. GIIRS, managed by B Lab, uses a 
rating system to assess the social and environmental performance of companies and 
investors but does not incorporate financial performance. PRISM, launched in 2014 
by Intellecap, is a rating and reporting framework specifically designed to measure the 
impact of investments in the Indian context and is also applicable to other emerging 
markets. Whereas IRIS is a set of metrics, GIIRS and PRISM are ratings systems 
that assign values and weights to an organization’s performance on metrics. Both 
GIIRS and PRISM use IRIS metrics in their assessment questions where possible. 
Furthermore, the Indian Impact Investment Council (IIC), which will be discussed 
subsequently, has come together with a mission to infuse standardization in the Indian 
impact investing market.
Despite these available resources and tools for standardization, many impact investors 
have not established a standardized mechanism and a set of metrics to measure 
impact across investees or even investee types; they pursue impact measurement 
on a case-by-case basis, working with the entrepreneur to determine metrics that 
make sense. For impact funds where a DFI acts as the limited partner, metric-based 
reporting is more closely followed, including compliance with environmental, social, 
and governance standards. 
150 IRIS (formerly known as Impact Reporting and Investment Standards) is a set of standardized metrics for 
impact measurement managed by the Global Impact Investment Network (iris.thegiin.org).
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Challenges facing impact investors in India
Overall, India presents a relatively favorable market for the entry and sustainability 
of impact investors, given its consistent economic growth, rich entrepreneurial 
culture, robust impact enterprise ecosystem, and demonstration of successful exits. 
Investors generally believe that, while certain challenges do exist, none are prohibitive 
to initiating an India-focused fund or making an impact investment in India. 
Nevertheless, these challenges are outlined below. 
Regarding entry into India, most challenges surround establishing an India-based 
fund. Funds based in India are subject to unfavorable and inefficient tax implications; 
as a result, due to tax treaties between India and other countries (for example, 
Mauritius or Singapore), fund managers often opt to establish these funds in foreign 
countries. Furthermore, in order to be an India-based fund, regulations require a 
minimum percentage of funds to be raised domestically (this percentage varies based 
on size of the overall portfolio). Raising domestic capital has historically been difficult, 
particularly when compared with raising foreign capital. While most fund managers 
find it an appropriate and manageable set-up to be based off-shore, a key drawback 
includes the lack of ability to provide debt financing as a foreign fund, which will be 
discussed further in this section.
Given a robust impact enterprise landscape, pipeline development in India is, 
on the whole, not seen as a major hurdle for investment; in fact, investors are 
becoming more proactive and strategic about their investments. Investors do 
not see a challenge in finding a sufficient number of investible enterprises in India. 
However, they do believe that there are a significant number of enterprises who do 
not have access to common investee/investor networks and therefore, do not receive 
equal chance of accessing funding as those that do. This differential access is likely 
to be driven by a variety of factors including language skills (those less comfortable 
with English are more disadvantaged) and location (rural entrepreneurs probably 
have less exposure to networks). As a result, investors are planning and willing to be 
more proactive in their search for investee organizations—not only moving towards 
a hypothesis-driven approach, as discussed above, but also committing a significant 
amount of resources to identify relevant organizations through field visits and active 
engagement on the ground. 
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FIGURE 15: CHALLENGES FACED BY INVESTORS IN INDIA
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The primary concern at the screening or due diligence stage of an investment is 
the lack of affordable and experienced vendors. While several large consulting 
companies offer due-diligence services, investors find that these organizations do not 
always have sufficient experience working with impact enterprises, particularly those 
operating in rural areas.
Structuring and managing an investment pose the greatest challenges to impact 
investors in India. At the deal structuring stage, the lack of ability for foreign 
investors to provide debt capital inhibits their engagement with investees, particularly 
early- or growth-stage organizations, who are seeking debt financing. Furthermore, 
potential mismatches between investor and investee preferences, particularly in 
terms of the investee diluting its ownership and relinquishing substantial control to 
the investor who takes a seat on the board of directors, often arises as a result of a 
lack of intermediary support. Support from chartered accountants and due diligence 
consultants has gone far in bridging the gap, and is likely to go even further as more 
players enter the market.
While managing the investment, several additional challenges arise. First, given that 
many investors do not have sector-specific expertise within their teams, they are 
unable to provide sector-specific technical assistance to their investees. Second, due 
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to the inefficiency of the Indian legal system, investors cite difficulty in enforcing 
contracts. Lastly, tax laws affecting impact investors in India change often, with 
varying implications for investments. 
Finally, while several exits in India have increased investor confidence, exits are not 
entirely without challenge. First of all, there have been few exits in sectors other than 
financial services, suggesting that sustainable models for exits in these sectors are yet 
to be seen. A significant amount of impact capital is tied up with these enterprises 
even beyond the planned exit timeline. Further, related to other issues for domestic 
funds that receive an initial capital investment from foreign investors, the repatriation 
process for capital upon exit is often difficult. Applications for repatriation need to 
be made to the Reserve Bank of India following an approval for disinvestment, and a 
“no objection” tax clearance certificate must be obtained from the Indian Income Tax 
Authorities.   
Beyond the impact investing market
While beyond the scope of this particular study on India—especially given the 
deliberate focus on impact investors in this market—it is important to acknowledge 
a considerable amount of activity peripheral to the impact investing space. As in 
other countries, the presence of other institutional investors, banks, private equity 
(PE) and venture capital (VC) funds, angel investors, pension funds, and other 
conventional investors is strong in India. These conventional investors often invest 
alone or alongside other impact investors into impact enterprises as well as other 
enterprises (without impact intention) in sectors with potential for positive social or 
environmental impact. More so than in other countries under study, in India, we see a 
potential blurring of the lines between impact investing and conventional investing, as 
an increasing number of impact enterprises are seen as financially viable investments, 
where financial profitability inherently drives impact.
Looking forward
While a quantification of future committed funds is not within the scope of this study, 
all evidence points toward an impact investing market that will continue to grow and 
be robust in the future. Several existing fund managers are currently raising new funds 
for investments in India, and DFIs have already announced plans to commit additional 
impact capital for future deployment in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars, 
through both indirect investment into funds and direct investments into enterprises. 
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NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES: 
THE DEMAND SIDE
Overview of impact enterprise ecosystem in India
The impact enterprise landscape in India has been described by various studies, 
including Intellecap’s 2012 Social Enterprise Landscape Report, GIZ’s 2012 Market 
Landscape of the Indian Social Enterprise Ecosystem, and ADB’s 2012 India Social 
Enterprise Landscape Report. Given the extensive literature already discussing 
the demand for impact capital in India, our aim is not to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the impact enterprise landscape, but to acknowledge the critical role that 
these enterprises play in driving trends and opportunities in impact investing in India. 
The rapid growth of impact enterprises in India began in approximately 2005, 
with a particularly high growth in the number, scale, and prominence of for-profit 
impact enterprises having occurred since 2010. Correspondingly, the last decade 
saw a similar growth trajectory of the amount of impact capital within the country. 
Most impact enterprises in India are in their growth stage, but the sector is 
relatively mature in comparison with its South Asian counterparts. Although 
examples of mature impact enterprises are limited, growth-stage companies have 
begun to achieve scale. In order to keep up with the growing sector and create a 
more formal establishment of impact enterprises in India, leading organizations came 
together in 2012 to create the National Association for Social Entrepreneurs (NASE) 
as a platform for advocacy. 
A majority of impact enterprises today operate in the following four sectors: 
financial services, renewable energy, agri-business and livelihoods. The single 
largest sector within which impact enterprises operate (approximately 21%) is the 
financial services sector.151 The demand for capital within the financial services sector 
is largely what has driven the flows of capital into the sector over the past decade, as 
outlined in the section above. The financial services sector has received a significant 
policy push from the RBI and the government, and should continue to grow rapidly. 
Aadhaar, the unique individual identification scheme of the government, and the 
RBI’s bank-led initiative for “a bank account for every Indian” might unlock potential 
for enterprises in this sector. Further, the adoption of technology-based services 
by the BoP, such as mobile payments, might also improve sector prospects. This is 
reflected in the optimism shown by impact investors towards this sector.
The renewable energy, agri-business, and livelihoods sectors each account for 15% 
of the total number of impact enterprises in India. Solar energy has been backed 
strongly by policy at the state and central levels in India, with the availability of 
attractive financing mechanisms. This has led to a growth in decentralized renewable 
energy and consumer product companies providing solar energy solutions. In the agri-
151 “Invest. Catalyze. Mainstream: The Indian Impact Investing Story,” Intellecap, 2014.
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business space, impact enterprises have tried to plug the severe inefficiencies in the 
agricultural supply chain in India, with a focus on empowering the smallholder farmer. 
Livelihoods companies such as rural business process outsourcing centers have tried 
to equip rural individuals with jobs and disincentivize migration to urban areas.
Healthcare, education, and technology-based services are trending sectors for 
the growth of impact enterprises in the future. In addition to other sectors in which 
impact enterprises operate, such as affordable housing and water and sanitation, 
the affordable healthcare space has seen a few impact enterprises achieve scale 
and maintain financial viability. Education represents a large opportunity; however, 
the sector is still being explored beyond vocational training. Challenges in the 
sector include difficulties caused by changing government regulations and poor 
infrastructure. Lastly, with the high level of mobile connectivity in India, enterprises 
that can deliver services via mobile devices are likely to have a huge opportunity to 
scale. This is likely to attract a large number of enterprises to this space.
Many impact enterprises now adopt the philosophy of impact as inextricably 
linked to profitability in their business models. Certain enterprises reject the label 
of a “social enterprise” or “impact enterprise” because of the association of these 
terms with the idea of not seeking profits. Some enterprises believe that the label 
reduces the attractiveness of a company seeking equity or debt from conventional 
financial institutions. As such, the boundaries between traditionally labeled impact/
social enterprises and mainstream enterprises may become increasingly blurred. 
Access to finance
Impact enterprises seek different financing instruments at various stages of their 
lifecycle. Grants and working capital loans are prioritized at an early stage, equity 
at early and growth stages and long-term debt at growth and mature stages. Due to 
availability of capital, however, enterprises are often forced to engage in investments 
that may not be optimal for their business, such as taking on equity at an earlier stage 
than is preferable because they cannot access debt. 
Depending on their stage of lifecycle, entrepreneurs face varying difficulties in 
accessing finance. In particular, seed-stage enterprises find it very difficult to secure 
finance, particularly in the form of working capital debt. As the impact investing 
sector matures, with a greater number of profitable exits and increasing investor 
confidence over time, the perceived riskiness of these seed-stage impact enterprises 
is likely to fall. Even for growth-stage enterprises that have received equity infusions, 
access to long-term debt is challenging. This is primarily due to the lack of lender-
accepted collateral, and the inability of these enterprises to meet the three years of 
profitability criterion of banks. Furthermore, in sectors that banks do not understand 
very well, such as renewable energy and sanitation, this issue is exacerbated.
Given the difficulty of working in rural areas and with BoP customers and 
producers, impact enterprises aim to grow revenue and profitability over a longer 
period of time than do conventional enterprises. Impact enterprises catering to 
BoP customers often have difficulty in payment collection. This is largely because 
their customers are unable to pay regularly and reside in hard-to-access rural areas. 
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As a result, these enterprises require a significant amount of time to achieve scale and 
ensure stable revenue flows. “Patient capital,” often provided by impact investors, is 
the best fit to address this need.
Although a fair number of impact enterprises have remained financially viable, 
fewer have achieved profitability. An Intellecap survey152 found that half of the 
enterprises surveyed had annual revenues of over INR 50,00,000 (approximately 
USD 83,000), in the financial year 2010-2011. A quarter of all enterprises in this 
sample reported being profitable over the same period. However, this is in part 
attributed to the fact that a majority of surveyed enterprises had been in operation for 
less than three years. 
Limited financial knowledge as well as a lack of adequate support in structuring 
financial deals are key constraints for impact entrepreneurs in India. Financial 
experts, such as chartered accountants and investment bankers, are beginning to 
support impact enterprises in the process of seeking capital, and structuring deals 
in a way that is most beneficial and least harmful to the enterprise. However, with 
few intermediaries such as these engaging in the process to date, impact enterprises 
often negotiate on their own and thus, lack the financial expertise that comes with 
having advisory support. In addition, with the lack of access to debt financing at an 
early stage in their lifecycle, impact enterprises often receive equity early on, which 
significantly dilutes their ownership and results in lower valuations than they might 
have achieved at a later stage. Impact enterprises openly advise that giving up 
controlling shares may lead to disagreements between the investor and the investee, 
and as a result, a loss of motivation and potentially a faltering business. Therefore, an 
opportunity exists for additional intermediary support organizations to bridge the gap 
between investors and enterprises.
The investor-investee relationship, beyond the point of deal structuring, experiences 
further tension at later stages during the relationship. Enterprises sometimes feel 
as though investors have expectations of returns that are difficult to meet, and that 
they play too heavy a role on the company board. However, while there is room for 
improvement, most impact enterprises, particularly those at early and venture stages 
of growth, prefer receiving investments from impact investors over conventional 
investors given mission alignment.
152 “On the path to sustainability and scale,” Intellecap, 2012.
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Constraints to enterprise growth
Acquiring operational and managerial skills, as well as recruiting and retaining 
quality talent, are key constraints acknowledged by impact enterprises in 
achieving scale and profitability. In several cases, entrepreneurs have deep 
content expertise and passion for their work, but may not have the business skills or 
experience required for financial success. Incubators and even investors who provide 
support and hand-holding often play a significant role in supporting organizational 
scale-up. A skill deficit in the talent pool, as well as a potential lack of focus on human 
resource development within impact enterprises, is another challenge to achieving 
growth and scale. 
The policy environment under which impact enterprises operate offers financial 
and technical support, but awareness about how to access this support is low. 
The Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI)153 and the National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD)154 are two domestic development 
banks that offer a variety of financial schemes for micro and small enterprises. 
However, knowledge of these schemes is low among many impact enterprises. 
Enterprises that are aware of these schemes are unsure of how to access them, or find 
that bureaucratic processes in their implementation restrict access.
Lastly, while India does provide a nurturing environment for impact 
entrepreneurs, the enabling factors for success are not necessarily accessible 
to everyone. India enjoys a far-reaching entrepreneurial spirit, opportunity for 
innovation across sectors, and several networks and forums for technical and 
managerial support. However, many entrepreneurs remain unreached, particularly 
those residing and working only in rural areas, those who have poor English language 
skills, those who do not have access to networks of well-connected individuals and 
organizations, and those who have simply not sought involvement from incubators or 
investors. To date, enterprises that are identified, funded, and showcased are often 
those who already are well connected or who specifically seek out funding. As a result, 
there exists significant untapped potential in identifying innovation through more 
proactive and different channels, given an investor’s appetite to do so. 
153 SIDBI is a public sector financial institution set up to aid the development of MSMEs
154 NABARD is the apex development bank in India. Its main focus is to uplift rural India by increasing the 
credit flow to the agriculture and rural non-farm sector. It is also active in developing a financial inclusion 
policy.
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ENABLING IMPACT 
INVESTING: THE ECOSYSTEM
Support services for impact investors and enterprises have evolved greatly with 
the entry of new types of players and the formation of platforms. Intermediaries 
and incubators focusing on impact enterprises have entered the market and have 
been growing in number and in scale. These intermediaries include (i) investment 
bankers, such as Unitus Capital, who help broker deals between funds and enterprises; 
(ii) specialized chartered accountancy (CA) companies that are in high demand in the 
market; and (iii) incubators such as Unltd India, Dasra and the Centre for Innovation, 
Incubation and Entrepreneurship that provide support to enterprises early on in their 
lifecycle. The intermediaries’ expertise lies in analyzing enterprise data and business 
models, conducting field visits to verify their information and completing the due 
diligence process. Incubators are instrumental in providing advisory services, such 
as developing a business pitch, and in connecting impact enterprises to the right 
networks. However, some experts believe that incubators should shift their focus to 
provide operational, management, and mentorship support to impact enterprises, in 
order to make the most impact. 
Portraying the maturity of the space, various platforms have been set up to connect 
impact investors, enterprises, DFIs and other relevant financial institutions. These 
platforms bring stakeholders to the table to share information and to plan advocacy 
efforts. For example, the formation of IIC and NASE has shown how investors and 
enterprises are organizing themselves to meet common goals. This is discussed in 
detail below. In addition, the Sankalp Forum has facilitated a common platform for 
stakeholders, from investees to investors to ecosystem players, within the impact 
investing landscape to interact with one another.
Figure 16 provides an overview of players who support the overall impact investing 
landscape in India. 
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FIGURE 16: ECOSYSTEM STAKEHOLDERS IN INDIA
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Domestic development banks SIDBI and NABARD also play a role in boosting 
SME financing activity. However, awareness of their programs remains low 
among some impact enterprises, while others believe that they are hard to 
access. Among SIDBI’s various activities, the Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro 
and Small Enterprises (CGTMSE) scheme and its subsidiary venture capital arm, 
hold significant potential to scale up finance to impact enterprises. SIDBI’s CGTMSE 
scheme provides credit guarantee support to collateral-free and third-party guarantee 
free loans. This enables SMEs, who usually struggle to have adequate collateral, to 
access unsecured loans of up to INR 10,000,000 (approximately USD 167,000). 
However, financial institutions are often apprehensive to provide loans under the 
CGTMSE scheme. This is largely due to the lengthy process involved in claiming 
their loan amount in the case of a default. In these cases, bank branch managers 
have no incentive to take accountability for defaults on loans their branch disbursed. 
Another shortfall is that many impact enterprises are unaware of the scheme. Of the 
few that are aware, most do not know how to access it, or perceive the process to 
be too lengthy. An improvement in these mechanisms would enable a scale-up of 
enterprise debt financing. 
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SIDBI VC, a key SME financing player, was set up in 1999 to provide capital and 
strategic advice for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Under SIDBI 
VC, a number of funds have been created to provide support to various sectors. Most 
notably for impact enterprises, the Samridhi Fund, created in association with DFID, 
aims to provide finance to sectors in which impact enterprises typically operate. The 
life of the fund is due to extend to June 2020.
As the apex development bank in India, NABARD has the opportunity to play a 
significant role in improving access to finance for impact enterprises, for example 
in the provision of soft loans. However, most impact funds and enterprises perceive 
NABARD to be a bureaucratic government organization from which it is difficult 
to obtain financing. Some impact enterprises are not even aware that they can get 
support from NABARD. Similarly, funds believe that NABARD’s sector involvement 
has been too limited.
The current regulatory environment, while not prohibitive to conducting 
business in India, does pose several constraints. First, investors find it difficult 
to operate with tax laws that change often, and with little to no prior notice. This 
affects investor profitability and financial activity. Adding to their concerns, under the 
General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR) of the Indian Government, investors can be 
taxed retroactively. Considering these factors, impact funds operate in an uncertain 
environment. Moreover, the RBI regulations do not cover the deployment of certain 
instruments, such as non-convertible preference shares, and foreign investors are 
limited in providing debt to Indian enterprises. In addition, market players express 
concerns over policies and regulatory requirements that differ across states in India, 
which force funds and businesses to incur seemingly unnecessary costs of compliance.
In terms of implementation, bureaucratic processes and red tape create significant 
costs and delays in opening and operating a business. According to the World Bank 
Doing Business Rankings 2014, India ranks 158th in the world in ease of starting a 
business, suggesting a potentially discouraging environment for new entrepreneurs. 
Subsidies and government schemes can also sometimes be deterrents to investing 
in and operating impact enterprises primarily due to delays in disbursement and 
bureaucracy in the selection processes for enterprises. Many funds are unwilling 
to invest in subsidy-dependent businesses for this reason. In the case of funds, 
challenges around enforceability of contracts and resolving insolvency if a portfolio 
company was to fail are a cause for concern. Many impact funds are concerned 
about the slow judicial process when resolving such disputes. As a reflection of these 
issues, India ranks 186th and 137th in enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency in 
the Doing Business Rankings for 2014. This makes funds particularly cautious when 
deciding whether to invest in a particular enterprise, as they perceive a higher risk on 
investments, reducing the number of deals they close.
While posing some constraints to the growth of the impact investing industry, 
the regulatory environment in India also offers several opportunities for impact 
investors. The SEBI has taken several measures to improve the regulatory framework 
for funds, and the financing avenues for SMEs. SEBI, as the capital market regulator, 
has been the focal point for improving investment conditions and the modernization 
of the Indian financial system. In 2012, SEBI approved the creation of Alternative 
Investment Funds (AIFs) in India for the purpose of pooling capital from Indian and 
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foreign investors for investing as per a pre-decided policy. “Social venture funds” 
(SVF) fall under the first of three categories of AIFs, entitling them to certain 
incentives from the government, SEBI, or other regulators as they are perceived as 
making a positive impact beyond financial returns.155 This provides a pathway for the 
creation of more domestic funds. For example, the domestic Incube Connect Fund is 
registered as an SVF.
Further, in 2013, SEBI amended the policy to mandate the creation of angel funds, 
paving the way for a formal framework under which angels can operate as an investor 
group. SEBI is also leading the establishment of an SME stock exchange with the 
primary aim of funneling more equity investment to SMEs. However, experts believe 
that awareness about SEBI’s schemes remains low among impact entrepreneurs and 
needs to be improved for impact enterprises to benefit from them.
Another incentive for foreign impact funds to operate in India is the tax treaty 
between India and Mauritius, which allows foreign direct investors to avoid 
certain taxes. As a result, a few leading impact investors with an India focus have 
their funds registered in Mauritius. This, however, prohibits the funds from engaging 
in debt transactions in India, as discussed above. 
In order to further advocate for a supportive regulatory environment, set 
industry standards and achieve common goals, impact funds and enterprises 
have organized themselves into separate organizations—IIC and NASE—as 
discussed above. In 2013, leading impact investors conceptualized the IIC, a non-
profit organization that aims to serve as a self-regulatory initiative and provide more 
information, standards and transparency for impact investing in the Indian context. 
This council comprises approximately 25 members of the industry including Omidyar 
Network, Caspian, Acumen Fund, and Elevar Equity. The expectations from this 
industry body will be (i) to collaborate to provide a unified view of the space and the 
impact being made, (ii) to address policy issues to provide a conducive market for 
investors to get consolidated information, and (iii) to set up a platform for dialogue. 
Currently, many impact funds see the IIC as a very effective localized body for policy 
advocacy and for sharing information. However, they note that the IIC is still in its 
early phases and has yet to establish a formal working body. Experts believe that the 
IIC’s success will hinge on building consensus among investors, which they believe 
could prove difficult.
Established in 2012 by successful social entrepreneurs across sectors, NASE has 
pioneered the creation of a platform that represents entrepreneurial interest. It was 
founded by Indian enterprises including Vaatsalya, RuralShores, EnglishHelper, and 
Husk Power Systems, with the goal of advocating, lobbying, and partnering with key 
stakeholders to improve the ecosystem for impact enterprises. NASE is also focusing 
on setting standards for impact enterprises in India and helping entrepreneurs scale 
rapidly. Identified by experts and market players as a key need, NASE aims to bring 
entrepreneurs together, share their learnings and help each other grow. These entities 
believe that if NASE can develop bargaining power for advocacy, it can improve the 
industry to a great extent.
155 Other types of funds that fall under AIF are SME funds, VC funds, and infrastructure funds.
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Overall, a rich entrepreneurial ecosystem makes India an attractive destination 
for impact capital, with a relatively mature enabling environment and bright 
prospects for the future. Compared with emerging economies, India’s impact 
investing industry is robust and growing. Since 2004, India has witnessed rapid 
growth in the inflow of impact capital and the number of funds with Indian investees. 
DFIs invest billions of dollars each year, and approximately 20 out of the 50 impact 
funds included in the study have allocated the majority of their portfolio (or, in some 
cases, their entire portfolio) to investing in Indian enterprises. These fund managers 
remain bullish on future prospects, while many plan to set up new India-specific 
funds in the near future. Co-investments from conventional investors demonstrate 
the feasibility of earning market rate returns on impact investment and suggests a 
potential mainstreaming of the sector in the next decade. Leading impact enterprises 
have achieved scale, and in the recent years, there have been at least 17 profitable 
exits from impact investments. These developments, along with a supportive 
macroeconomic environment, have built India’s reputation as a vibrant destination for 
impact capital. 
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DFIS
• Arsalan Alfred M. Ni and Sayef Tanzeem Qayyum, International Finance 
Corporation
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
• Ershad Hossain, The City Bank Ltd.
• Mominul Islam, IPDC
• Habib Yousuf, Habib Bank
ECOSYSTEM PLAYERS
• Farooq Sobhan, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute
• Samira Zuberi Himika, Team Engine
• Saifur Rahman, LightCastle Partners
• Jerry Nicholson, Open Accelerator
• Maroof Mohsin, Yunus Centre
• Mustafizur Rahman Khan, Samad Miraly, and M Fayaz Taher, The Wave
• Mahmudul Hasan Sohag, Onnorokom Group
• Muzaffar Ahmed, CRISL
• Serajul Islam, EEF
• Arif Khan, SEC
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• Md. Masum Patwary, Bangladesh Bank
• AK Chowdhury, Hoda Vasi Chowdhury & Co
IMPACT ENTERPRISES
• David How, Oasis Coffins
• Samantha Morshed, Pebble Child
• Minhaz Anwar, Better Stories
• Amer Khan, Magnito Digital
Annex 2—Survey respondents
FUND MANAGERS
• Subrata Mitra, Venture Investment Partners Bangladesh Ltd.
• Marten van Middelkoop, Incluvest
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
• Ershad Hossain, The City Bank Ltd.
• Mominul Islam, IPDC
ENTERPRISES
• Amer Khan, Magnito Digital
• Asif Saleh, BRAC Bank Ltd.
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Annex 1—Interview participants
FUND MANAGERS
• Bidhya Sigdel and Shabda Gyawali, Dolma Development Fund
• Willem Grimminck and Niraj Khanal, One to Watch
• Saurya SJB Rana, Tara Management Pvt. Ltd
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTION (DFI)/ INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION (IFI)
• Navin Dahal, DFID
• Deep Karki, Valentino Bagatsing, and Santosh Pokare, IFC
ECOSYSTEM PLAYER
• Vidhan Rana and Sanam Chitrakar, Biruwa Ventures
• Suman Rayamajhi, Eos Adivsors
• Prabhat Shrestha and Robin Sitoula, Lead International 
• Radesh Pant, Nepal Investment Board 
• Willem Grimminck, Rock Start
• Saurabh Rijal, Saadhya
• Niraj Giri and Mukti N. Shrestha, Securities Board of Nepal
ENTERPRISES
• Kumud Sing , Alpine Coffee Estate 
• Bhuwan K.C., Ecoprise
• Samir Newa, The Organic Village
• Anand Bagaria, Pro Bio-Tech Industries and Nimbus International Co.
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Annex 2—Survey respondents
FUND OR FUND MANAGER
• Willem Grimminck and Niraj Khanal, One to Watch
ECOSYSTEM PLAYER
• Solutions Consultant Pvt. Ltd.
ENTERPRISES
• Kumud Sing, Alpine Coffee Estate 
• Bhuwan K.C., Ecoprise
• Health at Home Pvt. Ltd.
• Anand Bagaria, Pro Biotec/NIMBUS
• Shree Krishna Livestock Devt. Farm
• WindPower Nepal
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Annex 1—Interview participants
FUND OR FUND MANAGERS
• Ahmad Jalal, Abraaj Group
• Saima Irtiza, Acumen Fund
• Ali J. Siddiqui, JS Group Private Equity Fund
• Valerian Fauvel, Insitor
• Ali Saigol, IndusBasin
DFIS/IFIS
• Waqas Hassan, DFID
• Faeyza Khan, IFC
• Fay Chetnakarnkul, Norfund
• Yasir Ashfaq, Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund
• Maryam Riaz, USAID
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
• Shoaib Ahmad, State Bank of Pakistan
• Rashid Bajwa, National Rural Support Program
• Atyab Tahir, Tameer Bank
ECOSYSTEM PLAYERS
• Fiza Farhan, Buksh Foundation
• Jeremy Higgs, Ecoenergy Finance
• Roshaneh Zafar, Kashf Foundation
• Asher Hasan, Neya Jeevan
• Kasloom Lakhani, Invest2Innovate
Annex 2—Survey respondents
FUND OR FUND MANAGERS
• Saima Irtiza, Acumen Fund
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SRI LANKA
Annex 1—Interview participants
FUND OR FUND MANAGERS
• Niroshan Kurera, Etimos Lanka Pvt. Ltd. 
• Indika Hettiarachchi, Jupiter Capital Partners
• Chandrien De Mel, Lanka Ventures PLC 
• Chanaka Wickramasuriya, LR Global
DFIS/IFIS
• Kamal Dorabawila and Dinesh Warusavitharana, IFC
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
• Senaka Kakiriwaragodage, National Development Bank PLC
ECOSYSTEM PLAYERS
• Steve Francone, Good Market 
• SA Deepthi Kumari, National Enterprise Development Authority
• Hastitha Assiriyage, SME.lk
ENTERPRISE
• Anura Atapattu, Berendina Microfinance
• Ausha Alles, Bradix
• Saman Kathuritathne, Herbal Health Ceylon
• Charith Jagoda, LOLC Micro Credit Limited
• Charitha Ratwatte Jr., Rural Returns
• Selyna Peiris, Selyn Handlooms
• Amanda Kiessel, Sevalanka Foundation
• Ara Pararajasingham, Sunshine Holdings
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FUND OR FUND MANAGERS
• Niroshan Kurera, Etimos Lanka Ptv. Ltd 
• Augustin Vitorica, GAWA Capital 
ENTERPRISE
• Shri Jayawardanapura
• The Bread Company
• WOOD 4 KIZ
• Flow Health Bar
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MYANMAR
Annex 1—Interview Participants
FUND OR FUND MANAGERS
• 1 Anonymous Private Equity Investor
• Bradley Kopsick, Insitor Capital
• Catherine A. Smith, Anthem Asia
• Oliver Belfitt-Bash, RONOC
DFIS/IFIS
• Thatha Hla, ADB
• Thomas Foerch, GIZ
• Vikram Kumar, IFC
• Daniel Kostzer, UNDP
ECOSYSTEM PLAYERS
• Mi Mi Myo Win and Tristan Ace, British Council 
• Emmanuel Maillard, Building Markets
• Thuta Aung, Hamsa Hub
ENTERPRISES
• Hannes Manndorff, Accion
• Cathy Win, Good Sleep
• Cathy Win, Good Night, 
• Cathy Win, Good Job 
• Allen Himes, Indigo Energy
• Zin Mar O and Sam Kang, Kant Kaw Education Center
• Steve Dowall, Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund
• Richard Harrison, PACT Myanmar
• M.T. Winn, Shwe Minn Tha
• Myo Win, Smile Education and Development Foundation 
• Wunna Aung, Sprinkles
• Cavelle Dove,Yangon Bakehouse
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ECOSYSTEM PLAYERS 
• Thuta Aung, Hamsa Hub
ENTERPRISES 
• Thuta Aung, Hamsa Hub
• Cavelle Dove,Yangon Bakehouse
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INDIA
Annex 1—Interview participants
FUND MANAGERS
• Vikas Raj, Accion Venture Lab
• Payal Shah and Suzanna Thekkekera, Acumen Fund
• Rema Subramanian, Ankur Capital
• Mona Kachhwaha, Caspian Impact Investment Advisors
• Sandeep Farias, Elevar Equity
• Venky Natrajan, Lok Capital
• Anand Chandnani, responsAbility
• Karthik Chandrasekar, Sangam Ventures
• Eleanor Horowitz, Unitus Seed Fund
• 1 Anonymous Private Equity Investor
• 1 Anonymous Venture Capital Firm
DFIS
• Tracey Austin, CDC
• Kunal Makkar, DEG
• Tony Bakels, FMO
• Jan Stilke and Florian Arneth, KfW
FOUNDATIONS
• Abhijit Nath, Michael Susan and Dell Foundation (MSDF)
• Govind Shivkumar, LGTVP
• Badri Pillapakkam, Omidyar Network
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ECOSYSTEM ACTORS
• Megha Jain, Dasra
• Pooja Warrier and Tej Dhami, UnLtd
• Anuj Sharma, ASCo
• Usha Ganesh, Intellecap
• Amit Kumar Rathi, Unitus Capital
ENTERPRISES
• Sonali Mehta-Rao, Mela Artisans
• Rajeev Kher, Saraplast
• 1 Anonymous Education Enterprise
• 1 Anonymous Financial Inclusion Enterprise
ABOUT THE GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK
The Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN®) is a nonprofit 
organization dedicated to increasing the scale and effectiveness 
of impact investing. The GIIN builds critical infrastructure and 
supports activities, education, and research that help accelerate 
the development of a coherent impact investing industry. For more 
information, see www.thegiin.org.
30 Broad Street, 38th Floor, New York, NY 10004  
+1.646.837.7430 | info@thegiin.org | www.thegiin.org
